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Abstract 
This thesis explores the impact of financial contagion following the outbreak of the recent 
global financial crisis. It provides a new and unified approach to identify contagion. The first 
aim is to investigate for financial contagion by accounting for the existence of trends in linkages 
between markets, due to progressing globalisation, and allows for a description of the progress 
of contagion across the crisis period. Based on different reactions of domestic markets to 
financial shocks originating abroad, the occurrence of contagion is categorised into three types: 
“shock”, “recoupling”, and “kink” contagion. The results for a sample of 25 stock markets show 
that the impact of the 2007-9 crisis was largely heterogeneous and countries were not uniformly 
affected: those markets, which experienced contagion, were affected in various ways, and those, 
which did not suffer from contagion, experienced the crisis episode in various ways, too. The 
second objective is to examine contagion effect at a sectoral level from the world and domestic 
financial sectors across 25 countries and the findings show that the impact of the 2007-9 crisis 
was largely heterogeneous and the real economy was not uniformly affected. At least one sector 
of all countries in our sample was affected during the crisis, either by global or their local 
financial sectors. Moreover, there is also evidence of more instances of contagion effects in 
non-financial sectors of developed economies as compared to emerging ones, and the Basic 
Material sector was more vulnerable to shocks from both global and domestic financial sector 
relative to other sectors. The final part of this thesis proposes a new approach to test for financial 
contagion, which accounts for the existence of day-of-the-week effects in returns. The existence 
of day-of-the-week effects in contagion form the U.S. for twelve European countries before and 
during recent financial crisis using synchronised data is examined.  The results show that 
countries did not experience contagion consistently during every day of the week; rather, excess 
co-movements happened only during certain days of the week. This model has the potential to 
disclose otherwise unobserved contagious effects, and to offer a more detailed picture of those, 
which could be identified using a more traditional approach. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1.Research Background and context 
This thesis is dedicated towards a novel approach to identify financial contagion. There have 
been numerous research studies conducted on this topic since financial crises have been 
unfolding across the globe. The international financial market has experienced several financial 
crises since the U.S. stock market crash in 1987, such as the Mexican peso crisis in 1994, the 
Asian Crisis in 1997, the Russian Crisis in 1998, the U.S. dot-com crisis in 2000, the U.S. sub-
prime crisis in 2007, and the European debt crisis in 2010. A common feature of these financial 
crises is that the dramatic shocks in the equity markets of the crisis-originating country can 
quickly spillover to other economies of different structures, sizes and development stages across 
the world. The dynamics of dependence in international equity markets have led economists to 
raise the question whether the high cross market co-movements during a crisis provide evidence 
of contagion. Hence the main motivation of studying contagion comes down to one basic 
question: If one economy sneezes, does the rest of the world catch a cold? And if yes, what is 
the best way to test for it.  
For the purpose of this thesis, I will be focusing on financial contagion during the 2007-2009 
financial crisis, which has led to the worst economic collapse since the Great Depression of 
1929 (Temin, 2010). The subprime mortgage market in U.S. where the crisis originated, was 
less than 4 percent of the financial system, according the Bank of International Settlement 
(2009).  Yet, this had a substantial impact in the U.S and around the world. The crisis rapidly 
spread across the economic sectors of both emerging and advanced economies around the 
world, mainly due to the interdependency of financial markets which has been stimulated by 
growing economic integration for the last 30 years. This interrelationship amongst markets has 
been fostered through a gradual liberalization of capital movements, deregulation of financial 
markets and new technologies in both developed and developing countries. And, despite the 
numerous benefits of financial globalisation, it can lead to crises affecting not only countries 
with weak fundamentals but can also have an impact on countries with sound fundamentals 
since crises can spillover to other economies through real links, financial links or market 
imperfections such as herding behaviour or panics. The severity of the 2007-2010 financial 
crisis affected both financial activities and macro-economic conditions around the globe, with 
long term consequences for economic development and growth. Hence a detailed understanding 
of the processes driving the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), and how this is transmitted, is both 
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topical and has important policy development implications for measures to deal with future 
crises.  
There have been several research studies which have proposed to capture the rational and 
irrational aspects of the spread of the financial crisis, following the seminal paper by King and 
Wadhwani (1990) and contagion is the term which mainly represents this stream of research. 
And until now there has not been a clear consensus on what precisely contagion signifies. For 
instance, King and Wadhwani (1990) defines contagion as “an increase in correlation during a 
crisis period relative to a stable one”. But the mostly commonly used definition is the one given 
by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) who describe contagion as “a significant increase in the cross-
market linkages after a shock to one or a group of countries” and use the term ‘shift contagion’ 
to describe this situation.  
Together with the disagreement on the definition of contagion, there is also controversy 
regarding the best method to empirically test for contagion, which can be summed up into two 
different categories, namely direct and indirect measurement. The first method involves 
measuring the presence of contagion by observing the fundamentals that drive spillovers. In 
other words, it requires economists to observe macroeconomic fundamentals (such as interest 
rates, financial constraints, policy responses, trade and financial openness) together with risk 
appetite, contingent contracts, amongst others (see for example, Baele et al., 2011; Bekaert et 
al. 2014). However, in practice, it is quite difficult to implement this method, as firstly, it is 
quite challenging to agree on which economic fundamental is more important and it is also 
impossible to measure certain fundamentals at the required level of granularity. Moreover, it is 
also difficult to obtain these data at high frequency level which is desirable to investigate for 
contagion.  
The second method involves observing and evaluating the symptoms of financial contagion. 
This is done by looking at the co-movement during a “normal” and the excess co-movement 
during a crisis, above the non-crisis period. In other words, it involves the examination of how 
different the propagation is during a contagious event, from the shock transmission that exists 
in normal times. The question which arises while employing the indirect procedure is that what 
defines “normal”? Previous research studies on financial contagion literature consider the 
period before the crisis occurred as normal, i.e. the pre-crisis period. And the standard approach 
in the literature is to test whether an empirical measure of linkages between markets differs 
significantly between tranquil and crisis periods (see for example, Baur, 2012; Kenourgios and 
Dimitriou, 2012). However, my observation is that those tests typically do not allow for those 
linkages to vary within each market state or account for the fact that they can vary across 
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different days of the week. Hence, existing results could be misleading or biased as they might 
falsely identify contagion where a higher level of spillovers in a crisis period would have been 
observed anyway, even in the absence of a crisis, due to long-term trends in financial integration 
among markets (e.g. globalisation). In addition to this, contagion does not occur consistently 
across the whole crisis period and it does not propagate to other economies simultaneously.  
Given the severity of the recent financial crisis and its impact across equity markets, and the 
real economy around the world, it is important to understand how to identify genuine contagion 
for effective portfolio management, risk management and policy market decision during a 
financial crisis. Consequently, this study uses a unique approach while employing widely 
acknowledged empirical methods to address the controversies and ambiguities regarding the 
identification of financial contagion. 
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1.2.Research Objectives and Contribution 
Given the above arguments, this study follows three main research directions. The first one is 
to investigate contagion within an international market perspective. More precisely, this thesis 
explores how international market linkages evolve during a crisis and post-crisis period, and 
test whether there is evidence of genuine contagion. I am proposing a method to empirically 
discriminate between genuine contagion and changes in linkages due to long-term processes 
such as globalisation, by looking at the propagation of the 2007-2009 financial crisis in the 
equity markets, financial sectors and non-financial sectors of 25 developed and emerging 
countries. This method enables to determine the difference between spillovers and contagion 
effect, in order to test whether the higher co-movements are driven by globalisation or result 
from the shock inflicted by a crisis episode. By showing the integration process of the world 
market with other economies across a period of 27 years, this method allows to determine 
whether there has been a positive integration (globalisation) before the crisis, and how was this 
relationship affected after a crisis was triggered (whether there was contagion or decoupling). 
In addition to this, the integration process is also examined during the post crisis period. As a 
result, I suggest a new meaning of contagion, whereby it refers to an excess co-movement 
between equity markets during a turmoil period, as compared to what the integration process 
between these two markets would have been if the crisis had not struck. 
The second research direction is detection of contagion at different phases of a crisis. Contagion 
has a heterogeneous impact on equity markets, financial and non-financial sectors, depending 
on various factors (for instance the regional proximity and the trade and financial linkages with 
the crisis originating country, their current account deficit, amongst others). Consequently, I 
hypothesise that the timing which a shock originating from one country affects other economies 
differs significantly, whereby some can experience contagion immediately after the outbreak 
of a crisis whereas others might not face any distress until a later stage of the crisis. Further, the 
impact of a shock might only be transitory for certain markets, while for others it might have a 
permanent impact. As a result, in this thesis, evidence of contagion is categorised into three 
types, namely, ‘shock’, ‘recoupling’ and ‘kink’ contagion. This characterisation allows to 
determine whether an economy or a particular sector experienced contagion on the onset of the 
crisis or at a later stage. 
The third major objective of this paper is to investigate the hypothesis that contagion occurs 
only intermittently, and not steadily across a turmoil period, as postulated by most research 
studies in financial contagion literature. The average increasing co-movement during a crisis 
have been examined in previous literature. However, contagion is not a phenomenon that 
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happens consistently across the crisis period. It might be more persistent on certain days of the 
week, due to short selling activities during the crisis, strengthening of the blue Monday effect 
following the crisis outbreak, and the surge in the number of investors taking a short view due 
to liquidity needs during the recent financial crisis might all lead to changes in the day of the 
week effect domestically, but also affect cross-border investment decisions. Moreover, 
announcements of macro-economic data on taking place on different days of the week might 
lead to contagion effect being different across weekdays, too. 
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1.3.Structure of the thesis 
This thesis has been divided into six distinct chapters, with an appendix section at the end of 
chapter 3, 4 and 5. The first chapter illustrates a brief overview on financial contagion and the 
recent global financial crisis. Moreover, the aims and contribution of this thesis are also 
elaborated. 
Chapter 2 expands on the different definitions given to the term financial contagion. Moreover, 
various methods, ranging from a simple probability analysis to more complex and robust 
technique such as the dynamic conditional correlations model used to investigate contagion are 
discussed. The potential channels (including both fundamental and behavioural aspects) 
through which contagion are transmitted across economies are reviewed in detail. The factors 
that have contributed to the intensification of these channels are also discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 is the first empirical chapter of this thesis and proposes a new approach to model 
contagion. It accounts for the existence of trends and linkages between markets, due to 
progressing globalisation, and allows for a description of the progress of contagion across the 
crisis period. Based on different reactions of domestic markets to financial shocks originating 
abroad, the occurrence of contagion is categorized into three types: ‘shock’, ‘recoupling’, and 
‘kink’ contagion. The results for a sample of 25 stock markets show that the impact of the 2007-
9 crisis was largely heterogeneous and countries were not uniformly affected: those markets 
which experienced contagion were affected in various ways, and those which did not suffer 
from contagion experienced the crisis episode in various ways, too. Contagion was also less 
common than could be expected based on the more commonly employed model with market 
interdependencies assumed constant within sub-periods. 
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of the crisis on the real economy of 25 countries. Studying 
contagion effect at a sectoral level is important mainly because the returns dynamics of sectors 
are not all identical and some are more vulnerable to shocks compared to others because of their 
industrial structures. In this chapter, the same contagion model as in chapter 3 is employed and 
also classifies contagion into three distinct types. Following the fact that the 2007-2009 
financial crisis has not only affected equity markets, but also financial and non-financial sectors 
across the global, this chapter sets out to examine contagion effect at a sectoral level from the 
world and domestic financial sectors across 25 countries. The findings show that despite there 
might be no evidence of contagion at a country-level, the real economies of a country might be 
showing signs of contagion effects. In addition to this, I also look at whether the real economy 
of emerging or developed country are mostly affected and which sectors are more vulnerable 
to crises.  
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Chapter 5 on the other hand, combines insights from two vast but previously disjointed strands 
of the finance literature, on financial contagion and of days-of-the week effects in stock returns. 
I postulate that any conclusions on the existence and severity of financial contagion derived in 
the literature so far may be misleading or incomplete, as the prevailing testing approach fails to 
account for the existence of seasonalities in daily stock returns, as any approach treating all 
weekdays equally may fail to recognise those contagious but infrequent days. The chapter starts 
off with the examination of the Monday effect puzzle, whereby, stock returns are lower on 
average on Mondays as compared to other days of the week during the recent financial crisis 
across 13 developed economies. In addition to this, spillover and contagion effects from U.S. 
to 12 European economies across the days of the week are also explored. The findings show 
that there is substantial evidence of disappearing Monday effect. As far as the results regarding 
contagion effects are concerned, they show that contagion does not happen during all days of 
the week but may happen only during certain specific days of the week, which might be as a 
result of short selling activities, investors’ perceptions and the announcements of macro-
economic data taking place on different weekdays. 
And the final chapter concludes the findings of all the empirical chapters and describes the 
potential future and limitation of this research. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 2.1. Definition and Theories of Contagion 
The disagreement on whether there is any evidence of contagion or not, arises since there is a 
lot of disagreement on a definition of contagion and also on an appropriate technique. 
Regardless of the choice, whether to investigate in the first or second moment of market 
movements, it is crucial to precisely define the term contagion. And, there are numerous 
definitions attributed to the term contagion. The World Bank (2016), for instance summarizes 
the definitions into three categories. The first one is a broad definition by the World Bank, refers 
to the “cross-country transmission of shocks or the general cross-country spillover and that 
takes place both during good times and bad times”.  Under this definition, contagion can be 
transmitted through real or financial linkages, so that it is sometimes called fundamentals-based 
contagion (Calvo and Reinhart, 1996). These forms of co-movements may reflect normal 
interdependence, and do not need to be related to crises, despite they are emphasised during 
periods of crises. 
The second definition is a more restrictive one, as it refers to the “transmission of shocks to 
other countries or the cross-country correlation, beyond any fundamental link among the 
countries and beyond common shocks”. And, lastly, the third definition of contagion given by 
the World Bank is a very restrictive one, and states that “contagion occurs when cross country 
correlations increase during crisis times relative to correlations during tranquil times” and is 
most commonly used in recent empirical analysis to identify and measure financial contagion 
(Dungey et al. 2005; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), among others.  
One of the very preliminary research studies on contagion was conducted by King and 
Wadhawani (1990) and they describe contagion as increase in correlations between markets 
after an idiosyncratic shock to one market because information is perfectly revealed.  Pericoli 
and Sbracia (2001), on the other hand list five definitions of contagion, namely: “1) when there 
is an increased probability of crisis in a country, given the existence of a crisis in another 
country; 2) when volatility is propagated as a proxy for uncertainty from the crisis of a country 
to the financial markets of other countries; 3) when there is an increase in co-movements in 
prices and quantities between markets, given the crises in one or more markets; 4) when there 
is a change in the transmission mechanism or channel for contagion, with the intensification of 
the same after the crisis and 5) when there are co-movements that are not explained by the 
fundamentals.”  
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However, the most common definition of contagion is the one given by Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002) who refers to contagion as a “significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock 
to one country (or group of countries). According to this explanation, if two markets show a 
high degree of co-movement during periods of stability, even if the markets continue to be 
highly correlated after a shock to one market, this does not constitute contagion. It is only 
contagion if cross-market co-movement increases significantly after the shock.” Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) also used the term “shift contagion”, which occurs when the normal cross-
market channel intensifies after a crisis in one country. “It is only shift-contagion if the 
correlation between the two markets increases significantly. And if the co-movement does not 
increase significantly, then any continued high level of market correlation suggests strong 
linkages between two economies that exist in all states of the world.” Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002) use the term interdependence to describe this situation. The advantage of their definition 
is that it provides a simple way to test for the existence of contagion occurs. The linkages 
between two markets just have to be compared (for instance, cross market correlation 
coefficients) during a relatively stable period with linkages directly after a shock. The second 
benefit is that it provides a straight-forward method of distinguishing between alternative 
explanations of how crises are transmitted across markets. A similar definition is proposed by 
Dornbush, Park and Claessens (2000), whereby contagion is a “significant increase in cross 
market linkages after a shock to an individual country (or group of countries), as measured by 
the degree to which asset prices or financial flows move together across markets relative to this 
co-movement in tranquil times.” 
Karolyi (2003) defines contagion as “irrational co-movements” which are the residual in a 
model, after controlling for “fundamentals-based co-movements” (from real and financial 
linkages) and “rational investor-based co-movement” (from rational investment decision 
making by financial agents). And, according to Hartmann et al. (2004), contagion relates to a 
“situation where there is a significant increase in the conditional probability of having a crash 
in one market, given one occurred in another.” On the other hand, contagion is defined by 
Bekaert et al, (2014) as “the co-movement in excess of that implied by the factor model, i.e. 
above and beyond what can be explained by fundamentals taking into account their evolution 
in time.” 
 
It can be noted from the above descriptions of contagion that until now there has not been a 
universal definition for contagion adopted in the literature. Moreover, there is still an on-going 
debate on contagion transmission channels and the best way to identify this phenomenon.  
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2.2. Channels of Contagion 
According to Forbes and Claessens (2004), the literature on international stock market co-
movement can be divided in two broad groups, namely the fundamental causes and investors’ 
behaviour. The fundamental causes explain the spillovers that arises because of normal 
interdependence among economies. This mechanism of contagion consists of trade and 
financial linkages, changing nature of businesses, and common shocks. And according to 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) when a crisis originates in one country, this interdependence of 
economies becomes a carrier of crisis through real and financial linkages. Moreover, there have 
been numerous factors which have contributed to the increasing interdependence, for instance, 
innovations in information and communications technology, financial liberalisation, decreasing 
transaction costs, and availability of new financial instruments, such as futures and options. The 
increase in co-movement resulting from the channels of transmission mentioned above cannot 
be defined as contagion, unless they occur during a period of crisis and their impact is adverse.  
And, on the other hand, the behavioural causes show how investors’ behaviour is different in 
turbulent and tranquil times. Under this definition, contagion can occur during a crisis but is 
not linked to observed changes in macro-economic or other fundamentals but is only as a result 
of investors’ behaviour. This type of contagion is often said to be caused by “irrational” 
phenomena, such as financial panics, herding behaviour, loss of confidence and change in risk 
perception. However, these phenomena can be rational individually but still exacerbate the 
severity of a crisis. 
Distinguishing between the fundamental and behavioural based contagion is important as they 
have different implications (Gebka and Serwa, 2007; Forbes, 2012), as it enables economists 
and policy makers to know by which channel contagion is being transmitted to other economies, 
to take appropriate action to reduce the impacts of crises as far possible. The remainder of this 
section summarizes this extensive literature on channels of contagion. 
2.2.1. Fundamental Causes 
 
(a) Trade Linkages and competitive devaluations 
Interdependence amongst countries or sectors are more likely to increase if there is the existence 
of trade linkages. For instance, if Country X exports a large amount of its production of cars to 
another Country, Y. A shock in Country Y, will have a negative impact on the revenues of the 
automobile industry in Country X, following a decrease in demand of cars and a fall in the stock 
prices of Country Y. And eventually the prices of automobile-rated stocks in Country X will 
decline. Forbes and Chinn (2004) found that “direct trade flows are important determinants of 
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financial market co-movements while analysing emerging markets.” Johnson and Soenen 
(2003), on the other hand, examined the U.S stock market in relation to eight Latin American 
markets, and came to similar conclusions. Forbes (2012) shows that since 1990, trade exposure 
has considerably increased globally. She also points out that there has been a substantial rise in 
trade, especially in Euro area countries, and hence these countries are now more exposed to 
trade relative to other developed economies. And the trends in trade exposure could lead to 
increasing interdependence over time, which might potentially accentuate contagion effect 
when an adverse shock hits the country.  
Another contagion transmission channel is competitive devaluations. Devaluation of currency 
in a country affected by a crisis reduces the export competitiveness of the countries with which 
it competes, thus pressurising on the latter’s currency, especially when those currency do not 
float freely (Zhang et al., 2013). According to Corsetti et al. (1999), “a game of competitive 
devaluation can prompt a sharper currency depreciation compared to that required by any initial 
deterioration in fundamental and a non-cooperative nature of this game might accentuate this 
depreciation relative to what could have been achieved in a cooperative equilibrium. If market 
participants expect that a currency crisis will lead to a game of competitive devaluation, this 
will result into them selling their holdings of securities of other countries and curb their 
lending.” For instance, during the East Asian crisis whereby there was a considerable 
depreciation of the exchange rate even in economies that did not seem to be vulnerable, for 
example, Singapore, Taiwan and China to a speculative attack based on their fundamentals.  
(b) Common Bank Lenders 
This theory of common bank lenders was advanced by Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002). They 
assume that a single bank is lending to two countries, whose outputs are, in principal unrelated. 
In other words, it is assumed that there are no real linkages, but only financial linkages are 
present. The outbreak of a crisis in one country might affect its banks’ balance sheet, thus curtail 
lending to the second country. This reduction in service (e.g. contraction direct lending, 
insurance, provision of liquidity, etc.) to the second country has real effects, and in the end, this 
affects asset prices and exchange rates. Hence, since both countries are receiving financial 
services from a common financial institution, they are interrelated. For example, Arvai et al. 
(2009) found evidence that Austria, Germany and Italy play the role of common lender to 
countries in Central, Eastern and South-East Europe.  
 
The theory of common bank lenders can also be applied to margin calls, liquidity aspects or 
wealth effect. Instead of a banking sector, the financial intermediary in the latter cases is the 
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capital market. An example has been given by Calvo (2002), whereby a shock in one country 
lowers the value portfolio holdings of the intermediary. The result of a fall in wealth would 
therefore induce the financial intermediaries to sell off assets in the same asset class due to 
either higher degree of risk aversion or they are subject to margin calls. These theories were 
developed after the Asian crisis in 1997 and Russian crisis in 1998, to better understand 
contagion transmission. 
 
(c) Cross-market rebalancing  
A financial shock in a country might prompt investors to rebalance their portfolios for liquidity, 
or risk management purposes. This happens since the outbreak of a crisis in a country will 
encourage investors who have positions in that country to reduce their risk exposures and as a 
result lead to a sale in assets whose returns have high correlations with those of the assets in the 
crisis originating country. For instance, consider an economy with three markets: X, Y and Z; 
assume that X and Y share exposure to one macroeconomic risk factor, whereas Y and Z share 
exposure to a different macroeconomic factor. A shock in market X may prompt investors to 
rebalance their portfolios in market Y (because of their common risk exposure), which in turns 
prompts investors to rebalance their portfolios in Z. As a result, the shock transmits itself from 
X to Z, although the two markets do not share exposure to the same risk factor (i.e., their 
fundamentals are independent). 
 
Investors may also be tempted to sell liquid assets in such circumstances for other reasons. For 
instance, according to Kodres and Pritsker (2002) the diminishing value of assets of in crisis 
country lead to a need to raise cash to meet margin calls. Moreover, while conducting an 
experimental analysis to analyse cross-market rebalancing, Ciprani et al. (2013) confirmed the 
fact that the rebalancing channel is an important element in creating cross-market contagion. 
 
(d) The global nature of businesses 
Cavaglia et al. (2001) examined cross-border mergers and acquisition and show that mergers 
and acquisitions have grown from $40 billion per annum during the period from 1989 to 1993 
to $400 billion per annum during the period from 1994 to 2000. By using a factor model, Brooks 
and Negro (2006) claim that “if a firm raises its international revenues by 10%, it will increase 
its exposure to global shock by 2% and simultaneously reduces exposure to local shocks by 
1.5%.” Moreover, a shock to the multinational firm influences the price of stocks of all its 
subsidiaries simultaneously around the world. Hence undoubtedly, an increase in mergers and 
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acquisition and multination corporations around the world would aggravate the impact of a 
crisis. 
 
(e) Common Shocks 
The global phenomena or common shocks, such as changes in “U.S. interest rates, slowdown 
in world aggregate demand, a decline in commodity prices, or changes in the bilateral 
exchanges” between countries can have a negative impact on the economic fundamentals of 
several economies concurrently and may lead to the occurrence of a crisis (Rose and Wyplosz, 
1996). An example of a common shock is the substantial dollar appreciation between 1991 and 
1995 and the long-lasting slowdown in Japanese growth, which have contributed to the 
weakening of numerous sectors in Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, Babetskii et al. (2007) 
confirms that common shocks are indeed seen as a cause of stock market co-movements in their 
study of financial integration of four European Union members (the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia) with the Euro area. 
 
2.2.2. Behavioural Aspect 
From the previous section, i.e. the fundamental-based contagion, it could be observed that the 
spillover of a crisis to other economies depends of the degree of integration, whether it is in 
terms of financial markets or trade linkages. Therefore, it can be implied that more financial or 
economic integration will lead to a more extensive contagion effect to other countries or sectors. 
However, this does not mean that countries that are not financially or economically integrated 
(maybe due to capital controls or lack of access to international financing) are not immune to 
contagion. For example, even though there was no clear trade relationship between Mexico and 
Argentina, the later still suffered from the Mexican crisis in 1994.  
 
Hence other than the fundamental causes for the international stock co-movement, there is the 
behaviour of investors, which is much harder to measure and dealt with. Even though, in 
economic theories, the behaviour of economic agents is assumed to be rational, it is a well-
known fact that economic agents and investors behave rationally as well as irrationally. The 
last thirty years has witnessed major changes in financial globalisation, in terms of market 
liberalization together with a decline in familiarity and home bias, which meant that the 
importance of investors has also been growing as they have started to trade globally. 
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(a) Liquidity Problem and incentive problem 
Another factor that can explain an increase in stock co-movement is the liquidity problem of 
investors. For instance, Frank and Hesse (2009) show that during the recent financial crisis, 
hedge funds that held asset-backed securities were induced to sell more liquid assets to meet 
margin calls, thus transmitting market stress.  
Hence, if an institutional investor faces losses in a country, she might be motivated to dispose 
risky assets in other countries to meet the demands of her customer who offload their stake in 
the investor’s company. Further, if the investor is more leveraged, she tends to sell riskier asset.  
 
(b) Information asymmetries and Herd Behaviour 
Imperfect information and differences in investors’ expectations is another potential cause of 
contagion. For instance, where better information is absent, investors might have the belief that 
the existence of a financial crisis in one economy can lead to financial shocks in other nations. 
This behaviour which arises from information asymmetry is not necessarily irrational. Since 
investors are not fully informed about each country’s true characteristics, they therefore make 
their decisions based on some known factors, which may not necessarily reflect the state of the 
vulnerabilities of the country.  
 
Herd behaviour and general loss of confidence are other possible causes of stock market co-
movements. According to Calvo and Mendoza (2000), “information asymmetries and fixed 
costs involved in gathering and processing country-specific information” could lead to herd 
behaviour which is rational. In their model, they differentiate between two types of financial, 
namely the uninformed and informed one.  
 
The uninformed one, usually depicted by small and middle investors, incur more costs to gather 
relevant information and hence follow or consider the investment decisions of the better-
informed investors, which they provide useful information. Moreover, in the case of 
informational cascades, trading by other parties can be considered to contain superior 
information about assets, hence it may be a rational strategy to suppress one's prior beliefs and 
follow the market. 
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(c) Wake-up calls 
The wake-up-call hypothesis was first put forward by Goldstein (1998) to explain contagion 
from Thailand to other Asian countries in the Asian crisis. He argues that the other countries 
were affected by the same structural and institutional weaknesses as Thailand (for e.g. weak 
banking system) but investors ignored those weaknesses until the Thai "wake-up call”. 
 
According to Goldstein (1998), “wake-up calls may happen because investors are not focused 
on or aware of certain vulnerabilities, or because fundamentals only become problematic during 
a crisis thereby generating multiple equilibria. Weaker fundamentals or even just increased 
concern about a country’s fundamentals could also strengthen various channels of contagion.”  
For instance, a shock in the financial sector of Country X might lead to a fall in the funding 
given to banks in other countries, which can eventually lead to a wake-up call and countries 
with weaker fundamentals might even face bank runs.  
 
Goldstein (1998) also states that “the wake-up calls can involve many forms of reassessment 
including not only the macroeconomic, financial or political characteristics of the country but 
also the functioning of financial markets or the policies of international financial institutions.” 
For instance, a country’s terms for debt restructuring could provide information on how other 
countries would be treated in similar circumstances. A re-examination of the functions of 
financial markets or policies taken by international institutions could cause investors to sell 
assets across countries, thereby causing contagion. 
 
More recently, Bekaert et al (2014) confirms the “wake-up call” hypothesis, they that there has 
been evidence of contagion from domestic stock markets to individual domestic stock 
portfolios, with severity inversely related to the quality of the countries’ economic 
fundamentals and polices.  
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2.2.3.  Factors contributing to the intensification of contagion channels  
 
As mentioned above, there are numerous channels through which contagion might occur, and 
they can be categorised into fundamental-based and behavioural aspect. In addition to this, there 
are various factors which have intensified the contagion channels among countries and they are 
as follows: 
(a) Liberalization in Global trade of financial services 
Financial markets have become more interdependent during the past 30 years. This has led to a 
steady liberalization of capital movements, deregulation of financial markets and new 
technologies in both developed and developing countries.  Despite of the numerous advantages 
of financial liberalization, many research studies (e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998 and 
Williamson et al. 1999) show that almost all banking crises have been associated with financial 
liberalization. This is because economies have become more interrelated, following the 
developments of the financial market and as a result domestic markets have become less 
isolated and react almost immediately to new information from the international market. This 
international linkage among markets are more likely to impact investors negatively, especially 
during a financial turmoil. According to Caprio et al. (2000) one possible explanation could be 
that financial liberalization exposes the risk and poor performance of pre-liberalization 
portfolios. 
 
(b) Consolidation and Conglomeration  
Financial institutions have been consolidating at a rapid pace over the past decade. In order to 
survive global competition, many banks are looking for strong partners in international markets. 
This bank consolidation process has been encouraged by both the governments and by the 
integration in the unified economic and monetary unions. For instance, according to Wilmarth 
(2008), policies taken by the government in the U.S., U.K. and Europe has encouraged 
consolidation and conglomeration within the financial services industry during the last two 
decades which consequently led to the formation of seventeen large complex financial 
institutions, known as the LCFIs, which dominated both domestic and global markets for 
securities underwriting, syndicated lending, asset-back securities, over-the-counter derivatives 
and collateralized debt obligations. Moreover, the countries mentioned above, and some 
European nations experienced an enormous credit boom between 1991 and 2007, and the LCFIs 
played a leading role as direct lenders and securitizers for nonprime home mortgages. And 
nonprime borrowers had to keep taking out new loans to pay off their old ones. Hence, when 
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house prices stopped rising in 2006 and collapsed in 2007, defaults skyrocketed, as borrowers 
could not refinance, and this subprime financial crisis began. 
 
(c) Globalisation and dependence on international capital inflows 
As shown by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), during the last decades, restrictions have been 
lifted in both emerging and developed economies and there have been different factors 
contributing to the growing financial globalisation. For example, governments have been lifting 
restrictions on domestic financial institutions and the capital account of the balance of payment. 
There are indeed benefits of globalisation, such as financial development. However financial 
globalisation can also contribute of spillovers of crises, not only in economies with weak 
fundamentals, but also those with sound fundamentals, as countries have become more 
integrated into the world financial markets. For instance, globalisation can contribute to crises, 
if there are financial market imperfections. According to Schmukler et al. (2003), imperfections 
in financial market may lead to herding and irrational behaviour amongst investors and 
speculative attacks. Moreover, countries might be more prone to crises if they rely on foreign 
capital. For instance, a sudden shift in foreign capital flows might lead to financing problems 
and economic downturns. And according to Reinhart (1999), these shifts are not necessarily 
dependent on a country’s fundamental but might be due to global factors such as world interest 
rates, economic cyclical movements, and a global drive towards diversification of investments 
in major financial centres, amongst others. Moreover, according to Broner et al. (2003) when 
countries depend on short term capital inflows relative to their ability to generate cash on short 
notice, they become more vulnerable if there are sudden reversals of capital flows and this 
might lead to liquidity crises. 
 
(d) Financial Innovations 
Financial innovations can hold unknown risks, because of their complexity and various ways 
used to measure risks. For instance, “the use of credit derivatives for hedging or speculative 
purposes imply numerous risks, such as: credit risk, counterparty risk, rating agency risk, and 
settlement risk” (Gibson, 2007). For the last two decades, financial innovation has facilitated 
the transfer of risk associated with mortgage risks, which has mostly been transferred via 
securitization and sold to investors globally. And since many financial institutions did not have 
an effective risk management during 2007-09 financial crisis, the turmoil on financial markets 
was widespread. And the problem was that risk management did not advance at the same pace 
as financial innovation. Hence the prevalence of complex and opaque financial instruments, 
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fuelled at times by poor management and government interventions worsen the consequences 
of the crisis on both advanced and emerging economies.  
 
(e) Development of new technologies.  
“Constant technological improvements and the development of internet banking and brokerage 
services over the past decade has led to globalization to go beyond the limits of the ownership 
structure of financial conglomerates and reach the retail markets”, (Balino and Ubide, 2000). 
Many banks are using their online operations in order to get into the foreign markets thus 
avoiding expensive establishment of overseas departments. “In addition, the emergence of 
virtual banking, e-service development has created the opportunity to develop non-bank 
financial institutions which carry out basic banking functions as well” (Račickas and 
Vasiliauskaitė, 2011). 
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2.3. Previous Findings    
2.3.1. Testing for Contagion  
 
There are numerous approaches that have been used to measure different features of contagion 
and/or interdependence. In this section, some of the most commonly used methods namely: 
probability analysis, cross market correlation, vector auto-regression (VAR), and dynamic factor 
analyses are discussed. Some research uses the combination of more than one of the above methods. 
 
(a) Probability Models 
One of the earliest approaches for testing contagion are probability models which assess the 
probability of a crisis conditional on information elsewhere, considering fundamentals or 
similarities.  
The probability model tests were introduced by Eichergreen et al. (1996) and are used to 
examine channels of contagion by differentiating, among others, trade and financial links. 
Eichergreen et al. (1996) showed that financial contagion is more likely to spread through trade 
linkages compared to macro-economic similarities between countries by using a probit model 
and a panel of quarterly macroeconomic and political data covering 20 industrial economies 
from 1959 through 1993. This approach has been extended by Forbes and Warnock (2012) to 
test for the role of contagion in explaining sharp movements in capital flows and by Constancio 
(2012) to investigate probabilities of contagion resulting from credit default swaps. Probability 
models are commonly used as a method to test for contagion, as it readily allows for statistical 
evidence. However, the disadvantage is that they have limited success in controlling for 
endogeneity and omitted variables that could simultaneously cause events to occur in multiple 
countries. 
 
(b) Correlation Coefficient  
One of the most preferred method used by economists to capture and measure co-movement is 
correlation. “As per this approach, if two markets are closely and naturally correlated during 
stable periods, then, during a crisis, the impact of a shock from one market to another will lead 
to a considerable rise in the stock market co-movements which signifies contagion. And, on the 
other hand, if there is no major change in the relationships after a shock to one market, and the 
stability in the transmission system persists, then market co-movements can be assumed to be 
driven by strong real linkages between two economies. Such stability in parameters indicates 
interdependence over time. Therefore, based upon the above assumptions, contagion means that 
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cross-country linkages are basically different after a shock to one market while interdependence 
means no real change in relationships” (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). 
 
King and Wadhwani (1990) and Lee, Kim and Park (1993) were the first one to carry out 
preliminary test for financial contagion. Their test was based on a simple comparative analysis 
of Pearson’ correlation coefficient between market in the tranquil and turmoil periods, to assess 
the effect of the U.S stock crash in 1987 on the stock markets in the U.K., Japan, and various 
other countries. Their results support the evidence of contagion by depicting that the correlation 
coefficients between several markets significantly rose during the crash. Correlation tests were 
also used by Calvo and Reinhart (1996) whereby they find co-movement of weekly returns on 
equities in Asia and Latin America higher after the Mexican crisis relative to the pre-crisis 
period.  
 
However, numerous researchers have pointed out some loopholes pertaining to the 
conventional “correlation” technique while structural changes are being tested. They state that 
significant increase in correlations among markets may not be sufficient proof of contagion. If 
markets are historically correlated, this means that a sharp change in one market will naturally 
lead to changes in other markets, and therefore correlation during a crisis will increase. For 
instance, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) states that “the correlation coefficient between markets is 
in fact conditional on market volatility and during a period of crisis when there is increasing 
stock market volatility, the unadjusted estimates of cross market correlations will be biased. 
This can wrongly lead to accept that contagion occurred. In addition to this stock prices mostly 
suffer from problems such as heteroscedasticity. More specifically, heteroscedasticity in 
movements of asset prices might cause the estimated cross-market correlations to rise after a 
crisis, although there is no rise in the underlying correlations.” 
 
(c) Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) Analyses  
Unlike probability models, VAR analysis considers the endogeneity of different economic 
variables when examining interdependencies among economies and analyses the dynamic 
impact of random disturbances and describes the assessment of a set of endogenous variables 
in the system as a linear function of their past evolution. “VAR models are more often presented 
with impulse response functions that test for the effects of the different shocks in one variable 
on the other variables, and variance decompositions that measure the relative importance of the 
different shocks to the variation in the different variables” (Sims, 1980). Granger causality tests 
are often used in the VAR analysis to decide the endogeneity of the variables.  
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Kim, Lee, and Park (2009) used a VAR model to examine on the level of economic 
interdependence which exists between emerging Asian nations and developed countries 
including Japan and the U.S. Their findings show the evolution of macroeconomic 
interdependence between the developing and developed economies under study through 
changing trade and financial linkages at both the regional level and the global level. Moreover, 
using the VAR model, Angkinand, Barth, and Kim (2010) also employed a VAR model to 
examine the interdependence among developed countries. They point out a significant increase 
in interdependence over time and that the spillover effects from the U.S to other industrial 
countries have been substantial during the recent financial crisis. And more recently, a study by 
Zhang (2011) examines the effect of U.S. stock market movements on Asian markets during 
the recent financial crisis using VAR analysis and find that the U.S. equity market has a stronger 
impact on the Asian equity markets during the crisis.  
 
Shortly, after the Asian crisis in 1997, an extension of the VAR model was developed, and it is 
referred to as the Global Vector Auto-regression approach. It was used to test the impact of 
macro-economic developments on the losses of major financial institutions, (Chudik and 
Pesara, 2016). It follows a two-step approach, whereby the country specific models are firstly 
estimated conditional on the rest of the world. Secondly, individual countries VAR model are 
put together and solved simultaneously as one large G-VAR model. Chudik and Fratzscher 
(2011a) have employed a G-VAR approach to examine the transmission of global liquidity 
shocks and shocks to investor’s risk appetite on equity markets during the recent financial crisis. 
And more recently, Beirne and Gieck (2014) employ a G-VAR to analyse how the transmission 
mechanism between assets (equities, bonds and currencies) over 60 economies may change 
during periods of crises, over the period 1998 to 2011. Their findings indicate that emerging 
economy equity markets are much more integrated to global equity markets than the integration 
of emerging bond markets with global bond markets and the integration of emerging currency 
market with global currency markets. 
 
As established earlier, one of the advantages of employing a VAR model for examining 
interdependence and contagion effect is that it provides a systematic approach that imposing 
restrictions and recognises endogeneity among variables and as a result, captures relationships 
which are often hidden to standard procedures such as OLS regressions. However, one of the 
downsides of this method is that the robustness of the VAR estimations depends on a plausible 
setup on the endogenous assumptions among variables.  
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(d) Copula Approach 
Copula (Schweizer and Sklar, 1983) is a multivariate probability distribution which has uniform 
marginal distribution of variables are also a common method to test for contagion. This method 
is mostly employed to examine dependence structures after extreme events. Copulas are part of 
a joint distribution dependence structure and they model the dependence between variables in 
a flexible way and independently of the marginal distribution.  
Over the past decade, they have been numerous research papers employing copula method to 
analyse the integration process between markets and contagion effects. For instance, Patton 
(2006a) developed the concept of time varying copulas which allows dependence to vary over 
time and also depend on a set of conditioning variables. Time-varying copulas was also adopted 
by Candelon and Manner (2007) in order to investigate asset market contagion during the Asian 
crisis. And, a two-step approach is employed by Rodriguez (2007). He uses a univariate 
SWARCH model firstly to determine two volatility regimes, namely the low and high volatility 
regime corresponding to a turmoil and normal period. In the second step, copula models are 
estimated, based on a dummy variable which represents representing the volatility regimes in 
the “ground-zero” country. The dependence parameters across the two volatility regimes are 
then compared using a standard likelihood ratio test. And more recently, Ye et al. (2012) have 
used the Archimedean copula method by examining the tail dependence coefficient for 
measuring the degree of financial contagion between the U.S and Asian markets during the 
recent banking crisis. 
 
(e) ARCH/GARCH Framework 
Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986) were amongst the first one to model financial time series 
through a univariate ARCH and GARCH models and stochastic volatility models as well. And 
Hamao et al. (1990) were amongst the first to use the ARCH/GARCH framework in order to 
test for contagion. They have looked at intraday stock market returns from 1985 to 1987, and 
by using a GARCH (1,1)-M model, they found evidence of volatility spillover effect from U.S 
and U.K. stock markets to the Japanese stock markets.  
 
And since then, there have been various GARCH models used in literature to investigate for 
contagion. An extension of the GARCH model is the (Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle, 1993) 
GJR GARCH model, which has been used by Baur (2012) to investigate contagion effects, 
accounts for possible asymmetric impacts of positive and negative shocks on the volatility of 
the markets. Another variation of a GARCH model is the DCC (Dynamic Conditional 
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Correlations) – GARCH which has been developed by Engle (2002) provides time-varying 
correlation between economic variables. One of the benefits of using a DCC-GARCH models 
is that it accounts for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of the variables while conducting 
time-varying calculation of correlations. The “2008 Global Financial Stability Reports” (IMF, 
2008) employs a DCC-GARCH to analyse the co-movements in stock markets between the 
U.S. and emerging economies and found increasing correlation levels during the past several 
years up to 2008. Overall, GARCH models has proved to be more robust than the static 
correlation models, especially for looking at financial variables which often face greatly 
changing volatility, and in this thesis, a GARCH model will be employed. 
 
2.3.2. Integration and Time Varying Betas  
 
In the third and fourth chapter of this thesis, the time-varying integration process amongst 
equity markets are also examined. Examination of time-varying dependence structures in 
international equity markets has attracted increasing attention of theorists, empirical 
researchers, and practitioners recently. This is mainly since over the past three decades, there 
have been major changes in the world financial markets, in terms of increasing globalisation, 
lesser trade barriers, growing economic relation around the world and competition and more 
cost effect transportation system and improved technology. And as a result, one could expect 
increasing financial market integration. 
The literature on stock market interrelationships and integration is fairly rich (for e.g. Baele et 
al. 2014; Bekaert et al. 2014; Ibrahim and Brzesczynski, 2014). The deregulation of capital 
movements in the early 1990s has resulted into systematic interrelation of the major financial 
markets. This dependence shows the growing similarities in reactions towards macroeconomic 
policies or financial crises. However, the empirical evidence is diverse depending on the data, 
methodology and theoretical models used. Shabri Abd Majid and Kassim (2009), for instance, 
examined the stock market integration among the U.S. stock market and the Indonesian and 
Malaysian markets over the period from February 2006 to December 2008, and found that these 
three markets tend to show more integration during crisis period. Moreover, Wu et al. (2015) 
investigate interdependence based on daily data from July 1997 to July 2010, among nine Asian 
Stock Markets (Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
China, and India) and the U.S. market. Their empirical results show that during the recent 
financial crisis, the U.S. stock market was co-integrated with the Asian Stock market. On the 
contrary, Roca (1999) and Smyth and Nandha (2003) showed that global markets are weakly 
interlinked.  
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Baele et al. (2010) are one of the first to examine European market integration and contagion 
after the recent financial crisis. They use model with both structural instruments and a latent 
regime variable and finds that both global and regional market comovement have substantially 
increased over the last 30 years, indicating a considerable progress in the degree of European 
market integration. According to them, one of the factors that strengthened this integration 
process even further is the introduction of Euro and adds that the overall increase in integration 
with world for the European markets being studied is relatively larger than for regional 
integration. However, they do not find evidence of contagion during any of the crisis periods 
they consider, namely the Mexican crisis, the Asian crisis, the Russian crisis, the Nasdaq Rash, 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the (start of the) subprime crisis, and during periods of high market 
volatility. They claim that contagion test results are vulnerable to suboptimal specifications for 
the dynamic factor model. For instance, the specifications with constant global (regional) 
market exposures incorrectly identify contagion during the 1987 crash, Asian crisis, the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, the (start of the) subprime crisis, and during periods of high global market 
volatility. Similarly, the findings show that contagion test results can differ substantially 
depending on how the time variation in both the structural and cyclical component of the factor 
exposures is modelled.  
 
Bekaert et al. (2014) is another study that examined the integration process and contagion 
during the recent financial crisis. They develop a three-factor model to set a benchmark for 
what the global equity market co-movements should be, based on existing fundamentals, as 
compared to Baele et al. (2010), who uses a two-factor model. Their model distinguishes 
between a U.S specific factor, a global financial factor, and a domestic factor for pricing of 415 
country-sector equity portfolios across 55 countries and define contagion as the co-movement 
in excess of that implied by the factor model. Their benchmark factor model is also referred to 
as an “interdependence” model, and it implies a transmission of shocks proportional to the 
factor exposures, as measured pre-crisis. Contrary to Baele et al. (2012), they find significant 
evidence of contagion during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. They also use their framework to 
differentiate amongst the channels of contagion and to explain the heterogeneity on contagion 
Moreover, they find that the globalisation process may have gradually increased the U.S and 
global banking sector factor exposures over time but it may have also led to decoupling during 
the crisis as globalisation reversed due to the substantial decrease of trade integration, capital 
flows, and financial integration. However, Bekiros (2014) results find that, there has been an 
increase in international integration for BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) 
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during the financial crisis. Bekeart et al. (2012) also observe that countries with weak 
fundamentals (such as poor sovereign ratings, and high fiscal and current account deficits) were 
more vulnerable to shocks from both from U.S. and from the domestic market and were overall 
more severely affected by the global financial crisis than countries with good fundamentals. 
However, good government policies implemented during the financial crisis, such as debt and 
deposit guarantees and through capital injections into domestic banks have helped to protect 
the domestic banking sector, and hence reduced domestic contagion.  
In the same line as Bekaert et al. (2014), Støve et al. (2014) also found financial markets have 
become more and more interlinked in the past decades while examining the impact U.S to other 
economies during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Their results show that the dependence 
between U.S. and European markets have increased during the 2007-2009 crisis compared to 
the stable period.  
As far as time-varying correlation, there are many recent literatures (for example, Aloui, Alissa, 
and Nguyen, 2011; Syriopoulos and Roumpis, 2009) that have investigated this issue among 
developed and emerging markets and analyse related diversification benefits. The main 
conclusions of these literatures are that the benefits of international diversification come from 
weak correlation between developed and emerging markets, and the time-varying correlation 
has significant impact on this benefit. Moreover, Bianconi et al. (2011), and Kenourgios et al. 
(2011) show that after the recent financial crisis, there has been a general trend of increasing 
correlations, but they fail to suggest if the impact of the crisis on correlation pattern was short 
or long lived. This is important, as a permanent change means that there will crucial 
implications for the management of the international stock portfolios.  
 
As mentioned above, there are two contradicting views regarding how a financial crisis changes 
the existing links between international stock markets. The first one is that the effect a shock 
on correlation levels may be permanent. According to Minsky (1992) crises can have major 
impact on the fundamentals of an economy and a financial shock might lead to structural 
changes to the financial markets. The same conclusions are found by Whalen (2008). On the 
other hand, there is the view that there is only a temporary change in the correlation levels 
following the occurrence of a crisis. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) suggest the impact of crisis on 
correlation will often be short term and not long-lasting pattern. Additionally, while 
investigating the impact of the recent financial crisis on global banking, Shehzad and De Haan 
(2013) find there has only been a temporary shock in the stock prices of banks in emerging 
26 
 
countries and the prices recovered fairly quickly. However, the stock prices of banks in 
industrial countries remained at a lower level, relative to the pre-crisis period.  
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2.4.  Summary  
In this chapter, the theoretical backgrounds of the contagion effect, the channels by which they 
are transmitted from the country where the crisis has originated to other economies were 
discussed. Additionally, the methods used by various research studies for assessing the presence 
of contagion are outlined. Moreover, previous literature on integration and time varying 
correlation of stock market are compared. 
 
From the above literature and findings, it can be observed that there is still controversy which 
remains regarding the best method to empirically distinguish between contagion and 
interdependence, and whether markets are integrated. The standard approach in the literature is 
to test whether an empirical measure of linkages between markets differs significantly between 
tranquil and crisis periods. However, my observation is that those tests typically do not allow 
for those linkages to vary within each of market states. Hence, existing results could be biased 
and, e.g., falsely identify contagion where a higher level of spillovers in a crisis period would 
have been observed anyway, even in the absence of a crisis, due to long-term trends in financial 
integration among markets (e.g. globalisation). Another way by which exiting literature might 
be biased is by identifying contagion during the crisis period and assuming the transmission of 
shock during a crisis is identical across the whole crisis period and all days of the week.  The 
model proposed in this study discriminates empirically between genuine contagion and changes 
in linkages due to long-term processes such as globalisation. Another issue that this research 
addresses is that whether the shock transmission mechanisms return to their previous state once 
a financial crisis has passed, as some studies suggest that a crisis changes the connectedness 
between markets permanently (Gebka and Karaglou 2012) while others assume that post- and 
pre-crisis linkages are identical (Baur, 2012). However, even those research studies which 
report a change seem to be ignoring the fact that linkages would have evolved even if there was 
no crisis. Hence, different spillovers before and after crises might simply illustrate the 
progressing globalisation rather than the impact of crises on interdependencies between 
markets. Another issue with previous literature is that they look at the average co-movement 
during a crisis period, and hence generating a yes or no answer to contagion. The findings 
pertaining to such research studies might be misleading for diversification purposes, as 
contagion is a phenomenon that occurs intermittently over a crisis period. As a result, instead 
of looking at overall contagion during a turmoil period, this study explores financial contagion 
at different stages of a crisis and over the different days of the week. 
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Chapter 3: Financial Contagion: A new approach robust to trends in 
globalisation and interdependence  
3.1.Introduction 
In this chapter, I propose an improved approach to identify financial contagion, by accounting 
for the existence of trends on the linkages between equity markets, due to continuing 
globalisation. One existing strand of the literature model contagion as an increase in otherwise 
constant linkages between markets, whereas another strand attempts to explicitly model the 
relationship between financial linkages and economic fundamentals. The proposed model is a 
straightforward method which accounts for trends in financial linkages without the need for 
explicit modelling of their dependence on changes in fundamentals and allows for a description 
of how contagion evolves during a crisis period, thus bringing together two strands of the 
existing literature.  
 
The outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007 attracted vast interest of academics, 
practitioners, policy makers, and the public in the topic of financial contagion. And as discussed 
in the previous section of this thesis, there are several core issues that remain ambiguous and 
unresolved, even though there have been several academic studies on contagion. Firstly, there 
is no commonly accepted definition of contagion; for instance, the World Bank (2016),  offers 
three different explanations, Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) identify no fewer than five definitions 
of contagion proposed in the literature, and Forbes (2012) lists eleven research studies, each 
with its distinctive definition of contagion. Secondly, and related, there are multiple distinct 
empirical methods proposed to test for the existence of contagion, including conditional 
probabilities (e.g.,  Rose and Wyplosz, 1996, Hartmann, et al., 2004), correlation analysis (e.g., 
Forbes and Rigobon, 2002, Brière et al., 2012, Støve et al., 2014), VAR models (e.g., Climent 
and Meneu, 2003, Rigobon, 2003, Gebka and Serwa, 2006, Blatt et al., 2015), multivariate 
GARCH models, often involving endogenous regimes in parameters (e.g., Hamao et al. 1990, 
Gebka and Serwa, 2007, Chiu et al.,  2015, Dungey et al., 2015), etc. 
 
Regarding the definition of contagion, a consensus appears to be forming that interrelationships, 
or return spillovers, among stock markets worldwide are a natural and rational phenomenon, as 
countries are linked to each other by economic fundamentals, such as foreign trade and FDI, 
common bank creditors, and actions of portfolio investors. These investors can rationally 
respond to common news, liquidity shocks, changes in wealth inducing risk aversion variations, 
or can hedge against macroeconomic risks. Hence, it can be rational for stock markets to move 
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together over time, and for those co-movements to be stronger, e.g., in times of high volatility. 
Only if those co-movements become excessively high and cannot be attributed solely to 
changes in fundamental links between markets, can financial contagion be assumed (Forbes 
and Rigobon., 2002, Karolyi, 2003, Boyer et al., 2006, etc.).  
 
One problem of such a definition immediately becomes apparent, however: how can one 
discriminate between fundamentals-based (i.e., rational) and contagious (i.e., excessive) 
spillovers? One branch of the literature proposes to explicitly model the dependence of inter-
market linkages on observed variables which proxy economic fundamentals, such as exchange 
rates, foreign trade, state of the banking system, macroeconomic condition of the domestic 
economy, industry structure (mis-)alignment, informational links with the world, etc. (Ng, 
2000, Bekaert et al., 2005,2014 and Baele, Inghelbrecht, 2010). Contagion is identified in this 
approach when, for example, idiosyncratic country shocks derived from such a factor model 
are still dependent on foreign markets during crisis, or when there is an unexpected increase in 
those residual correlations or factor loadings, that is, if changes in those fundamentals explicitly 
accounted for cannot fully capture the observed dependence of one market on another. 
However, firstly, it is not clear which precise variables should be included in such a model to 
fully capture the impact of fundamentals on interdependencies among markets, which will lead 
to possible model misspecifications due to omitted variable bias and potential incorrect 
inference about existence of contagion. Secondly, as many empirical proxies of fundamentals 
are only available at low frequencies, a researcher is left with either too few observations in the 
crisis period (when fitting the model to low frequency data), or high persistence and low 
volatility of explanatory variables (when regressing high frequency stock returns on low 
frequency economic variables), especially if the crisis period under investigation was short.  
 
An alternative approach to capture contagion is to test for a significant increase in co-
movements between markets in the crisis versus the pre-crisis period, so allowing utilisation of 
higher frequency data. Using raw correlations for this purpose, as in King, Wadhwani (1990), 
can result in biased inference, however, as correlations tend to rise simply due to an increase in 
volatility in one market, even if the strength of the links between markets’ returns has not 
changed. Hence, either adjusted correlations are employed (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), or, 
alternatively, a measure of co-movements, the slope coefficient from a regression of one 
market’s return on another, is investigated for an increase during crisis. The latter approach 
appears very popular in the literature. The common feature of these approaches is that they 
assume constant co-movements within each sub-period.  
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However, empirical studies demonstrate that co-movements between markets’ returns vary over 
time and tend to follow upward trends due to progressing globalisation (e.g., Brière et al., 2012, 
Baele and Inghelbrecht, 2010, Pukthuanthong and Roll, 2009, Carrieri et al., 2007, Bekaert et 
al., 2011).1 In addition, linkages between markets during the crisis period are not time-invariant 
either, as several research studies identify different phases within crisis episodes (Chiang et al., 
2007, Fry-McKibbin et al., 2014, Dungey and Gajurel, 2014, Dungey et al., 2015, Kenourgios 
and Dimitriou, 2015). Hence, a model with constant pre-crisis and crisis co-movements (betas) 
could lead to biased inference about existence of contagion, as it might falsely identify 
contagion where a higher level of spillovers at the end of the sample period would have been 
observed anyway, even in the absence of a crisis, due to long-term trends in financial integration 
among markets (e.g., globalisation). Further, it would fail to capture the time-varying nature of 
those movements and the possible contagion within the crisis period, as those would have been 
assumed to be constant throughout the crisis. 
 
This chapter contributes to existing literature in several ways. Firstly, a new method to 
empirically discriminate between contagion and changes in linkages between financial markets 
which only occur due to long-term processes such as globalisation or disintegration is proposed. 
This approach does not require an identification of fundamental variables, and is applicable to 
easily available, higher-frequency return data. Secondly, the model employed in this paper 
allows contagion to occur only during specific stages of the crisis. Thirdly, rather than 
generating a yes/no answer to the contagion question, it allows us to distinguish among different 
types of contagion, which we term ‘shock’, ‘recoupling’ and ‘kink’ contagion. In addition to 
this, statistical tests for each of these forms is also conducted. Lastly, the empirical analysis of 
the 2007-9 episode shows that genuine contagion was less common than what could have been 
concluded using standard approaches, and that it occurred in different forms and at different 
phases of the crisis period in different countries. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes the methodological 
framework to differentiate among different types of and test for financial contagion. Empirical 
methodology and data are presented in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, respectively, whereas Section 3.5 
describes the results and Section 7 summarises our findings and concludes. 
                                                             
1 Reversals of globalisation, or disintegration, and no trends in integration are also possible, but empirically less 
relevant in my dataset, as demonstrated in the empirical part. Even if I mostly give examples based on progressing 
globalisation, my model is flexible and allows for any trend, positive or negative, or lack of trends in the integration 
process.  
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3.2. Methodology Framework 
3.2.1. The Sub-period Specific Constant Spillovers Model 
 
The starting point is the following model of financial contagion which assumes spillovers 
parameters to be constant in sub-periods (as, e.g., in Baur (2012)): 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑊,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡,𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡  (3.1) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denotes stock returns in country i at time t, 𝐷𝑡,𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆  is a dummy variable equal to 
one during the crisis period and zero otherwise, and  𝑅𝑊,𝑡 is the return on the world stock market 
index at time t. The estimated coefficients 𝛽 measure the average impact of world market 
returns on returns in country i during the non-crisis (𝛽1) and crisis (𝛽1 + 𝛽2) period. Contagion 
is defined in this approach as a significant positive change in the impact of the world stock 
market returns on individual country’s returns during the crisis period, i.e., 𝛽𝟐 > 0.  
 
There are several implicit assumptions underlying this model. Firstly, it assumes pre- and post-
crisis periods to be identical in terms of the effect the world market exerts on country i (i.e., 𝛽1 
is implicitly assumed to be identical pre- and post-crisis). Since in (3.1), 𝛽2 captures the change 
in average return co-movement over and above the non-crisis period (i.e., both pre- and post-
crisis), but contagion is defined as an increase in β as compared to the pre-crisis period, if the 
pre-crisis and post-crisis periods’ βs are different, the coefficient 𝛽2 as given by model (3.1) 
will be biased.  This biasedness will increase with the length of the post-crisis period and/or the 
degree of difference between pre-and post-crisis periods. Secondly, this model imposes a 
restriction that the intercept term, 𝛼0, is constant across subperiods, confining all the effects 
from the crisis to manifest themselves in the slope coefficient 𝛽𝟐. Hence, it rules out, for 
example, a level shift in conditional country’s i returns caused by the crisis, which can result in 
biased estimates of parameter 𝛽2 and incorrect inference about the existence of contagion. 
 
Furthermore, (3.1) assumes that the links between the world and the national market are 
constant within each sub-period (i.e., 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are not time-varying). This feature does not 
allow for trends in financial linkages, as measured by 𝛽, prior to, during, and after the crisis 
period (due to, e.g., progressing globalisation), nor does it allow contagion to evolve during the 
crisis period. As mentioned in Section 3.1, contagion might be short-lived, and although 
perhaps being evident for part of the crisis period, model (3.1) will only capture contagion if its 
effect is strong enough to dominate the entire crisis period. And yet, if contagion is evident for 
even a short time, a robust test should be able to identify it. Below, I propose an extension to 
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model (3.1) and provide a detailed demonstration of how a model such as (3.1), which assumes 
sub-period constant linkages, can mis-specify the existence of contagion. 
 
3.2.2. The Globalisation Model 
 
To address the potential issues identified with model (3.1), I propose a new model which is 
referred to as the ‘Globalisation Model’: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑡,𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑡,𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆  + 𝛽1𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡,𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆  +
𝛽3𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡,𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                    (3.2) 
where   
𝛽1𝑡 =  𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑡   (3.2A) 
𝛽2𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑡  (3.2B) 
𝛽3𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑡  (3.2C)  
and 𝐷𝑡,𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆  equals one in the post-crisis period and zero otherwise. Eq. 3.2 also contains 
an additional variable, the time trend “t” 
 
If 3.2A, 3.2B and 3.2C are substituted into 3.2, it leads into the following model to be estimated: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑡,𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑡,𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆  +𝛿0𝑅𝑊,𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡 + 𝛾0𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡,𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆  +
𝛾1𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡,𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 +  𝜃0𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡,𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝜃1𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡,𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
 
The resulting parameter estimates, 𝛿0, 𝛿1, 𝛾0, 𝛾1, 𝜃0, and 𝜃1, which are referred to in Figure 3.1 
are then used to construct the “beta” estimates as defined in 3.2A, 3.2B and 3.2C. They also 
enable to obtain an estimate of any parameter “beta” at any point in time “t”. For example, if 
the crisis starts in week 𝑡 = 𝜏1, the point estimate of  𝛽1𝑡 at  𝑡 = 𝜏1 can be obtained by 
substituting 𝑡 = 𝜏1 into 3.2(A) to obtain 𝛽1𝑡 =  ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑡 . This will assume a specific value 
(for week 𝜏1) and the same procedure can be employed to estimate any “beta” at any given 
point in time “t”.  
 
The most important feature of model (3.2) is that it allows for a (linear) temporal development 
in the level of integration 𝛽 between the stock market of country i and the world, a process 
which can be different in each sub-period. This is achieved by allowing each parameter 𝛽 to be 
a function of time t.2 In the pre-crisis state, 𝛿1 measures the pace of globalisation, while in the 
                                                             
2 Here, long term trends in market integration are modelled as linear functions of time. More complex, non-linear 
processes could be imposed, but at a risk of capturing transitory variations in market integration trends rather than 
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crisis period, the difference in the pace of globalisation from its pre-crisis trajectory is given by 
𝛾1; post-crisis, the difference in the pace of globalisation from the pre-crisis period is given by 
𝜃1. Hence, the new model, (3.2), allows for temporal variation of 𝛽𝑡 within each subsample, 
addressing an issue with (3.1) described above. Figure 3.1 shows an example of a diagrammatic 
representation of how these coefficients can be considered in terms of the temporal 
development of 𝛽𝑡 parameters. 
 
Figure 3.1: Coefficients of the Globalisation Model (3.2) 
 
In summary, model (3.2) addresses all the main concerns identified with model (3.1) and is a 
more flexible specification than that those assuming sub-period specific constant integration 
levels, as represented by (3.1). It should be noted that model (3.2) nests (3.1): if 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛿1, 𝛾1, 
and 𝛽3𝑡 are all constrained to be zero, then model (3.1) results. Only where this is the case, 
would there be no potential misspecification bias in using (3.1) as opposed to (3.2). Model (3.2) 
differs from (3.1) in a number of respects. First, it allows for differences in the impact of the 
world on the national market between the pre- and the post-crisis period, as modelled by distinct 
coefficients 𝛽1𝑡 and 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡, respectively. Hence, the post-crisis period is not assumed to be 
identical with the pre-crisis one (𝛽3𝑡 can be different from zero). 𝛽2𝑡   in Model (3.1) represents 
change in co-movement over and above the non-crisis period. And if the pre-crisis and post-
                                                             
genuine long-run processes. Moreover, the first week of the crisis period (i.e. Week 1451) is represented by 𝝉𝟏 in 
this study. And 𝝉𝟐 and 𝝉𝟑 represents the last week of the crisis period and first week of the post crisis period, 
respectively. 
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crisis period are treated as the same, this might result into potential overestimation or 
underestimation of 𝛽2𝑡. 
 
The underestimation of 𝛽2𝑡 might arise if there is an increase in the co-movement between the 
World stock market portfolio and the individual countries’ stocks during the post crisis. As it 
can be seen from Figure 3.2A below, if 𝛽3𝑡 is higher during the post crisis period, it suggests 
that 𝛽2𝑡  has been underestimated in the first model. The dashed line shows the level of co-
movement between the World Stock Market portfolio with the stock returns of the individual 
countries during the pre-crisis period by using Model (3.1), where the pre and post crisis period 
were assumed to be identical. The solid lines, on the other hand, represent the level of co-
movement between the World Stock Market portfolio and the individual markets, across the 
different regimes (i.e. pre-crisis, crisis and post crisis period), by using Model (3.2). Hence, 
treating the pre and post crisis as identical might lead to biased contagion result.  
 
And on the other hand, if 𝛽3𝑡 is lower on average during the post-crisis period, it might lead to 
potential overestimation of 𝛽2𝑡 if the pre-crisis and post-crisis were treated as the same (i.e. by 
using Model (3.2.1)). This is displayed through Figure 3.2B below. 
 
Figure 3.2: Underestimation and Overestimation of 𝛽2𝑡 from model (3.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Figure 3.2A      Figure 3.2B 
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other words, all changes were being captured by the  𝛽𝑡 even if the intercepts were changing, 
which might lead biased 𝛽𝑡 coefficients and contagion results. However, if the intercept is 
varied across time, i.e. a dummy is assigned for the constant term during the crisis and the non-
crisis period, this might potentially lead to more reliable estimates of contagion. 
 
And thirdly, given the specification of (3.2), the degree of stock market integration, 𝛽𝑡, is not 
assumed to be constant over time in each sub-period (as was the case in (3.1)), but can evolve 
over time as a result of, for instance, increasing globalisation in the pre-crisis period. In model 
(3.1) with constant sub-period betas, contagion was defined as a significant increase in 𝛽 due 
to crisis’ outbreak (𝛽𝟐 > 0). However, if 𝛽 is, for example, increasing over time due to 
progressing globalisation, then the average 𝛽𝑡 in the later part of any sample will always be 
higher than the average 𝛽𝑡 in the earlier part of the same sample, even if there was no crisis 
towards the end of the sample (or if the crisis was present but did not affect the financial 
integration process 𝛽𝑡). Hence, (3.1) will tend to find “contagion” (defined as an increase in 
average 𝛽𝑡) even when there is none, provided there is a process of increasing integration. 
Therefore, we define contagion not as an increase in average 𝛽𝑡 but as existence of higher values 
of 𝛽𝑡 in the crisis period compared to what would have been expected if the evolution of 𝛽𝑡 
observed pre-crisis continued unaffected into the crisis period. 
 
To further explain this definition of contagion, which accounts for pre-crisis trends in financial 
interdependence as measured by 𝛽𝑡, as well as the difference between the identification of 
contagion in model (3.1) versus (3.2), Figure 3.3A and 3.3B provides examples of two 
hypothetical stock markets, assuming no post-crisis period for simplicity. The solid lines show 
values of 𝛽𝑡 coefficients implied by model (3.2), in pre-crisis (?̂?1𝑡) and crisis (?̂?1𝑡 + ?̂?2𝑡) period. 
The dotted lines represent average values of 𝛽𝑡 in both subperiods, as would have been 
measured by model (3.1):  ?̂?1 and (?̂?1 + ?̂?2). The dashed line in the crisis period indicates β 
values which should be expected in the “crisis period” if there had been no impact of the crisis 
on the process of market integration (i.e., no contagion), and is obtained by extrapolation of the 
pre-crisis process in β (i.e., 𝛽𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑡 +𝛽2𝑡 =  𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑡, assuming 𝛾0 = 𝛾1 = 0 in (3.2)). In 
example A, 𝛿1 > 0 but (𝛿1 + 𝛾1) < 0; in other words, the process of integration or 
globalisation reverses following the outbreak of the crisis at time 𝑡 = 𝜏1.  
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Figure 3.3: Difference between model (3.1) and (3.2) 
 
 
        Figure 3.3A    Figure 3.3B 
It is evident that the outbreak of the crisis has affected the financial integration process (solid 
line), as, in example 3.3A, there is a discontinuity in 𝛽𝑡 at crisis’ start, and the intertemporal 
behaviour of 𝛽𝑡 has changed in the crisis as well (market i increases its integration with the 
world market pre-crisis but is dis-integrating from it in the crisis period). In addition, 𝛽𝑡 values 
in the first phase of the crisis are not only higher than pre-crisis but also higher than they would 
have been (dashed line) if the crisis had no effect on the financial integration process (𝛽𝑡). 
Hence, one would conclude that there is evidence of contagion. However, using a definition of 
contagion that the average level of financial spillovers (𝛽𝑡) is higher following the outbreak of 
a crisis (as in (3.1)), one would incorrectly conjecture that there was no contagion, as the 
average 𝛽𝑡 during the crisis period is lower, not higher, than the average pre-crisis 𝛽𝑡 (dotted 
lines).  
 
Example 3.3B provides another demonstration of differences between model (3.1) and (3.2). 
This time, a negative shock to the financial integration process (𝛽𝑡) at crisis’ start (t=𝜏1), 
followed by a higher pace of globalisation process during the crisis (as indicated by a higher 
slope of 𝛽𝑡) is demonstrated. If one defined contagion as a rise in the average level of financial 
spillovers (𝛽𝑡) pre- vs during the crisis, the conclusion would be that contagion was observed 
here, as the average 𝛽𝑡  is higher following the crisis’ inception (dotted lines). However, it can 
also be observed that 𝛽𝑡 values during the crisis (solid line) are lower, not higher, than they 
would have been if the pre-crisis process in 𝛽𝑡 continued unchanged into the crisis period, i.e., 
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if the crisis’ outbreak did not affect the financial integration process (represented by the dashed 
line). Hence, the observed values of 𝛽𝑡 are relatively too low during the crisis, which I suggest 
is to be interpreted as weaker, not stronger, co-movements in the crisis period, i.e., no contagion 
but rather decoupling. 
 
In addition to the more robust identification of contagion, model (3.2) also allows for insights 
into the exact intertemporal nature of the financial integration process in each sub-period. For 
instance, in Figure 3.3A it would unveil a very high level of spillovers at the beginning of the 
crisis and a reversal of the financial integration process following the crisis’ outbreak, both 
important features of financial integration which would remain unnoticed if one was employing 
a model of constant sub-period 𝛽𝑡 coefficients, such as model (3.1).  As a result, allowing the 
𝛽𝑡 to evolve across the different regimes might prove to be important to identify true contagion, 
as the latter may occur for only a short period of time (e.g., at the start or end) during the crisis 
period, and this is not captured by model (3.1). 
 
Consequently, the “Globalisation Model” allows the linkages between the individual stock 
markets and the World Stock market portfolio to vary across time, is constructed to address the 
limitations of the model (3.1). The details on how evidence of contagion is captured by this 
model are explained below. 
 
3.2.3. Identifying Different forms of Contagion under the Globalisation Model 
 
Based on the “Globalisation Model” established the previous section, I propose a new definition 
of financial contagion. Contagion can be identified as an increase in 𝛽𝑡 during the crisis period, 
over and above of what it would have been if the linkage between the individual country and 
world stock market portfolio was following the same process as in the pre-crisis period. 
Moreover, this increase in 𝛽𝑡 can be at any point during the crisis and 𝛽𝑡  is not necessarily 
higher during the whole crisis period, to provide for evidence of contagion. 
Contagion can be identified in the following situations by estimating model (3.2):  
a. “Shock” Contagion 
The term “shock” contagion is defined as a positive jump in the co-movement (𝛽2𝑡) between 
the stock market of the individual countries in this study and the world stock market portfolio, 
following the outbreak of the crisis. In other words, it means that 𝛽2𝑡 > 0 at the starting point 
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of the crisis period (𝑡 = 𝜏1). Following this initial rise in the co-movements of stock returns 
with the world market portfolio (𝛽2𝑡), there are different scenarios which may occur during the 
crisis period: 
i. An increase in the slope of the linkages between the individual stock markets 
and the world market portfolio, during the crisis as compared with the pre-crisis 
period. (i.e. 𝛾1> 0) 
 
   Figure 3.4A: Shock contagion (𝛽2(𝜏1) > 0 (Week 1451); 𝛿1 > 0; 𝛾1 > 0) 
ii) A decrease in the slope of the linkages between the individual stock markets and 
the world market portfolio, during the crisis as compared with the pre-crisis 
period. (i.e. 𝛾1< 0)  
 
Figure 3.4B: Shock Contagion (𝜷2(𝜏1) > 0 (Week 1451); 𝜹𝟏 > 0; 𝜸𝟏< 0, 𝜹𝟏 + 𝜸𝟏< 0) 
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iii) No change in the slope of the linkages between the individual stock markets and 
the world market portfolio, during the crisis as compared with the pre-crisis 
period. (i.e. and 𝛾1= 0) 
 
Figure 3.4C: Shock Contagion (𝜷2(𝜏1) > 0 (Week 1451);  𝜹𝟏 > 0; 𝜸𝟏= 0) 
In all of these situations, “shock contagion” is identified if, following the outbreak of a crisis, 
the value of 𝛽𝑡 at crisis’ onset is higher than it would have been had the pre-crisis integration 
process still prevailed. 
 
b. “Recoupling” Contagion 
 “Recoupling” contagion refers to a situation where there is an initial fall in the co-movement 
between the individual stock market and the world stock market (𝛽2𝑡 < 0 at 𝑡 = 𝜏1), followed 
by a subsequent rise in 𝛽𝑡 above the level which would have prevailed had there been no impact 
due to the crisis. This situation can be defined as contagion only if there is an increase in the 
slope (𝛾1> 0) during the crisis period, as this is a necessary condition for 𝛽𝑡 to be higher at a 
certain point during the crisis than what it would have been if the shape of integration process 
had been the same as in the pre-crisis period. With this increase in slope, 𝛽𝑡 must be higher at 
the end of the crisis period than what it would have been if the prior integration process had 
prevailed. For the “recoupling contagion” to exist, it is irrelevant whether the slopes of financial 
integration process 𝛽𝑡 pre- and during crisis are positive or negative; but the latter period must 
have a higher slope than the former. 
The following show possible situations which might arise within the “recoupling” contagion: 
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i) 𝛽2𝑡(𝜏1) < 0 (𝛽𝑡 declines in week 1 of the crisis, but increases at higher pace than 
pre-crisis thereafter (𝛾1 >  0), consequently 𝛽𝑡 is higher during certain part of 
crisis period than what it would have been if the same globalisation process as in 
the pre-crisis period was being followed); increasing globalisation pre-crisis: 𝛿1 > 
0 
 
 
  Figure 3.5A: Recoupling Contagion (𝛽2(𝜏1) < 0 (at Week 1451); 𝛿1 < 0; 𝛾1> 0) 
 
ii) same as i) but decreasing globalisation during pre-crisis: 𝛿1 < 0;  
 
Figure 3.5B: Recoupling Contagion (𝛽2(𝜏1) < 0 (at Week 1451); 𝛿1 < 0; 𝛾1> 0) 
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iii) same as i) but constant globalisation during pre-crisis: 𝛿1 < 0; In addition, the crisis period 
can be characterised by a negative, positive, or zero overall slope (𝛿1 + 𝛾1) 
 
Figure 3.5C: Recoupling Contagion (𝛽2(𝜏1) < 0 (at Week 1451); 𝛿1 = 0; 𝛾1> 0) 
 
c. “Kink” Contagion 
Unlike in the previous two situations, “kink contagion” can occur when there is no abrupt 
change in co-movements between the individual country and the world stock portfolio during 
the first week of the crisis (i.e., 𝛽2𝑡 = 0 at the starting point of the crisis, 𝑡 = 𝜏1). Instead, 
contagion is identified provided there is an increase in the slope (𝛾1 > 0) during the crisis period 
and consequently 𝛽𝑡 is higher during the crisis than what it would be if the process of integration 
process has been the same as in the pre-crisis period. For the “kink contagion” to prevail, it is 
irrelevant whether the slopes of financial integration process 𝛽𝑡 pre- and during crisis are 
positive or negative; but the latter period must have a higher slope than the former. 
The following graphs show the different situations that might arise within the “Kink 
Contagion”. 
i) No abrupt changes in 𝛽2𝑡(𝜏1) (i.e. 𝛽2𝑡(𝜏1) = 0 in week 1 of the crisis, but the 
slope of 𝛽𝑡  increases as compared to the pre-crisis period (𝛾1> 0), so that 𝛽2𝑡 is 
higher at during the crisis period than what it would have been if the same 
globalisation process as the pre-crisis period was being followed); increasing 
pre-crisis globalisation (𝛿1 > 0) 
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Figure 3.6A: Kink Contagion (𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0 (at Week 1451); 𝛿1 >0; 𝛾1> 0) 
 
 
ii) Same as in i) but constant pre-crisis globalisation (𝛿1 = 0) 
 
Figure 3.6A: Kink Contagion (𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0 (at Week 1451); 𝛿1 =0; 𝛾1> 0) 
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iii) Same as in i) but decreasing pre-crisis globalisation (𝛿1 < 0);  
 
Figure 3.6C: Kink Contagion (𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0 (at Week 1451); 𝛿1 <0; 𝛾1> 0) 
3.2.4. Tests for Different Forms of Contagion under the Globalisation Model 
 
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, the occurrence of contagion can be categorised into 
three scenarios, namely, “shock”, “recoupling” and “kink contagion”. The level of 𝛽𝑡 at each 
point in time across the crisis period can easily be calculated from the estimated model (2), both 
the crisis-specific 𝛽𝑡 values as well as those values which would be observed if the pre-crisis 
process in 𝛽𝑡 continued unchanged into the crisis period. Specifically, the estimated value at 
each point in time within the crisis period can be calculated using: ?̂?𝑡 = ?̂?1𝑡 + ?̂?2𝑡 = ?̂?0 + 𝛾0 +
(?̂?1 + 𝛾1)𝑡, where the ‘hats’ represent estimated coefficient values, and t is in the range 
1 2t     (during the crisis period). If crisis outbreak had no effect of the process of 𝛽𝑡 (i.e., 
?̂?2𝑡 = 0), those crisis betas could be estimated using the coefficients governing the process in 
the pre-crisis period and would equal ?̂?𝑡 = ?̂?1𝑡 = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑡, where t is the time variable from 
the crisis period.  
 
 Given the estimates of model (2) parameters as well as their variance-covariance matrix, a t-
test can be performed to test for the significance of the difference in 𝛽𝑡 between the crisis 𝛽𝑡 
values and those which would have been observed if crisis outbreak had had no effect on the 
intertemporal movement in 𝛽𝑡, at any point in time. Testing the significance of these differences 
between states is made easier by the fact that 𝛽2𝑡 captures the difference in the level of 𝛽𝑡 
between the pre-crisis (𝛽1𝑡) and the crisis (𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡) period. The form of the t-test will depend 
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upon the type of contagion which is being tested for and can be summarised in the following 
diagram: 
 
 
Figure 3.7: T-test to determine the type of contagion 
 
 
a) A test for “shock contagion” 
To test for “shock contagion”, the level of 𝛽2t at the start of the crisis period (t=𝜏1) is analysed. 
In particular, “shock contagion” exists if there is a significant difference in co-movements at 
crisis’ onset between model-implied crisis-specific ?̂?t (= ?̂?1(𝜏1) + ?̂?2(𝜏1)) and what would be 
observed in absence of disruptions in the financial integration process (?̂?1(𝜏1)). If there is a 
significant positive difference (i.e., ?̂?2(𝜏1) > 0 ), this provides evidence for the existence of 
shock contagion. Figures 3.4A, 3.4B, and 3.4C represent possible scenarios for the evolution 
of the 𝛽t coefficients and how 𝛽2(𝜏1), if statistically significantly positive, would represent the 
degree of shock contagion. A test on 𝛽2(𝜏1) is a one-tailed t-test: 
𝐻0: 𝛽2(𝜏1) ≤ 0, 𝐻𝐴: 𝛽2(𝜏1) > 0 
with 𝛽2𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑡, 𝑡 = 𝜏1 and where the standard error of the coefficient 𝛽2tat time t, 
𝑆𝐸(𝛽2𝑡), is calculated as: 𝑆𝐸(𝛽2𝑡)
2=𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑡) = (𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛾0) + 𝑡
2𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛾1) +
2𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛾0, 𝛾1) = [𝑆𝐸(𝛾0)]
2 + 𝑡2[𝑆𝐸(𝛾1)]
2 + 2𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛾0, 𝛾1). 
 
The jump is positive and significant during week 𝑡 = 𝜏1 (i.e., the first observation of the crisis 
period) if the null hypothesis is rejected, hence shock contagion would be inferred. 
 
b) A test for “recoupling contagion” 
“Recoupling contagion” is present if there is an initial significant fall in the co-movement 
(𝛽2(𝜏1) < 0) and 𝛽𝑡 is higher at some point during the crisis compared to what it would have 
been if the pre-crisis process had continued unchanged. Hence, a suitable test is to find that 
Contagion
Shock
𝛽2 𝜏1 > 0
Recoupling
𝛽2 𝜏1 < 0
𝛽2 𝜏2 > 0
Kink
𝛽2 𝜏1 = 0
𝛾1 > 0
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𝛽2(𝜏1) < 0 and 𝛽2(𝜏2) > 0 (where 𝜏1 and  𝜏2 stand for the first and the last observation of the 
crisis period, respectively). Figures 3.5A, 3.5B, and 3.5C represent possible scenarios for 
recoupling contagion. To test for recoupling contagion formally, therefore, requires two tests. 
The initial step being a one-tailed test with:  
𝐻0: 𝛽2(𝜏1) ≥ 0, 𝐻𝐴: 𝛽2(𝜏1) < 0, 
and, providing the null hypothesis is rejected, the second step, again one-tailed: 
𝐻0: 𝛽2(𝜏2) ≤ 0, 𝐻𝐴: 𝛽2(𝜏2) > 0. 
Only if both null hypotheses are rejected can we confirm the existence of recoupling 
contagion. 
 
c) A test for “kink contagion” 
“Kink contagion” is referred to as a situation where there is no sudden change in co-movement 
during the first week of the crisis (i.e., 𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0), but there is an increase in slope of 𝛽𝑡 (𝛾1 >
0) during the crisis period and, consequently, 𝛽𝑡 is higher during the crisis than what it would 
be if the slope of the integration process was the same as in the pre-crisis period. Therefore, 
firstly a two-sided t-test is conducted in order to test whether 𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0, as there would be 
evidence of contagion provided that firstly the null of no change in 𝛽𝑡 is not rejected and, 
secondly, the slope of the integration process is significantly higher during the crisis period 
(𝛾1 > 0) than what it would be if the pre-crisis integration process continued unchanged into 
the crisis period.3  
 
Figure 3.6A, 3.6B, and 3.6C show possible situations where kink contagion would be identified. 
Unlike in other situations, there is no abrupt change in the co-movement between the world 
market and the individual country’s stock market at the start of the crisis period (point A). 
However, as the crisis unfolds, 𝛽𝑡 is higher than what it would be if the same globalisation 
process as in the pre-crisis period was being followed, due to 𝛾1> 0 (and leading to 𝛽2(𝜏2) >
0). Hence, we would interpret the underlying situation as kink contagion. The appropriate 
testing procedure is therefore: 
𝐻0: 𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0, 𝐻𝐴: 𝛽2(𝜏1) ≠ 0, 
and, providing the null hypothesis is not rejected, the second step, one-tailed, involves testing: 
𝐻0: 𝛾1 ≤ 0, 𝐻𝐴: 𝛾1 > 0. 
Rejection of the null at this second step, following non-rejection at the first, would imply the 
presence of kink contagion.  
                                                             
3 Alternatively, instead of testing for an increase in slope (𝛾1 > 0), one could test whether 𝛽𝑡  at the end of the 
crisis period is significantly higher than what it would be in absence of the crisis, i.e., 𝛽2(𝜏2) > 0. 
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3.3. Empirical Methodology  
Model (3.2) is estimated within a GARCH framework, as the OLS estimation technique may 
provide not only inefficient but also potentially inaccurate parameter estimates (Hamilton, 
2010). More specifically, the Glosten, Jagannathan, Runkle (1993), or GJR, approach is 
employed to model the process of conditional volatility in residuals. The GJR-GARCH model 
also captures asymmetries in volatility resulting in positive versus negative shocks. Model (3.2) 
constitutes the mean equation, whereas the conditional volatility, ℎt, is modelled for each 
country as a GJR-GARCH (p,q)4 process:   
 
ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖 + ∑ (𝛼𝑖,𝑗 +  𝑔𝑖,𝑗𝐼𝑖,𝑡−𝑗)𝜀𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
2𝑝
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝑏𝑖,𝑘
𝑞
𝑘=1 ℎ𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
2    (3.3) 
 
where 𝐼𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 = 1 if 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 < 0 and is equal to zero otherwise, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 represents the error term 
from equation (3.2), for country i, lagged j periods, and it is assumed this error can be 
decomposed as 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = √ℎ𝑖,𝑡𝑣𝑖,𝑡 with 𝑣𝑖,𝑡~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑(0,1). This model allows for the impact of past 
shocks on conditional volatility to be different depending on whether they are positive 
(∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 ) or negative (∑ (𝛼𝑖,𝑗 +  𝑔𝑖,𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 )). Typically for stock market data, one expects 
𝑔𝑖,𝑗 > 0, i.e., for a negative shock at lag j to exert a larger impact on conditional volatility of 
stock returns than a positive shock of the same magnitude, a phenomenon known as the leverage 
effect (Black, 1976). The GJR-GARCH nests both the GARCH model, which imposes no 
asymmetries 𝑔𝑖,𝑗 = 0 and the more restrictive ARCH model, (𝑔𝑖,𝑗 =  𝑏𝑖,𝑘 = 0) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
The combined model (3.2)-(3.3) is subject to a battery of specification tests. 
 
3.3.1. Unit Root test 
Firstly, the (log) indices (𝑃𝑖,𝑡) and returns (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≡ 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1)) are tested for 
stationarity using both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey, Fuller, 1979) and the Phillips, 
Perron (1988) tests using the Enders (2010) sequential procedure to select the most appropriate 
model (with or without deterministic components), to make sure that only stationary variables 
are used in Eq. (3.2) to avoid potential spurious regression problems.   
                                                             
4 GJR GARCH model has been selected as it was chosen based on the best Information Criteria (i.e. AIC and BIC). 
While estimating Eq. 3.2 for each country in the sample a GARCH, E-GARCH, and GJR GARCH have been 
employed, and based on the AIC and BIC results, GJR GARCH was chosen.  
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(a) Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test is used as it is more suited to complicated dynamic 
structure. This test consists of estimating the following regression: 
∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝜌1 + 𝜌1𝑡 + 𝛿𝑌𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 ∆𝑌𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡        (3.4)    
Where 𝜀𝑡 is a pure white noise error term and where ∆𝑌𝑡−1 = (𝑌𝑡−1 −  𝑌𝑡−2 ), ∆𝑌𝑡−2(𝑌𝑡−2 −
 𝑌𝑡−3), etc. In the ADF test, it is tested whether 𝛿 = 0. The ADF test whether a variable contains 
a unit root. The null hypothesis is that it contains a unit root, and the alternative is that the 
variable was generated by a stationary process. The decision rule is as follows: 
 If the estimated (𝜏)Tau  statistic of the regression coefficient > ADF critical value, do 
not reject null hypothesis, i.e. unit root exists (Not Stationary) 
 If the estimated (𝜏)Tau statistic of the regression coefficient < ADF critical value, reject 
null hypothesis, i.e. unit root does not exist 
 
3.3.2. Co-integration Test 
 
Second, I test for cointegration between each national and the world (log) index, as existence 
of cointegration would necessitate an inclusion of an error correction term into Eq. (3.2) to 
circumvent the omitted variable bias; this is accomplished by employing the Johansen (1991) 
cointegration test.  
 
A version of Johansen test is employed, where an estimator that minimizes an information 
criterion is defined. The approach suggested by Gonzalo and Pitarakis (1998) and Aznar and 
Salvador (2002) is used, where the lag length in an autoregressive model is selected. This 
approach can be applied to determine the number of co-integrating equations in a VECM. A 
consistent estimator of the number of co-integrating equations can is provided by choosing the 
number of co-integrating equations that minimizes the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion 
(SBIC). In case of co-integrated series, the the two-step Error Correction Model (ECM) 
proposed Engle and Granger (1987), which corrects for disequilibrium in the short run. 
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3.3.3. Heteroscedasticity  
One of the key assumptions of regression is that the variance of errors is constant across 
observations, i.e. homoscedastic errors. Eq. 3.2 is estimated using OLS and tested for 
homoscedasticity of residuals.  
The White’s (1980) test will be used which is a test of the null hypothesis of no 
heteroscedasticity against heteroscedasticity of unknown, general form. Heteroscedasticity has 
serious consequences for the OLS estimator and the estimated standard errors is wrong. Hence 
the confidence intervals and hypotheses test cannot be relied upon. 
If the p-value of less than the chosen alpha level, then the null hypothesis is rejected, showing 
evidence of heteroscedasticity.  
 
3.3.4. ARCH LM tests 
Equation (3.2) is firstly estimated by OLS and the residuals are tested for conditional 
heteroscedasticity using the Engle ARCH LM test. Existence of conditional heteroscedasticity 
provides further rationale for modelling the error terms within a GARCH framework.  
 
The ARCH LM test which is a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test is used for autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) in residuals. This particular heteroscedasticity 
specification was motivated by the observation that in many financial time series, the magnitude 
of residuals appeared to be related to the magnitude of recent residuals. Ignoring ARCH effects 
may result in loss of efficiency. The ARCH LM test statistic is computed from an auxiliary test 
regression, and to test the null hypothesis that there is no ARCH up to order q in the residuals, 
the following regression is run.  
 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2  =  𝛽0 + ( ∑ 𝛽𝑠
𝑞
𝑠=1 𝑒𝑡−𝑠
2 ) +  𝑣𝑡           (3.5)    
 
Thus, the squared residuals are regressed on a constant and lagged squared residuals up to order 
q. The squared standardizes residuals can be obtained as follows: 
?̂?𝑡
2 = 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2 /ℎ̂𝑡,  
Where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2̂  is the estimated residuals, and ℎ̂ is the variance, are obtained from The Globalisation 
model.  
In order to determine whether there are any ARCH effects in the residuals, the p-value is 
observed. If the p-value of less than the chosen alpha level (5 % significance level, in this case), 
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then the null hypothesis of No ARCH effect is rejected, and if the p-value is greater than the 
chosen alpha level, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
 
3.3.5. Normality Test 
The GJR-GARCH model is fitted assuming normal distribution of error terms at first, and the 
resulting residuals are tested for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test.  
The error term in Eq. (3.2) are assumed to be normally distributed. However, the residuals might 
not be normally distributed. Hence, the Shapiro-Wilk test is used to test the normality of the 
residuals. The hypothesis is as follows: 
𝐻0: Residuals are normally distributed 
𝐻1: Residuals are not normally distributed 
If the p-value of less than the chosen alpha level (5 % significance level, in this case), then the 
null hypothesis is rejected, and there is evidence that the residuals tested are not from a normally 
distributed population.  
Where non-normality is found, equation (3.2)-(3.3) is re-estimated under the assumption that 
residuals follow t-distribution or GED (generalised error) distribution. Subsequently, the final 
distribution decision (normal, t, or GED) is made based on the information criteria (AIC and 
BIC), and equation (3.2)-(3.3) is re-estimated.  
 
3.3.6. Autocorrelation  
Ljung-Box Q statistics are employed to test whether there remains autocorrelation in residuals. 
If the standardized residuals display serial correlation, it means that the model of the mean has 
not been properly specified. The standardized residuals can be expressed as follows: 
?̂?𝑡 =  𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2 /ℎ̂𝑡
0.5  ,   
Where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
2  represents the residuals from Eq. (3.2), and ℎ̂𝑡
0.5 is the conditional standard deviation. 
And in order to test for the model of the mean, we propose to perform a Ljung-box Q Statistics 
for the  𝑠𝑡 sequence.   
The Ljung-Box test statistic is given by: 
Q(m) = N(N + 2) ∑
p̂h
2
N−h
m
h=1             (3.6) 
The null hypothesis for this test is that the first m autocorrelations are jointly zero, 
𝐻0  = p1=p2=…=pm=0 
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and the null hypothesis of the evidence of serial correlation cannot be not rejected if the 
various Q statistics are equal to zero. 
Where evidence of autocorrelation is identified, the residuals are these are modelled as an 
ARMA process of an appropriate order established empirically. In addition to this, the Engle’s 
LM ARCH test (mention in sub-section 3.3.3) is applied to the standardised residuals to test 
whether using a GJR-GARCH specification fully captures the ARCH effects in residuals. 
 
A general-to-specific approach in estimation of equation (3.2)-(3.3) is employed. Initially, the 
full model allowing for linear trends in coefficients 𝛽𝑡 in each subperiod is estimated. Next, 
those trend coefficients found insignificant are dropped from the regression and the reduced 
model (3.2.2) is estimated. This ensures that the precision of parameter estimates is not 
negatively affected by the presence of insignificant variables.  
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3.4. Data 
Following Baur (2012), for the main stock index in each of 25 major world economies5, daily 
closing prices in local currency are obtained from DataStream for the period 27th October 1979 
to 27th March 2012. Mink (2015) demonstrates that returns converted into a common currency 
also reflect fluctuations in exchange rates, which biases inference about contagion. The sample 
does not contain more recent observations as otherwise the post-crisis period would be too 
heterogeneous, especially given economic and political turbulences which took place during 
that time, hence the differentiation between crisis and post-crisis periods would be more 
difficult and less precise. 
 
The indices estimated by DataStream are used rather than those provided by other providers, 
for example, the national stock exchanges, as the former are based on a common methodology 
and, hence, more comparable across countries than the latter. I calculate weekly Tuesday-close-
to-Tuesday-close returns, resulting in 1,693 weeks in the sample, as using weekly data helps to 
mitigate issues resulting from day-of-the week effects and nonsynchronous trading due to time-
zone differences, an issue which plagues daily return observations. Tuesdays are chosen 
because this minimises the number of non-trading days, hence maximises the sample size, while 
also reducing the influence of day-of-the-week effects on prices. The specific countries 
(together with their mnemonics on DataStream) included are: Australia (TOTMKAU),  Brazil 
(TOTMKBR),  Canada (TOTMKCN), Chile (TOTMKCL), China (TOTMKCH),  France 
(TOTMKFR),  Germany (TOTMKBD),  Hong Kong (TOTMKHK),  Indonesia (TOTMKID), 
India (TOTMKIN), Italy (TOTMKIT), Japan (TOTMKJP), Mexico (TOTMKMX), New 
Zealand (TOTMKNZ), Norway (TOTMKNW), Russia (TOTMKRS), South Africa 
(TOTMKSA),  South Korea (TOTMKKO),  Spain (TOTMKES),  Sweden (TOTMKSD), 
Switzerland (TOTMKSW), Taiwan (TOTMKTA), Thailand (TOTMKTH), U.K. 
(TOTMKUK),  and U.S (TOTMKNA). This sample of 32 years and 5 months contains 1450, 
86 and 157 weekly observations in the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis period, respectively. 
 
To determine the precise date of the beginning and the end of the crisis period, the dates as in 
Baur (2012) is used. This firstly involves considering both major financial and economic events 
                                                             
5 The indices for the 25 countries and world stock market are constructed by DataStream. A divisor driven 
methodology is used by Thomson Reuters Global Equity indices (2015). In other words, the value of the Index of 
a country is equal to the aggregate market value of all index securities divided by the divisor of the Index. This 
divisor is an arbitrary number (100, in this case) which is chosen at the beginning of the index to fix the starting 
value. Moreover, if there is any corporate action which affects the market value of the index, the divisor is then 
adjusted to offset the change in the market value of the index so that the index value does not jump up or down 
drastically. 
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from the timelines provided by the Bank for International Settlements (Filardo et al., 2009). 
The second step uses estimates of conditional volatility in the financial sector returns (as this is 
where the initial shock originated), estimated using a GJR-GARCH (1,1) model with a constant 
in the mean equation, and identifies the crisis as a period where this volatility exceeds a given 
threshold. Results from these two steps are combined and the resulting crisis period employed 
in this study spans from 7 August 2007 to 24 March 2009. Dungey and Gajurel (2015) review 
the literature on dating of the 2007-9 crisis and estimate the start and end point of a crisis using 
a smooth transition GARCH model. Their estimated centre of transition into (out of) the crisis 
period is 3 July 2007 (15 May 2009), which implies that the financial markets were fully in the 
crisis regime after (before) those dates. This corresponds well with the dates employed here. 
 
To obtain the best proxy of the global stock market, W, with return 𝑅𝑊,𝑡 in model (3.2), two 
candidates are considered: the world stock market index constructed by DataStream, as it 
captures movements in most of the national stock markets world-wide, and the DataStream’s 
US stock market index, as the global financial crisis of 2007-9 is widely believed to have 
originated in that country. We estimate model (3.2)-(3.3) for each country i with each of those 
global market proxies at a time, and, based on AIC and BIC information criteria, the world 
stock market index is found to provide a better model fit across the board.  Hence, the world 
stock market index is employed as a proxy of the global market in model (3.2) in the subsequent 
analysis. 
 
Descriptive statistics of weekly returns are presented in Table 3.1 below. On average, the crisis 
period is characterised by lower returns and higher return volatility, but also less negative 
skewness and lower kurtosis as compared to pre-crisis figures. These results indicate that return 
distribution during the crisis period was more spread-out and shifted to the left but also less 
asymmetrical and with less heavy tails than its pre-crisis counterpart. This is maybe because 
the pre-crisis covers a longer time period containing a number of heterogeneous economic and 
political events affecting stock returns, which would have generated extreme positive and, more 
likely, negative returns so contributing to the distribution’s asymmetry and its heavy tails. The 
post-crisis returns are, on average, higher and less volatile than the pre-crisis ones, but also less 
asymmetrical and heavy-tailed than the pre-crisis returns. Overall, returns characteristics appear 
to differ across sub-periods, which provides an additional rationale for modelling pre-, during, 
and post-crisis periods as distinctive regimes.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics  
Country Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
 Pre-Crisis Crisis Post Crisis Pre-Crisis Crisis Post Crisis Pre-Crisis Crisis Post Crisis Pre-Crisis Crisis Post Crisis 
Australia 0.00191 -0.00652 0.00123 0.02549 0.04015 0.02394 -2.10724 -0.38642 -0.21755 30.9189 4.71685 4.63141 
Brazil 0.00360 -0.00384 0.00227 0.03846 0.04915 0.02613 -0.27925 -0.21771 -0.25701 6.44343 6.12240 4.43692 
Canada 0.00177 -0.00521 0.00218 0.02078 0.38382 0.02166 -1.25210 -0.87762 -0.20278 16.3499 6.49096 3.28318 
Chile 0.00355 -0.00286 0.00312 0.02636 0.03105 0.02092 0.13894 -0.59838 -0.62672 4.65206 4.75396 4.79918 
China 0.00239 -0.00491 0.00201 0.04989 0.07490 0.04115 -0.19460 -0.49372 -0.29615 7.94312 3.53570 5.26636 
France 0.00201 -0.00847 0.00171 0.02663 0.03855 0.03034 -0.85868 0.53744 -0.36013 8.17328 5.82418 3.86073 
Germany 0.00153 -0.00758 0.00255 0.02485 0.03496 0.03011 -1.01138 -0.44368 -0.72969 8.70641 3.87844 4.88579 
Hong Kong 0.00245 -0.00706 0.00306 0.03999 0.05397 0.03314 -1.24124 -0.23712 -0.14693 12.8475 3.43370 6.22510 
Indonesia 0.00125 -0.00569 0.00635 0.04217 0.06573 0.03090 0.14661 -0.62547 -0.70142 7.38568 7.58736 6.05421 
India 0.00324 -0.00555 0.00337 0.04410 0.06464 0.03138 -0.34061 -0.76598 0.78500 13.2442 4.40349 6.50855 
Italy 0.00238 -0.01062 0.00066 0.03290 0.04269 0.03469 -0.36876 0.93212 -0.28174 7.04928 8.80447 3.46451 
Japan 0.00104 -0.00876 0.00052 0.02564 0.04595 0.03018 -0.32883 -0.29314 -1.61279 6.41827 6.03788 15.8027 
Mexico 0.00538 -0.00472 0.00443 0.03849 0.03799 0.02009 0.80986 -0.30664 0.06447 11.2984 5.46240 3.98993 
New Zealand 0.00112 -0.00596 0.00067 0.02415 0.02318 0.01325 0.25477 -0.38919 -0.42660 11.1097 3.84211 7.39565 
Norway 0.00217 -0.00864 0.00292 0.03328 0.05844 0.03561 -1.12240 0.25264 -0.66167 14.4147 6.34500 4.41639 
Russia6 0.00719 -0.00790 0.00356 0.06610 0.07898 0.04269 -0.27926 -0.48961 -0.49900 10.0495 7.58611 5.46151 
South Africa 0.00323 -0.00364 0.00293 0.03139 0.04286 0.02281 -0.85337 -0.18334 -0.52971 8.57973 4.84190 3.79301 
South Korea 0.00153 -0.00508 0.00344 0.04343 0.04753 0.02914 0.13487 -0.19350 -1.17768 4.90338 4.08660 8.67198 
Spain 0.00179 -0.00821 0.00008 0.02668 0.04092 0.03347 -0.85658 0.18293 0.08794 7.44859 9.04347 3.50523 
Sweden 0.00262 -0.00836 0.00355 0.03196 0.04767 0.03071 -0.50988 0.80649 -0.20240 6.13398 7.05835 3.59010 
Switzerland 0.00183 -0.00703 0.00161 0.02165 0.03498 0.02238 -1.47246 0.45919 -0.87236 13.7148 5.48303 6.25258 
Taiwan 0.00104 -0.00663 0.00235 0.04709 0.04681 0.02926 -0.41153 0.04231 -0.05440 5.22967 3.07305 8.00898 
Thailand 0.00192 -0.00803 0.00658 0.04581 0.04748 0.03238 0.16577 -0.24338 -0.43014 7.36816 5.89286 4.58888 
U.K. 0.00187 -0.00615 0.00276 0.02150 0.03855 0.02735 -1.53066 0.77247 -0.46278 17.8027 6.43824 4.74983 
U.S. 0.00193 -0.00705 0.00362 0.02236 0.03843 0.02517 -1.37652 -0.95022 -0.33767 19.3951 6.13009 3.46606 
Note: Descriptive statistics of weekly aggregate stock market returns for each of the 25 countries in the sample for the pre-crisis (Oct 1979 – Jul 2007), crisis (Aug 2007 –Mar 
2009) and post crisis (Apr 2009 – Mar 2012) period, with 1450, 86 and 157 observations, respectively.
                                                             
6 One of the reasons for a high mean in Russia is because of the shorter data sample (i.e. from 27th January 1998) during the pre-crisis period for Russia, which was obtained 
from DataStream. 
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3.5. Empirical Results 
3.5.1. Data Features and Model Specifications 
This section gives a brief overview of results of data diagnostics and for model adequacy and 
specifications.  
(a) Stationarity test 
 Firstly, both unit root tests (ADF and PP) show log indices to be nonstationary but returns in 
each country to be stationary. Table 3.2 below shows the findings pertaining to ADF test. Non-
Stationarity is tested both at log-levels and Stock Returns. The lag length is selected using the 
Schwartz or Bayesian Information (SIC). The “t-statistics” for all Stock Prices is greater than 
the critical values at 1% level whereas for Stock Returns of the time series, the “𝜏 (Tau)” is less 
than the critical value at 1% level. As a result, it can be concluded that for stock prices, the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, indicating that they are non-stationary. On the other hand, the null 
hypothesis is rejected for stock returns, showing that they are stationary. Henceforth, it can be 
concluded that all variables appear to be non-stationary at log-levels and stationary in log 
returns. 
 
Table 3.2: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test  
ADF Test 
(Full Sample) 
Stock Prices Stock Returns 
T Stats 1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% 
C.V 
 T Stats 1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% 
C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
Australia -2.616  -17.746 
Brazil -2.246  -14.472 
Canada -2.714  -17.755 
Chile -3.271  -16.028 
China -2.197  -13.143 
France -1.362  -17.300 
Germany -1.972  -17.583 
Hong Kong -2.778  -17.761 
Indonesia -2.766  -13.377 
India -3.205  -13.928 
Italy -2.328  -17.491 
Japan -1.976  -17.339 
Mexico -3.003  -16.512 
New Zealand -2.497  -19.684 
Norway -2.447  -16.829 
Russia -1.329  -12.447 
South Africa -2.980  -17.011 
South Korea -2.895  -15.120 
Spain -1.672  -15.731 
Sweden -2.435  -16.061 
Switzerland -1.103  -16.955 
Taiwan -3.253  -15.904 
Thailand -2.573  -16.229 
U.K. -1.799  -28.748 
U.S. -1.558  -18.993 
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ADF test is conducted for the weekly log indices and aggregate stock market returns for each of the 25 countries 
for the full sample (Oct 1979 – Mar 2012). The lag length is selected using SIC, and the t-statistics and critical 
values are compared in order to test the null hypothesis of non-stationarity 
 
(b) Co-integration  
To identify the correct model specification, the Johansen Test is used to log-prices series to 
explore possible effects of co-integration. The test uses the Schwaz Bayesian Information 
Criterion (SBIC). Table 3.3 shows that for all pairs of Stock Prices, the SBIC indicates that 
there are no co-integrating vectors. 
Table 3.3:  Johansen Test for Co-integration (IC based) 
 SBIC HQIC AIC 
Australia    
Max Rank:   0   -9.606217* -9.638618 -9.657673 
                      1   -9.602833 -9.64131* -9.663938 
                      2 -9.600832 -9.640578 -9.665152 
Brazil    
Max Rank:   0 -8.79683* -8.845398* -8.875167 
                      1 -8.782711 -8.840385 -8.875736 
                      2   -8.77914 -8.839849 -8.877061 
Canada    
Max Rank:   0 -10.40912* -10.3968 -10.42196 
                      1 -10.39986 -10.41401 -10.42234 
                      2 -10.3968 -10.41298 -10.42249 
Chile    
Max Rank:   0 -9.334703* -9.375537   -9.400126 
                      1 -9.329911 -9.378401* -9.4076 
                     2 -9.329669 -9.380712 -9.411448 
China    
Max Rank:   0 -8.052061* -8.098883* -8.127475 
                      1 -8.039381 -8.094982   -8.128935 
                      2 -8.03625   -8.094777 -8.130517 
France    
Max Rank:   0   -9.644958* -9.677359* -9.696415 
                      1   -9.637088 -9.675565 -9.698193 
                      2   -9.634486   -9.674988 -9.698807 
Germany    
Max Rank:   0 -9.756629* -9.78903* -9.808086 
                      1 -9.747921 -9.786397 -9.809026 
                      2 -9.74555   -9.786051 -9.809871 
Hong Kong    
Max Rank:   0 -8.632158* -8.664559* -8.683614 
                      1   -8.350358 -8.663024 -8.685653 
                      2 -8.348715 -8.662499 -8.686318 
Indonesia    
Max Rank:   0 -8.359007* -8.40064* -8.425759 
                      1 -8.356302 -8.399796 -8.429626 
                      2 -8.350588 -8.400755 -8.432154 
India    
Max Rank:   0 -8.244488* -8.275439* -8.294096 
                      1 -8.233951   -8.272639 -8.295961 
                      2   -8.231813 -8.273081 -8.297958 
Italy    
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Max Rank:   0    -8.951536* -8.983937* -9.002993 
                      1 -8.944395 -8.982871 -9.0055 
                      2 -8.942147 -9.006468 -9.006468 
Japan    
Max Rank:   0 -9.729791* -9.762192* -9.781248 
                      1 -9.720921 -9.759397 -9.782026 
                      2 -9.718661 -9.759162 -9.782982 
Mexico    
Max Rank:   0 -8.87955* -8.909464 -8.926037 
                      1 -8.872852 -8.910219* -8.93096 
                      2 -8.871237 -8.910001 -8.93322 
New Zealand    
Max Rank:   0   -9.658554* -9.69734* -9.720574 
                      1 -9.648353  -9.722002  -9.722002 
                      2 -9.647796 -9.696279 -9.725321 
Norway    
Max Rank:   0 -9.034615* -9.065997 -9.084393 
                      1 -9.031648 -9.068914* -9.090759 
                      2 -9.030583 -9.06981   -9.092806 
Russia    
Max Rank:   0 -7.516765* -7.573553* -7.60892 
                      1 -7.498793 -7.566228 -7.608226 
                      2 -7.491719 -7.562705 -7.606913 
South Africa    
Max Rank:   0 -9.076229* -9.10863 -9.127685 
                      1 -9.073408 -9.111885* -9.134513 
                      2 -9.07102 -9.111522 -9.135341 
South Korea    
Max Rank:   0 -8.414154* -8.44301* -8.460281 
                      1   -8.40565 -8.44172 -8.463308 
                      2 -8.402778 -8.441253 -8.46428 
Spain    
Max Rank:   0 -9.451827* -9.494872* -9.514646 
                      1 -9.443834 -9.489307 -9.513318 
                      2 -9.440461 -9.487549 -9.512973 
Sweden    
Max Rank:   0 -9.242322* -9.275245* -9.294639 
                      1 -9.232775 -9.271871 -9.294901 
                      2 -9.231391 -9.272545 -9.296788 
Switzerland    
Max Rank:   0 -10.05343* -10.08583* -10.10489 
                      1 -10.04447 -10.10558 -10.10558 
                      2   -10.04104 -10.08154 -10.10536 
Taiwan    
Max Rank:   0   -8.25405* -8.29248 -8.315478 
                      1 -8.252445 -8.298081* -8.325392 
                      2 -8.252193 -8.300231 -8.328979 
Thailand    
Max Rank:   0 -8.254796* -8.292451 -8.314939 
                      1 -8.252039 -8.296755* -8.323459 
                      2 -8.249723 -8.296792 -8.324901 
so.    
Max Rank:   0   -10.21828* -10.22636* -10.23112 
                      1 -10.20979 -10.22395 -10.23227 
                      2 -10.20707 -10.22325 -10.23276 
U.S.    
Max Rank:   0 -10.69365* -10.72605* -10.7451 
                      1 -10.68259 -10.72107 -10.74369 
                      2 -10.6793 -10.7198 -10.74362 
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Johansen test is conducted for the for all pairs of each 25 countries’ weekly log indices with the World stock 
market portfolio log indices for the period from (Oct 1979 – Mar 2012). The test uses SBIC to indicate whether 
the pairs are co-integrated or not. 
 
(c) Heteroscedasticity 
Having established the form of equation (3.2), I estimate it using OLS and test for 
homoscedasticity of residuals. To test for heteroscedasticity, the White General 
Heteroscedasticity Test is used. From Table 3.4, it can be concluded that the null hypothesis is 
rejected for 12 countries (Australia, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, India, Japan, South 
Africa, Spain, Switzerland, U.K., and U.S.) at 1% level which means that there is a substantial 
amount of heteroscedasticity from an OLS (Ordinary Least Square) model.  
Table 3.4:  Testing for Heteroscedasticity in Eq 3.2 from an OLS model 
 Chi(2) P Value 
Australia 290.34 0.0000 
Brazil 1.06 0.3023 
Canada 91.20 0.0000 
Chile 2.58 0.1080 
China 14.98 0.0001 
France 9.27 0.0023 
Germany 100.83 0.0000 
Hong Kong 4.36 0.0368 
Indonesia 2.34 0.1263 
India 16.23 0.0001 
Italy 1.42 0.2338 
Japan 17.65 0.0000 
Mexico 0.11 0.7450 
New Zealand 3.31 0.0688 
Norway 1.06 0.3023 
Russia 1.32 0.2510 
South Africa 26.06 0.0000 
South Korea 0.05 0.8242 
Spain 32.17 0.0000 
Sweden 1.41 0.2348 
Switzerland 188.72 0.0000 
Taiwan 0.66 0.4161 
Thailand 1.24 0.2655 
U.K. 104.27 0.0000 
U.S. 103.31 0.0000 
The White’s (1980) test is used to test the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity against heteroscedasticity. The 
null hypothesis is rejected for 12 countries at 1% level which means that there is a substantial amount of 
heteroscedasticity from an OLS model. 
 
(d) ARCH Effects after OLS regression 
Engle’s ARCH test is a Lagrange multiplier test to assess any autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedastic (ARCH) effects after estimating model (3.2) with an Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) model. The results can be observed in Table 3.5 and the p-values are smaller than the 
chosen alpha (at a 5% significance level), except for Spain. Hence, the residuals do show 
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evidence of ARCH effects, and a more appropriate technique (e.g. GARCH models) should be 
employed to estimate model (3.2) in order to ensure that there is no remaining ARCH effects.  
Table 3.5:  ARCH LM test in Eq 3.2 using an OLS model 
 Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Australia 1 151.400 1 0.000 
Brazil 1 127.781 1 0.000 
Canada 1 52.670 1 0.000 
Chile 1 77.377 1 0.000 
China 1 46.311 1 0.000 
France 1 38.268 1 0.000 
Germany 1 124.055 1 0.000 
Hong Kong 1 59.739 1 0.000 
Indonesia 1 47.727 1 0.000 
India 1 18.974 1 0.000 
Italy 1 41.180 1 0.000 
Japan 1 110.861 1 0.000 
Mexico 1 62.758 1 0.000 
New Zealand 1 39.427 1 0.000 
Norway 1 87.11 1 0.000 
Russia 1 21.412 1 0.000 
South Africa 1 42.393 1 0.000 
South Korea 1 68.168 1 0.000 
Spain 1 3.012 1 0.0826 
Sweden 1 61.933 1 0.000 
Switzerland 1 259.767 1 0.000 
Taiwan 1 101.852 1 0.000 
Thailand 1 13.794 1 0.000 
U.K. 1 69.322 1 0.000 
U.S. 1 46.666 1 0.000 
Engle’s ARCH LM test is conducted after modelling equation (3.2) using an OLS method for ARCH effects. It 
can be observed that there are ARCH effects in all, except, Spain, since the p-values are lower compared to the 
alphas at 5% significance level 
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(e) Normality Tests 
Next, equation (3.2)-(3.3) allowing for conditional heteroscedasticity is estimated the 
assumption of error normality is then investigated using the Shapiro Wilk test. Following the 
test, the p-values of the residuals are less than 5% significance level, which means that the null 
hypothesis of normality should be rejected. The results are displayed in Table 3.6. Given the 
non-normality, equation (3.2)-(3.3) is re-estimated assuming a student-t distribution and a GED 
distribution. The results indicate that both the AIC and BIC favour student-t distribution for 
residuals in (3.2). 
Table 3.6:  Normality test  
 W V Z Prob>z 
Australia 0.95136 49.541 9.866 0.000 
Brazil 0.91278 55.312 9.940 0.000 
Canada 0.98087 19.480 7.507 0.000 
Chile 0.97264 21.285 7.643 0.000 
China 0.94211 38.355 9.050 0.000 
France 0.93880 62.330 10.447 0.000 
Germany 0.94709 53.887 10.079 0.000 
Hong Kong 0.91087 90.776 11.397 0.000 
Indonesia 0.93545 46.087 9.722 0.000 
India 0.91700 63.729 10.378 0.000 
Italy 0.94786 53.106 10.042 0.000 
Japan 0.96416 36.507 9.095 0.000 
Mexico 0.88295 96.717 11.456 0.000 
New Zealand 0.85240 156.876 12.803 0.000 
Norway 0.94466 58.485 10.803 0.000 
Russia 0.89113 57.317 9.944 0.000 
South Africa 0.95918 41.578 9.423 0.000 
South Korea 0.96671 28.204 8.371 0.000 
Spain 0.96377 30.830 8.602 0.000 
Sweden 0.96782 32.177 8.769 0.000 
Switzerland 0.94902 51.925 9.985 0.000 
Taiwan 0.95262 40.523 9.240 0.000 
Thailand 0.95262 40.523 9.290 0.000 
U.K. 0.97472 25.753 8.212 0.000 
US.. 0.96486 35.790 9.044 0.000 
Shapiro Wilk test is conducted after modelling equation (3.2)-(3.3) to test for the normality of the error terms. 
Given the p-values are compared to the 5% significance level in order to determine whether the hypothesis of 
normality should be rejected or not. 
 
(f) Autocorrelation 
Having re-estimated the model assuming that the error term follows a t-distribution the residuals 
are tested for autocorrelation, and in cases where it is found, the errors are modelled as an 
ARMA process of an appropriate order. The Ljung-Box test is used, the null hypothesis of serial 
correlation cannot be rejected for Australia, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Indonesia, India, Italy, 
Norway, South Korea, Switzerland and U.S at 5% significance level.  
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(g) ARCH Effects after GARCH regression 
 Lastly, Engle’s LM ARCH test shows no remaining ARCH effects in residuals after estimating 
model (3.2)-(3.3). The results are in Table 3.7. The p-value observed are greater than the chosen 
alpha (at 5% significance level, in this case), suggesting that the models are correctly specified. 
 
Table 3.7: ARCH LM Test after GJR GARCH using Eq. 3.2 
 Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Australia 1 0.030 1 0.8625 
Brazil 1  0.094    1 0.7593 
Canada 1 0.044 1 0.8330 
Chile 1 0.242 1 0.6228 
China 1 2.558 1 0.1097 
France 1 0.314 1 0.5753 
Germany 1 0.010 1 0.9198 
Hong Kong 1 0.001 1 0.9769 
Indonesia 1 0.007 1 0.9313 
India 1 0.032 1 0.8589 
Italy 1 0.012 1 0.9141 
Japan 1 0.000 1 0.9909 
Mexico 1 0.360      1 0.5496 
New Zealand 1 0.004 1 0.9491 
Norway 1 0.053 1 0.8176 
Russia 1 0.043 1 0.8353 
South Africa 1 0.008 1 0.9309 
South Korea 1 0.001 1 0.9710 
Spain 1 0.035 1 0.8509 
Sweden 1 0.053 1 0.8185 
Switzerland 1 0.009 1 0.9247 
Taiwan 1 0.016 1 0.8991 
Thailand 1 0.002 1 0.9634 
U.K. 1 0.011 1 0.9149 
U.S. 1 0.029 1 0.8649 
Engle’s ARCH LM test is conducted after modelling equation (3.2)-(3.3) for ARCH effects. Given the p-values 
are greater compared to the alphas (5% significance level), it means there is no remaining ARCH effects in the 
residuals after estimating Model 3.2 with a GJR GARCH framework
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3.5.2. Model Estimation 
Table 3.8 presents estimation results for equation (3.2). Firstly, it is observed that in 9 out of 25 
countries, the intercept varies significantly across sub-periods (𝛼1 or 𝛼2 significant), supporting 
the earlier suggestion that imposing a time-constant intercept is a source of misspecification 
when describing the behaviour of returns over time. Secondly, in most of cases, the coefficient 
𝛽𝑡 capturing the interdependence between the local and the global financial markets is time-
varying before the crisis, as indicated by significance of 𝛿1
7. In all but one case, the positive 
sign on ?̂?1 indicates that financial integration was increasing over time in the pre-crisis period. 
Hence, if these positive trends had continued unchanged into the crisis period (𝛾0 = 𝛾1 = 0) 
but were not accounted for (as in model (3.1)), one would be at risk of falsely inferring that 
there was contagion during the 2007-9 crisis period, even if there was none. However, these 
trends in globalisation appear to change significantly in the crisis and post-crisis periods in most 
countries, as indicated by the significance of coefficients 𝛾 and 𝜃. These changes could give 
rise to one of the contagion phenomena as described above, and I investigate them in detail 
below.   
Table 3.9 provide estimation results necessary to assess the existence of all forms of contagion. 
Firstly, it can be observed that for six countries (Brazil, Canada, Russia, South Africa, Spain, 
and Switzerland), there was no change in the intertemporal process governing 𝛽𝑡, including at 
crisis’ onset, as 𝛾0 and 𝛾1 are not significantly different from zero (at the 10% significance 
level). This means that the pre-crisis process of integration continued unchanged into the crisis 
period, hence there is no evidence of any type of contagion. Secondly, for another four countries 
(France, Germany, Mexico, and Sweden), there was a significant negative change in the level 
(𝛾0<0) but no change in the slope (𝛾1=0) of the integration process 𝛽𝑡, i.e., values of 𝛽𝑡 during 
the crisis are all significantly lower, not higher, than what they would have been if the crisis 
had not struck. Hence, there is no evidence of contagion for these countries, either. Rather, 
capital markets of these four countries seem to have decoupled and been integrated less, not 
more, with the world during the crisis period, as compared to their pre-crisis expected 
integration levels. Bekaert et al. (2011), also found segmentation increased towards the end of 
2008 and then falls back to near pre-crisis in 2009. The level of decoupling might depend on 
financial and trade openness or it might be just that international investors decide to avoid 
markets having weak corporate governance (for instance, Mexico) or different legal systems. 
Moreover, according to Dervis (2012), decoupling might be due to differences between 
business cycles and the varied reactions to global shocks.  
                                                             
7 Missing values for 𝛿1 are due to its insignificance in the first pass of the estimation, hence were dropped and 
the model was re-estimated to increase efficiency of remaining estimates. 
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Table 3.8: Estimation Results for Model (3.2) 
Country    Pre-Crisis Crisis Post Crisis 
 ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐 ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 
Australia 0.0012*** -0.0016 -0.0024** 0.7489*** -0.0002*** 9.4904*** -0.0060 *** 0.3016*** - 
Brazil 0.0031*** 0.0018 -0.0037** 1.0132*** - -0.0176 - -0.2115*** - 
Canada 0.0007* 0.0004 -0.0007 0.7119 *** - 0.0604 - -0.0527 - 
Chile 0.0021*** -0.0009 0.0009 -0.0387 0.0003*** 15.1696 *** -0.0100 *** -0.1050 - 
China 0.0010* 0.0044 -0.0028 0.6956*** - 28.5010*** -0.0184*** 0.4394*** - 
France 0.0008 -0.0037** -0.0025** 0.4475*** 0.0004 *** -0.1464** - -0.0022 - 
Germany 0.0007 -0.0019 -0.0014 0.2617*** 0.0006*** -0.3233 *** - -3.6438** 0.0021** 
Hong Kong 0.0022*** -0.0013 -0.0022 0.6019*** 0.0002** 20.2149*** -0.0132*** -0.0011 - 
Indonesia 0.0016 0.0040 0.0029 -0.3847** 0.0009*** 19.51*** -0.0129*** -0.4890*** - 
India 0.0035*** 0.0023 -0.0031 -0.7744*** 0.0011*** 17.8411*** -0.0118*** 5.6710* -0.0038** 
Italy 0.0004 -0.0044*** -0.0034** 0.2928*** 0.0004*** -5.4261* 0.0036* 0.1759** - 
Japan -0.0003 -0.0012 0.00001 0.6580*** 0.0003*** 16.41*** -0.0110 *** -0.5609 *** - 
Mexico 0.0033*** -0.0022 -0.0016 0.4680*** 0.0003** -0.1347** - 5.831*** -0.0039*** 
New Zealand 0.0012*** -0.0046*** -0.0015 0.3271*** - 0.0728* - -0.0678* - 
Norway 0.0017*** -0.0010 -0.0022 0.4195*** 0.0003** 0.3194*** - 0.2546*** - 
Russia 0.0048*** -0.0031 -0.0042* 1.020*** - 0.0637 - 9.024*** - 0.0055*** 
South Africa 0.0027*** 0.0007 -0.0010 0.2894*** 0.0003*** 0.1180 - -0.1565 *** - 
South Korea 0.0002 0.0003 0.0011 -0.2701 0.0010*** 11.33 ** -0.0078 ** -0.6987 *** - 
Spain 0.0009* -0.0044 ** -0.0035** 0.4121 *** 0.0003*** -0.0862 - -0.0169 - 
Sweden 0.0015** -0.0049** -0.0014 0.2512*** 0.0006*** -0.2956*** - -0.3612*** - 
Switzerland 0.0014*** -0.0039** -0.0016 0.2247*** 0.0004 *** -0.0556 - -0.2398*** - 
Taiwan -0.0001 -0.0009 0.0006 0.2185 0.0005*** 12.7843*** -0.0086 *** -0.3326*** - 
Thailand 0.0016 -0.0032 0.0030 0.6341 *** - 0.1914** - 0.0937 - 
U.K. 0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0007 0.5232*** 0.0002*** 0.09323* - 0.1417** - 
U.S. -0.00004 0.0003 0.0012 0.9435 *** - -5.7349*** 0.0038*** -0.0856 ** - 
Note: Parameters stem from model (3.2): 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + +𝛽1𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑅𝑤,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽3𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where  𝛽1𝑡 =  𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑡,    𝛽2𝑡 =  𝛾0 +
𝛾1𝑡,  𝛽3𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑡, where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denotes stock returns in country i at time t, 𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 (𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆) is a dummy variable equal to one during the crisis (post-crisis) period and zero otherwise, 
and  𝑅𝑊,𝑡 is the return of the world stock index. Error terms are modelled as a GJR-GARCH (1,1) process, corrected for autocorrelation in residuals where required. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Insignificant trend terms (𝛿1 , 𝛾1 , 𝜃1) are excluded and model (2) is re-estimated where relevant. 
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Table 3.9: Types of Contagion 
Country First week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟏) Last week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟐) 
Decision Model 
(1) 
results 
Constant 
betas 
model 
 ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕 =  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 t- stats ?̂?𝟐𝒕 =  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 t- stats results 
Australia 9.4904*** -0.006 *** 0.7189 7.7736 0.2051 2.2871 Shock Contagion (Permanent) C C 
Brazil -0.0176 - -0.0176 - -0.0176 - No Contagion   
Canada 0.0604 - 0.0604 - 0.0604 - No Contagion C C 
Chile 15.169 *** -0.010 *** 0.6314 4.0146 -0.2202 -1.9948 Shock Contagion (Reversal) C C 
China 28.5010*** -0.0184*** 1.7630 6.4243 0.1967 1.0422 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C C 
France -0.1464** - -0.1464 - -0.1464 - No Contagion (Decoupling) C C 
Germany -0.3233 *** - -0.3233 - -0.3233 - No Contagion (Decoupling)   
Hong Kong 20.2149*** -0.0132*** 0.9877 5.5096 -0.1386 -1.0507 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C C 
Indonesia 19.51*** -0.0129*** 0.6824 3.0203 -0.4202 -2.4878 Shock Contagion (Reversal) C C 
India 17.8411*** -0.0118*** 0.7513 3.1990 -0.2497 -1.3916 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C C 
Italy -5.4261* 0.0036* -0.1770 -1.7627 0.1305 1.6313 Recoupling Contagion C C 
Japan 16.41*** -0.0110*** 0.3983 2.8124 -0.5399 -5.6790 Shock Contagion (Reversal) C  
Mexico -0.1347** - -0.1347 - -0.1347 - No Contagion (Decoupling) C  
New Zealand 0.0728* - 0.0728 - 0.0728 - Shock Contagion (Level Shift) C C 
Norway 0.3194*** - 0.3194 - 0.3194 - Shock Contagion (Level Shift) C C 
Russia 0.0637 - 0.0637 - 0.0637 - No Contagion    
South Africa 0.1180 - 0.1180 - 0.1180 - No Contagion C C 
South Korea 11.33 ** -0.0078 ** 0.0582 0.3192 -0.6028 -3.7450 No Contagion (Decoupling) C C 
Spain -0.0862 - -0.0862 - -0.0862 - No Contagion   
Sweden -0.2956*** - -0.2956 - -0.2956 - No Contagion (Decoupling)   
Switzerland -0.0556 - -0.0556 - -0.0556 - No Contagion C C 
Taiwan 12.7843*** -0.009 *** 0.3714 1.8488 -0.3557 -2.2609 Shock Contagion (Reversal)   
Thailand 0.1914** - 0.1914 - 0.1914 - Shock Contagion (Level Shift) C C 
U.K. 0.0932* - 0.0932 - 0.0932 - Shock Contagion (Level Shift) C C 
U.S. -5.7349*** 0.0038*** -0.2733 -3.5387 0.0466 1.0092 No Contagion (Decoupling)   
Note: Parameters stem from model (2): 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + +𝛽1𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑅𝑤,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛽3𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , where  𝛽1𝑡 =  𝛿0 +
𝛿1𝑡,    𝛽2𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑡,  𝛽3𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑡, where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denotes stock returns in country i at time t, 𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆  (𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆) is a dummy variable equal to one during the crisis 
(post-crisis) period and zero otherwise, and  𝑅𝑊,𝑡 is the return of the world stock index. Model (1) is:  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑊,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑤,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. ‘Constant betas model’ is identical to model (2) but with time-invariant 𝛽1 , 𝛽2, and 𝛽3. Insignificant trend terms 
(𝛿1, 𝛾1, 𝜃1) are excluded and model (2) is re-estimated where relevant. Error terms are modelled as a GJR-GARCH (1,1) process, corrected for autocorrelation in residuals 
where required. The hypotheses for shock contagion are: 𝐻0: 𝛽2(𝜏1) ≤ 0,   𝐻1: 𝛽2(𝜏1) > 0  , for recoupling contagion: 𝐻0: 𝛽2(𝜏1) ≥ 0,   𝐻1: 𝛽2(𝜏1) < 0 and  𝐻0: 𝛽2(𝜏2) ≤
0,   𝐻1: 𝛽2(𝜏2) > 0, and for kink contagion: 𝐻0: 𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0,  𝐻1: 𝛽2(𝜏1) ≠ 0  and  𝐻0: 𝛾1 ≤ 0, 𝐻𝐴: 𝛾1 >
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a) Shock Contagion 
From Table 3.9, it can be observed that there is an increase in stock returns co-movement 
(𝛽2(𝜏1) > 0 ) during the first week (i.e. Week 1451) of the financial crisis for Australia, Chile, 
China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand and U.K with the world stock market portfolio. Moreover, a t-test shows that 𝛽2𝑡(𝜏1) 
is significant 1% for the countries mentioned above, except for South Korea and Taiwan. 
Hence, it can be concluded that there is evidence of shock contagion for those stock markets 
with the World Stock Market Portfolio. However, as mentioned in the previous section, there 
might be different scenarios under which shock contagion might arise.  
New Zealand, Norway, Thailand, and U.K experienced shock contagion as their stock markets 
experienced a significant upwards shift (𝛾0>0) in 𝛽𝑡 over and above of what one would expect 
by extrapolating pre-crisis trends in financial integration, where present. This situation can be 
depicted in Appendix A.1(i) until A.1(iv). These countries did not record any significant 
changes in the pace of integration (𝛾1=0), which implies that their 𝛽𝑡 values increased at crisis’ 
onset and remained elevated, as compared to pre-crisis trends, throughout the entire crisis 
period. Hence, it was the level but not the pace of their financial integration with the world (not 
the slope of 𝛽𝑡) which was affected by the crisis.  
 
Another frequent type of shock contagion is observed for countries where, 𝛽𝑡 experiences a 
positive and significant shock at crisis’ start (t=𝜏1), but its slope decreases significantly as 
compared to the pre-crisis one (𝛾1<0). Countries which fall into this category are Australia, 
Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, India, Japan, and Taiwan 
These initial positive shocks in 𝛽𝑡 are statistically significant, i.e., ?̂?2(𝜏1) > 0 as indicated by 
values of the t-statistics in Table 3.9, which constitutes evidence in favour of shock contagion. 
In addition, model (3.2) allows inference about the persistence of those initial contagious 
shocks. Firstly, they might have faded away quickly and the financial integration process during 
the remaining part of the crisis period might have been weaker, not stronger, than what would 
have been expected if pre-crisis trends prevailed. Alternatively, the initial shocks might have 
been more persistent and have prevailed, at least partially, throughout the entire crisis period. 
To differentiate between these two scenarios (temporary vs. persistent contagion shocks), 
another t-test is conducted in order to find out whether 𝛽t in the last week of the crisis (t=𝜏2) is 
significantly different from its value which would have been expected at crisis’ end if the crisis 
have had no impact on the process of financial integration. Should the estimated 𝛽2(𝜏2) be 
significantly positive (negative) at crisis’ end, this would imply that the initial positive shock 
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in 𝛽t has not completely faded away (has reversed and led to lower-than-expected integration 
level), indicating at least partially persistent (temporary) contagious shocks. 
 
The results in Table 3.9 and appendix A.1(v) show that the initial contagious shock was 
significantly permanent only for Australia, as its 𝛽2(𝜏2) estimate is positive and significant. For 
the rest of the relevant countries, the remainder of the initial positive shock at crisis’ end. 
?̂?2(𝜏2), is negative and significant for Chile, Indonesia, Japan, and Taiwan, suggesting that 
initial contagious shocks tend to fade away and the level of integration during the later phases 
of the crisis was lower, not higher, than what should have been expected given pre-crisis trends 
in the integration process. This is shown in appendix A.1(vi) to A.1(ix).  For China, Hong Kong, 
and India, the initial shock appears to have completely vanished by the end of the crisis period 
(?̂?2(𝜏2) insignificant), with financial integration process 𝛽t returning to the path it would be on 
if no crisis had occurred. This is displayed in appendix A.1(x), A.1(xi), A.1(xii). 
 
b) Recoupling Contagion  
Contagion effects might also arise if there is a fall in 𝛽𝑡 following the outbreak of the crisis (i.e., 
𝛽2(𝜏1) < 0), accompanied by a steady rise in the level of 𝛽𝑡 as the crisis unfolds, leading to a 
higher level of 𝛽𝑡 at a certain point during this turmoil period. In case of recoupling contagion, 
this will result in co-movements being stronger by the end of the crisis period (i.e. t=𝜏2) than 
what they would have been if the pre-crisis globalisation process was followed, i.e., 𝛽2(𝜏2)> 0.  
 
The results in Table 3.9 show for both Italy and the U.S. that the level of 𝛽𝑡 was lower on the 
first week of the crisis period (i.e. ?̂?2(𝜏1) <0), as compared with what would have been 
expected pre-crisis. However, there is an increase in the level of 𝛽𝑡 as the crisis continues, so 
that by the end of the turmoil period 𝛽𝑡  is higher than what it would have been if the same 
integration processes as in the pre-crisis period were being followed (?̂?2(𝜏2) > 0). 
However, in order to determine the significance of the fall in co-movement of Italy and the U.S. 
with the world during the first week of the crisis, and whether 𝛽2(𝜏2) was indeed significantly 
higher at the end of the crisis period, as compared to what it would have been if the crisis did 
not occur, two t-tests are conducted. The first t-test conducted for week 𝑡 = 𝜏1, which is the 
first week of the crisis, suggests that the null hypothesis of 𝛽2(𝜏2) ≥ 0 can be rejected at 5% 
and 1% level for Italy and the U.S., respectively. In other words, there has indeed been a 
significant fall in the co-movement with the world for the abovementioned countries. The 
second t-test is to ascertain whether the level of 𝛽𝑡 was significantly higher for the stock returns 
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of Italy and the U.S. on the last week of the crisis period (t=𝜏2), compared to what it would 
have been if the crisis did not occur. The results show that the null hypothesis of 𝛽2(𝜏2) ≤ 0 is 
rejected for Italy at 5% level, but cannot be rejected for the U.S. Hence, we conclude that there 
is evidence of recoupling contagion only for the Italian stock market, as its integration with the 
world market at crisis’ end was higher than it would have been in absence of the crisis (Figure 
3.7(l)). In contrast, the U.S. market appears to have experienced a negative integration shock at 
crisis onset, from which it has fully recovered (as ?̂?2(𝜏2) is not significantly different from 
zero), but no evidence of contagion, i.e., excessive co-movements, can be found for the U.S. 
market. 
 
c) Kink Contagion 
“Kink” contagion is referred to as a situation where there is no sudden change in co-movements 
during the first week of the crisis (i.e., 𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0), but contagion can still be identified 
provided there is an increase in integration pace (𝛾1 > 0) during the crisis period and, 
consequently, 𝛽𝑡 is higher during the crisis than what it would have been if the pace of the 
integration process was the same as in the pre-crisis period. In our sample, none of the countries 
appears to have experienced this type of contagion (Table 3.9). For South Korea, the t-test 
suggests that the null hypothesis of 𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0 cannot be rejected, but the change in the 
integration speed is negative, not positive. Hence, South Korean market’s integration with the 
world was progressively weaker as the crisis unfolded, relatively to its pre-crisis pace, and it 
can be concluded that there is no evidence of kink contagion in our sample. 
 
Contagion in this chapter is defined as a significant increase in  𝛽𝑡 during the crisis period, over 
and above of what it would have been if the linkages between the individual country and world 
stock market portfolio was following the same process and in the pre-crisis period.  And 
therefore the “beta” estimates which would be expected during the “crisis period” if there had 
been no impact of the crisis in the integration processes between the world market portfolio and 
individual economies, are extrapolated over the crisis period. It can be seen from Appendix A.1 
that for all countries there would have been an increasing and positive integration process had 
the crisis not happen. 
And as far as the limitations of the integration process amongst countries are concerned, unless 
the asset returns of two economies are not perfectly explained by the same set of global factors, 
these countries cannot be perfectly integrated, Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009). Moreover, 
Chambet and Gibson (2008) find that the degree of integration depends on a country’s trade 
diversification, i.e. less diversified economies are more financially integrated.” 
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3.5.3. Discussion 
Out of 25 countries in our sample, there is evidence of contagion in 13 countries when using a 
model which allows for the existence of a post-crisis subperiod as well as for changes in the 
level of financial integration over time (model 3.2). When applying a specification such as 
model (3.1), i.e., with no separate post-crisis period and subperiod-specific time-invariant 
parameters, the results reported in Table 3.9, second-to-last column, indicate the existence of 
contagion in 18 out of 25 countries.8 Both models (3.1) and (3.2) find no contagion effects for 
Brazil, Germany, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and the U.S. However, the globalisation model (3.2) 
additionally indicates that there is no evidence of contagion for Canada, France, Mexico, South 
Africa, South Korea and Switzerland. Hence, a model with time-invariant parameters appears 
to overestimate the occurrence of contagion, as argued in section 3.2 of this chapter. 
 
An additional benefit of using the globalisation model (3.2) is that it allows for a more detailed 
description of contagious and non-contagious episodes. Firstly, not all contagions are equal: 12 
countries experience a positive shock to their co-movements with the world at crisis onset, i.e., 
“shock” contagion, whereas for Italy there is evidence of a negative initial shock followed by a 
speedy catching-up process, i.e., “recoupling” contagion.  
 
Secondly, not all shock contagions are equal. For instance, for some countries (e.g., Norway), 
the initial shock remains fully present across the entire crisis period, i.e., a level shift in the 
strength of the globalisation process 𝛽𝑡 is observed. In other countries, the initial shock dies out 
over time, but with different end-effects. For instance, in Australia the initial shock appears to 
be at least partially permanent, as the level of integration remains significantly above what 
would be expected pre-crisis for the end of crisis period. By contrast, in other countries (e.g., 
India), at crisis’ end the initial shock is no longer observable, which implies its transitory nature. 
In yet another set of countries (e.g., in Chile), the initial positive shock appears to have not only 
completely disappeared but reversed and became negative, i.e., the level of financial integration 
at crisis’ end is significantly lower, not higher, than what would have been expected based on 
pre-crisis trends in globalisation. This heterogeneity of markets’ responses to contagious shocks 
can only be revealed when implementing the globalisation model (3.2) with time-varying betas.   
 
Thirdly, there is also heterogeneity in responses to crisis outbreak among those countries which 
did not experience contagion. For instance, countries such as Brazil do not record any 
                                                             
8 The results from model (3.1) differ slightly from the those in Baur (2012), where a shorter sample period was 
used: our data shows evidence of contagion in Russia but none in Mexico. 
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significant impact of the crisis period on their intertemporal process of financial integration 
(insignificant 𝛾0 and 𝛾1), and their pre-crisis process of co-movements with the world (?̂?1 > 0) 
continues unchanged throughout the turbulent period. Furthermore, another group of countries 
has not experienced any contagion but has nevertheless been affected by the crisis’ outbreak: 
their co-movements with the world became significantly weaker at crisis’ onset, and either 
remained so throughout the turbulent regime (e.g., France), or just caught up with their pre-
crisis globalisation trend at crisis’ end (the U.S.). South Korea did not respond to the crisis 
initially but subsequently slowly drifted away from the world stock market as the crisis 
unfolded. Again, this heterogeneity in non-contagion cases can only be revealed when 
implementing the globalisation model (3.2). The results show that out of 14 developed and 11 
developing economies, 6 of each show evidence contagion. And there does not seem to be any 
pattern regarding contagion effects based on the geographical proximity. For instance, it can be 
observed from Table 3.9 that countries (e.g. Brazil and Mexico) near U.S (crisis originating 
country) did not show evidence of contagion whereas Australia, the furthest country from U.S 
experienced contagion. 
 
Moreover, it worth noting that the globalisation model (3.2) generates results which differ 
substantially from those obtained using model (3.1) not only because it separates the post- from 
the pre-crisis period, but also because it allows integration parameters to be time-varying within 
each sub-period. This is demonstrated by estimating a model with a separate post-crisis period, 
but which still imposes constancy of integration parameters in each sub-period (i.e., model (3.2) 
with 𝛽1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3 not being time-varying). It can be observed that the integration process 
between Australia and the world stock market has been negative during the pre-crisis, compared 
to other countries. This might be because Australia had a heavily regulated financial system 
until late 1970s. Bekaert et al (2011), found that heavily regulated industries, for instance 
banking and insurance sectors, were among the least integrated with the world economy.  Other 
reasons for a negative integration with the world stock market include, different industrial 
composition of an economy the legal environment and political stability of an economy (La 
Porta et al. 2007). 
 
The estimation results of that model regarding the presence of contagion are indicated in the 
last column of Table 3.3. It generates an almost identical set of results as model (3.1) except for 
two cases: it does not find evidence of contagion in Mexico, which is in line with model’s (3.2) 
findings, but it also fails to find contagion for Japan, even though model (3.2) indicates that the 
Japanese market experienced shock contagion. Hence, the differences in results between model 
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(3.1) and (3.2) are due to the fact that the latter allows for time variations in financial integration 
within each sub-period. This confirms the importance of allowing the process of integration to 
be time varying, as in our model (3.2). 
 
Additionally, as a robustness test9, I vary the timing of the crisis episode in two following ways. 
Firstly, the dates of 03/07/07 and 15/05/09 for the beginning and end of the crisis episode is 
adopted, based on findings in Dungey et al. (2015); this results in a crisis period starting earlier 
and finishing later than the original dataset, as adopted from Baur (2012). In addition to this, I 
also use a shorter crisis period as in Tong and Wei (2011), ranging between 31/07/07 and 
31/12/08. The results reported in appendix A.2 indicate that extending the crisis episode as in 
Dungey et al. (2015) changes little to the main conclusions about occurrence and types of 
contagion: out of 25 countries investigated, contagion result is different in only three cases 
(contagion not being detected), and in other three the exact type of market reaction to crisis is 
different (e.g., no reaction rather than decoupling shift). In the vast majority of cases, however, 
a longer crisis definition yields identical results as the initial crisis period definition. Results for 
the Tong and Wei (2011) crisis definition are somewhat less similar, which should come as no 
surprise as those authors rather radically terminate the crisis episode by the end of year 2008. 
More specifically, with that short crisis episode, different results in six cases (either non-
existing contagion detected or existing contagion not detected) are observed, and further seven 
cases disagree on the exact for (but not existence) of contagion. These results indicate that it is 
important to employ a reasonable definition of the crisis episode under investigation, but also 
that our method is rather robust to small, reasonable variations in this definition. In addition, if 
one employed a more conservative significance level (e.g., 1% rather than 5%), the differences 
in results for our various crisis definitions would be even less pronounced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
9 I have also performed a “counterfactual analysis” by assuming the crisis started and ended at a much earlier date 
(i.e. from 9 January 2007 to 29 July 2008). The findings are very different from the main contagion results as there 
were fewer cases of contagion and they were mostly recoupling contagion. For instance, Australia, Hong Kong 
and India showed evidence of recoupling contagion, which shows that these countries were not affected at the 
beginning of the sample period but were rather experiencing contagion at later stage. 
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3.6. Conclusion  
 
The findings of this chapter provide clear evidence that the financial crisis of 2007-09 has led 
to change in the dynamics of contagion between most of the stock markets of 25 leading world 
economies, by employing a new model for testing and differentiating among different types of 
financial contagion. 
 
One of the uniqueness of this paper is that it accounts for pre-crisis trends in financial 
integration, making mis-diagnosis of contagion less likely. It also allows to describe different 
patterns of markets’ reactions to an outbreak of a crisis, both cross-sectionally and over the 
duration of the crisis period. Hence, different types of contagion: “shock”, “recoupling”, and 
“kink” contagion can be identified. And as a result, a novel meaning of contagion is adopted, 
described a significant increase in equity markets co-movement during a turmoil period relative 
to what the co-movement would have been if the crisis did not occur (i.e. the sample 
intertemporal integration process as the pre-crisis period had prevailed).  Moreover, for the 
purpose of this chapter, I have used easily obtainable stock price data and does not require 
identification and use of proxies for economic fundamentals. Instead of depending on any 
structural or latent variables, the market exposures in this paper is time-varying. Previous 
research studies, for instance, Bakeart and Harvey (1997); Ng (2000); have made the global 
(regional) market exposures, or betas, time varying by making them conditional on some 
structural information variables, or on a latent regime variable (for example, Baele, 2005), as 
discussed in earlier sections. The disadvantage of the first approach is that although it allows 
betas to change with structural changes in the economic and financial environment, it cannot 
accommodate cyclical variation in the betas. Additionally, despite the fact that the second 
approach allows the betas to vary over the cycle, it is less suited for permanent changes in 
market betas. Baele et al. (2010) combine both approaches, in the sense that the market betas 
are conditional on three structural variables, reflecting time-varying integration and market 
development, and a latent regime variable which accounts for temporary economic fluctuations. 
 
When employed to test for contagion during the 2007-9 crisis episode on stock markets of 25 
leading world economies, model (3.2) identifies many fewer instances of contagion than a 
popular alternative approach, which assumes sub-period specific time-invariant world market 
exposures (e.g., Baur, 2012, Fry-McKibbin et al., 2014, Kenourgios, Dimitriou, 2015, Dungey 
and Gajurel, 2014, 2015 and Dungey et al., 2015). Hence, financial crises might not be as 
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contagious as commonly believed, in line with previous findings by Forbes, Rigobon (2002), 
Brière et al. (2012), Beirne and Gieck (2014), etc. In addition, the heterogeneity of markets’ 
reactions to world market shocks is unveiled, with some suffering from contagion in the early 
phases whereas others in the late phases of the crisis, with initial contagion being permanent or 
transitory, with the pace of globalisation during crisis being affected positively, or negatively, 
or not at all, etc. The findings of contagion in this chapter being confined into specific phases 
of the crisis period correspond well with, e.g., Dungey and Gajurel (2014), Kenourgios and 
Dimitriou (2015) and Dungey et al. (2015), but in my approach they emerge endogenously from 
model estimation.  
 
For portfolio investors, it is important to know whether the linkages between asset markets are 
time-varying, and how these potentially abrupt changes could be predicted, or their impact 
minimized, in order to devise safer investment strategies to benefit their clients. Policy makers 
aiming at stabilising domestic financial markets during crises would also benefit from the 
knowledge that the increased transmission of shocks originating abroad is likely to be due to 
fundamental, rational causes, and not to irrational contagion, and when it is contagious, it may 
materialise in one of several different forms, in different phases of the crisis. Moreover, time-
varying co-movements have significant impact on international portfolio diversification. The 
conventional wisdom is that benefits from diversification have been diminishing over time, due 
to progressing globalisation, and are especially weak in crises, as correlations between stock 
returns tend to be higher in bear markets. However, finding of contagion in this paper being 
less prevalent than expected strengthens the rationale for international diversification even in 
crises, as demonstrated empirically by, e.g., Vermeulen (2013).  
 
Further research could explore how allowing for non-linearity in the market integration process 
could help to increase the precision of the contagion type identification method proposed here. 
In addition, it would be an interesting avenue to explore the determinants of the cross-country 
heterogeneity in responses to crisis outbreaks which the method proposed here allows to 
uncover.  
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APPENDIX A: Financial Contagion: A new approach robust to trends in globalisation and interdependence  
A.1:  Betas during Crisis period compared to what the linkages would have been if the crisis did not prevail 
Figure A.1(i) to A.1 (xii) show the time-varying integration process during the crisis (i.e. 𝛽
2𝑡
) between each country’s stock market and the world stock market 
portfolio evolves during the crisis period (depicted by the blue line) as compared to how it would evolve if the same integration process as the pre-crisis was 
being followed (shown by the red line) 
Figure (i): New Zealand       Figure (ii): Norway 
   
Figure (iii): Thailand       Figure (iv): U.K 
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Figure (v): Australia        Figure (vi): Chile 
  
 
Figure (vii) Indonesia       Figure (viii): Japan 
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Figure (ix): China       Figure (x) Hong Kong 
  
 
Figure (xi): India       Figure (xii): Italy 
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Table A.2: Sensitivity Analysis (Different crisis dates) 
 Baur’s Crisis Dates (7/08/07 -
24/03/09) 
Dungey Crisis Dates (3/07/07-
15/05/09) 
Tong and Wei Crisis Dates (31/07/07-
31/12/08) 
 ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏  ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏  ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏  
Australia 9.4904*** -0.0060 
*** 
Shock 
Contagion 
(Permanent) 
9.5203*** -
.0061*** 
Shock 
Contagion 
(Permanent) 
7.168** -.00445** Shock Contagion 
(Transitory) 
Brazil -0.0176 - No Contagion -.2342** - No Contagion 
(Decoupling 
Shift) 
-.1695 - No Contagion 
Canada 0.0604 - No Contagion .0630 - No Contagion -5.9583** .0040** Kink Contagion 
Chile 15.1696 
*** 
-.0100 *** Shock 
Contagion 
(Reversal) 
12.12123*** -
.0080*** 
Shock 
Contagion 
(Reversal) 
15.6877*** -.0104*** Shock Contagion 
(Reversal) 
China 28.5010*** -
0.0184*** 
Shock 
Contagion 
(Transitory) 
19.8554*** -
.0129*** 
Shock 
Contagion 
(Transitory) 
  30.846*** -.0202*** Shock Contagion 
(Transitory) 
France -0.1464** - No Contagion 
(Decoupling 
Shift) 
-.1631*** - No Contagion 
(Decoupling 
Shift) 
-.1333** - No Contagion 
(Decoupling Shift) 
Germany -0.3233 
*** 
- No Contagion 
(Decoupling 
Shift) 
  -.4377*** - No Contagion 
(Decoupling 
Shift) 
10.88491*** -.0076*** No Contagion 
(Decoupling) 
Hong Kong 20.2149*** -
0.0132*** 
Shock 
Contagion 
(Transitory) 
11.3419*** -
.0074*** 
Shock 
Contagion 
(Transitory) 
24.26847*** -.0159*** Shock Contagion 
(Transitory) 
Indonesia 19.51*** -
0.0129*** 
Shock 
Contagion 
(Reversal) 
13.5764*** -
.0091*** 
Shock 
Contagion 
(Reversal) 
.1784231 - No Contagion 
India 17.8411*** -
0.0118*** 
Shock 
Contagion 
(Transitory) 
  8.5299* -.0056* Shock 
Contagion 
(Transitory) 
11.4794** -.0076* Shock Contagion 
(Transitory) 
Italy -5.4261* 0.0036* Recoupling 
Contagion 
-4.8029** .0034** Recoupling 
Contagion 
-5.9050** .0039** No Contagion  
Japan 16.41*** -0.0110 
*** 
Shock 
Contagion 
(Reversal) 
12.0709*** -
.0080*** 
Shock 
Contagion 
(Reversal) 
13.7231*** -.0093*** Shock Contagion 
(Reversal) 
Mexico -.1347** - No Contagion 
(Decoupling 
Shift) 
-.1278 - No Contagion  -.1585** - No Contagion 
(Decoupling Shift) 
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New 
Zealand 
0.0728* - Shock 
Contagion 
(Level Shift) 
.0646 - No Contagion 5.0094* -.00313* Shock Contagion 
(Permanent) 
Norway .3194*** - Shock 
Contagion 
(Level Shift) 
  .3186*** - Shock 
Contagion 
(Level Shift) 
-13.5838*** .0094*** Kink 
Russia 0.0637 - No Contagion    .07496 - No Contagion  -24.7964*** .01683*** Recoupling  
South 
Africa 
0.1180 - No Contagion .04981 - No Contagion .1457948* - Shock 
Contagion(Shift) 
South 
Korea 
11.33 ** -0.0078 ** No Contagion 
(Decoupling) 
7.7180* -.0054* No Contagion 
(Decoupling) 
8.9027* -.006175* No Contagion 
(Decoupling) 
Spain -0.0862 - No Contagion -.1355** - No Contagion 
(Decoupling 
Shift) 
-.1422* - No Contagion 
(Decoupling Shift) 
Sweden -.2956*** - No Contagion 
(Decoupling 
Shift) 
  -.3047*** - No Contagion 
(Decoupling 
Shift) 
 -.2623*** - No Contagion 
(Decoupling Shift) 
Switzerland -0.0556 - No Contagion -.1366** - No Contagion 
(Decoupling 
Shift) 
-.0486 - No Contagion 
Taiwan 12.7843*** -0.0086 
*** 
Shock 
Contagion 
(Reversal) 
6.481591* -.0043* No Contagion 
(Decoupling) 
  10.6461* -.0071* Shock Contagion 
(Transitory) 
Thailand 0.1914** - Shock 
Contagion 
(Level Shift) 
.2136*** - Shock 
Contagion 
(Level Shift) 
-.01488 - No Contagion 
U.K. 0.0932* - Shock 
Contagion 
(Level Shift) 
.0461 - No Contagion   .0688 - No Contagion 
U.S. -5.7349*** 0.0038*** No Contagion 
(Decoupling) 
-.0921*** - No Contagion 
(Decoupling) 
-.1187*** - No Contagion 
(Decoupling) 
Note: The table displays contagion results for different crisis dates. Parameters stem from model (3.2): 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + +𝛽1𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑅𝑤,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 +
𝛽3𝑡𝑅𝑊,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where  𝛽1𝑡 =  𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑡,    𝛽2𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑡,  𝛽3𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑡, where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denotes stock returns in country i at time t, 𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 (𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆) is a dummy 
variable equal to one during the crisis (post-crisis) period and zero otherwise, and  𝑅𝑊,𝑡 is the return of the world stock index. Error terms are modelled as a GJR-GARCH (1,1) 
process, corrected for autocorrelation in residuals where required. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Insignificant trend terms (𝛿1 , 𝛾1 , 𝜃1) are 
excluded and model (2) is re-estimated where relevant. 
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Chapter 4. Financial Contagion: A sectoral perspective 
4.1. Introduction 
The Financial crisis of 2007-2009 depicts a situation in which acute distress in the subprime 
mortgage market rapidly spread across both advanced and emerging economies worldwide and 
has affected both financial activities and macroeconomic conditions across the globe. In many 
countries, the financial sector is one of the main funding sources for industrial and service firms 
with little internal funds. Therefore, it is inevitable that non-financial sectors (i.e. the real 
economy) should be affected by the vagaries of the financial sector, following the outbreak of 
the crisis, as access to external financing was narrowed, hence restricting the volume of lending.  
The importance of the financial section in transmitting financial shocks across both developed 
and developing economies around the well is well recognised in the literature (Kaufman, 1994; 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013). For instance, Tong and Wei (2011) state “that international capital 
flows rose considerable from 2002, peaking in 2007. However, since 2008, world capital 
inflows declined sharply by 44% in absolute dollar amount relative to the peak in 2007". This 
reversal of capital flows could bring disastrous economic results. For instance, the liquidity 
supply available to firms could be disrupted, which lead to a loss of market confidence in other 
financial firms and induce investors to withdraw money and eventually forcing those firms to 
liquidate assets at a price below their intrinsic value. Moreover, the transmission of financial 
shocks can be intensified by their linkages both within and across countries.  
There is a prevailing notion the financial sector is the most vulnerable sector towards financial 
contagion in both the home country and across the world. However, in this chapter, it is 
hypothesised that as non-financial firms are also directly interconnected to their foreign 
counterparts through international trade, non-financial sectors may also be affected by 
contagion. A business cycle synchronization arises from trade linkages and as a result increases 
co-movement at a sectoral level (Giovanni and Levchenko, 2010). This interdependence in real 
economy activities has been considerably reinforced by the liberalization of international trade 
and rapid rise of multinational corporations over years. And it will be interesting to investigate 
how this interdependence with the world changes once the crisis has struck. 
Another reason why studying contagion in the real economy is important is due to the fact that 
co-movement at market level may mask the heterogeneous impact on various sectors, as real 
economy contagion may be asymmetric, i.e. that some sectors are more vulnerable to external 
shocks compared to others. Furthermore, from a portfolio management perspective, this sectoral 
heterogeneity of contagion means that there are prospects for achieving the benefit of 
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international diversification during crises, despite the evidence of contagion effects at the 
market level. Diversification opportunities will arise if there are low correlations between the 
some of the domestic sectors and the world stock financial sector. 
Due to the above arguments and the fact that there has been little attention attributed to 
contagion effects at the sectoral level (particularly non-financial sectors) compared to research 
studies on contagion effects at a market level, this chapter investigates contagion effects in 
financial and non-financial sectors arising from the World Financial sector and domestic 
financial sectors. In this chapter, I assume that non-financial sectors are directly affected by the 
global system (i.e. they borrow and lend globally), and as a result the GFC has direct impact on 
them. Further, GJR-GARCH model is employed and contagion effects is explored in 25 
countries (developed and developing), across 10 sectors (financial and non-financial). 
Moreover, in this study, contagion effects stemming from the World Financial sector, is labelled 
as “global contagion” which implies an increase in co-movement of either financial or non-
financial sectors, or both. Alternatively, contagion arising within a country, from the financial 
sectors to the real economy, is referred to as “domestic contagion”. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 and 3, most research studies (e.g. Bekaert et al. 2005; Boyer et al. 
2006; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) have adopted a strict definition of contagion, and explain it 
as “a significant increase in correlation between stock returns in different markets/regions.”  
Unlike previous literatures, I define contagion as an increase in co-movement between two 
equity markets during a crisis period, as compared to what it would have been, had the crisis 
not occurred10. One of the advantages using this description is that, a time-trend model is used 
to model the natural interdependence between markets, and according to this definition, 
contagion occurs when there is an excess co-movement during a turbulent period over and 
above the existing growing natural interdependence. This framework, which has been explained 
in detail in the previous chapter is also used to disentangle amongst the different situations in 
which contagion might arise, namely, ‘shock’, ‘recoupling’ and ‘kink’ contagion. 
The contribution of Chapter 4, relative the previous one is that it explores contagion at a sectoral 
level, and not at a country level. As mentioned previously, there have been numerous studies 
conducted on contagion at a market level, but very few at a sectoral level. Chapter 3 shows 
which countries displays evidence of contagion during the recent financial crisis and how the 
integration processes between individual stock market and the world stock market changes 
during periods. Moreover, it shows the different types of contagion which might arise, namely, 
                                                             
10 This novel definition has been adopted from Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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Shock, Recoupling and Kink contagion. However, it does not mean those countries that did not 
show signs of contagion were not affected by the crisis. Also contagion can be observed on a 
market level, but it might be driven by one or a few industries only and not all. And on the other 
hand, contagion might not be observed at a market level, but it exists in some sectors. Hence it 
is important for investors and policy makers to be aware of this in order to mitigate risk. 
As a result, Chapter 4, examines contagion in a comprehensive manner, i.e. contagion at a 
sectoral level in the 25 countries which examined in Chapter 3 and shows the integration 
processes of the real economy of a country and which sector has been most or least affected by 
the recent financial crisis. Moreover, recent research studies (e.g. Cho et al., 2007) have shown 
that industries have become more integrated globally over time, and are as a result more prone 
to facilitate global shocks to spread across countries. For instance, during the recent financial 
crisis, the turmoil that started in the subprime loan sector propagated to the banking sector and 
then across the whole world. 
The findings of this chapter show that during the 2007-2009 financial crisis all countries 
experienced “global contagion” through at least one of their sectors, and it had a more 
pronounced impact on developed relative to developing countries. Additionally, there is less 
occurrence of “domestic contagion” as compared to exposures from the World financial sector. 
But, most importantly, the findings show that a high degree of heterogeneity in contagion is 
experienced across all the sectors, with Basic materials, Financial, and Utilities sector showing 
the highest incidences of “global contagion”.  There are numerous potential reasons for sectoral 
contagion, for e.g. dependence on external financing, the surge in multinational corporations, 
trade channels, information asymmetry, amongst others. As far as the types of contagion is 
concerned, it is observed that sectors have been experiencing ‘Shock’ contagion more than any 
other type of contagion implying that these sectors were affected immediately after the outbreak 
of the financial crisis.  
This study differs from the above-mentioned research studies and contributes to the literature 
firstly in terms of our novel definition of contagion, proposed in Chapter 3, in order to overcome 
the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of contagion and explain this phenomenon as an excess 
co-movement in asset return during a period of turmoil, in comparison to what the co-movement 
would have been if the crisis did not occur. Moreover, similar to the previous chapter, a time 
trend is allowed in this contagion framework, in order to account for long-term processes such 
as globalisation, and hence allowing to empirically distinguish between genuine contagion and 
changes in linkages in the financial markets which would have prevailed in normal conditions.  
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Given the above, the results of this chapter also show how the integration process between the 
real economy and the global/domestic financial sector has been evolving before, during and 
after the crisis. This also enables one to look at whether countries that were more integrated 
with the financial sectors (world) were more prone to contagion compared to those that did not 
show any positive integration during the pre-crisis period. Another contribution of this research 
is that since there is an emphasis on the different types of contagion which might arise during 
a crisis, this enables me to examine whether sectors across 25 countries experienced contagion 
effect at the beginning of the crisis, or they were affected during the last phase of the crisis 
period.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, the literature of contagion effects 
at a sectoral level are presented. Section 4.3 describes the methodological framework to 
differentiate among different types of and test for financial contagion. Methodology and data 
are presented in Sections 4.4 and, respectively, whereas Section 4.5 describes the results and 
Section 4.6 summarises the findings and concludes. 
 
4.2. Prior Literature on Contagion at a sectoral level 
 
In the literature of equity markets contagion, there seems to be a dominance of country effects 
as compared to industry effects, which explains the lack of research on a sectoral level. 
Traditionally, researchers (for e.g. Griffin and Karolyi, 1998, and Serra, 2000) stated that 
“country effects are important in determining the stock returns and a nation’s unique economic 
environment is the reason why markets do not move closely together, resulting in low 
correlations and subsequently risk reduction benefits for international diversification.” 
However more recent research studies (e.g. Campa and Fernandes, 2006; Carrieri et al., 2012) 
show there has been an increase in the importance of industry effects. This is mainly because 
an economy consists of a mixture of different industries, and their stock prices might not be 
perfectly correlated with each other. For example, if two countries concentrate in two different 
sectors, then holding the two country portfolios is similar to holding portfolios of these two 
sectors. Hence, the two sectors do not have a perfect correlation, the two countries will also 
have low correlation. The analysis of sectoral spillovers thus provides a complimentary and 
more granular perspective on equity market spillovers.  
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4.2.1. Equity Market Contagion– A sectoral perspective 
 
The focus of this chapter is to investigate contagion effects in real economy during the recent 
global financial crisis. As established in the previous chapters of this thesis, there has been an 
on-going debate in the finance literature about the definition of contagion in international stock 
markets and returns, since the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) was published, leading to numerous 
methods and conflicting contagion results during crisis periods. Contagion analysis has evolved 
from simply examining correlation coefficients to more sophisticated methods, capable of 
addressing the shortcomings in the probability models, correlation breakdown approach, such 
as heteroscedasticity, omitted variables and endogeneity. For instance, dynamic copulas have 
been extensively used in contagion literature (see Patton, 2006; Okimoto, 2008; Aloui et al. 
2011). Dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) GARCH models have also been used (Chiang 
et al. 2007; Dimitriou et al. 2013).  And as far as analysing contagion at a sectoral level, several 
approaches have been used. Amongst them, there is the factor model based on the capital asset 
pricing approach (e.g. Phylaktis and Xia, 2009, Cho et al. 2015, Dungey and Gajurel, 2014, 
Bekaert et al. 2014) and multivariate GARCH models (e.g. Chiu et al, 2014, Kenourgios and 
Dimitriou, 2015).  
The objectives of the above-mentioned research studies were however not limited to generate 
a yes/no answer to the question of whether there was any evidence of contagion.  For instance, 
Dungey and Gajurel (2015) examines the impact of unexpected international transmission of 
banking crises from 2007 until 2009 for 54 countries and find that these transmissions are 
beyond any fundamentals that would occur during ‘normal’ times. Subsequently, they 
categorise contagion into 3 types, namely systematic contagion, idiosyncratic contagion and 
structural shift and found that most of the banking sectors in their sample experienced 
systematic (transmission of common shocks that hit the global market) and idiosyncratic 
(unanticipated impact of shocks affecting U.S banking sector and transmitted to other banking 
sectors) contagion during the crisis period.  
 
Bekaert et al. (2014) develops a three-factor model to set a benchmark for what global equity 
market co-movements should be, based on existing fundamentals (such as capital injections in 
financial and non-financial firms, trade and financial openness, information asymmetries, etc.). 
The model distinguishes between a U.S specific factor, a global financial sector and a domestic 
factor for the pricing of 415 country-sector equity portfolio, across 55 countries. They define 
contagion as the co-movement in excess of that implied model. They also show that contagion 
was more dominant from global equity markets to individual domestic equity portfolios as 
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compared to contagion from U.S markets. Moreover, they found that the strongest effect of 
contagion was experienced in Basic Materials, Industrials, Utilities, and Energy across all 
regions in their sample. 
 
Additionally, Baur (2012) and Kenourgious and Dimitriou (2015) investigate contagion in the 
real economy during the recent financial crisis and concluded that the sectors that were affected 
the most during the recent financial crisis are Energy, Utilities, and Basic Materials whereas 
the least affected are Telecommunications, Consumer Goods, Industrials and Healthcare. Both 
research studies look at the impact of external (global or U.S) and regional shocks on the real 
economies. Cho et al. (2015) detect contagion in Oil & Gas, foods and automobiles industry.  
 
4.2.2. Integration at a sectoral level  
 
“Theoretically, more open and integrated markets should lead to a lower cost of capital, 
increased savings and eventually, enhanced economic growth through international risk 
sharing” (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003; Carrieri, Errunza, and Hogan, 2007). Despite the fact that 
integration has its benefits, it can also make countries more vulnerable to external shocks. The 
benefits of globalisation have been extensively questioned during the global financial crisis, as 
there was a general belief that interconnected markets help propagate the crisis across the global 
markets. However, there are a few research studies that have examined the relationship between 
stock market integration and financial crisis, and amongst them is Bekaert et al. (2011) who use 
a three-factor model, to investigate the impact of the subprime crisis on both advance and 
emerging economies and Pukthaunthong and Roll (2009) who use a multi-factor model based 
on its explanatory power to investigate recent trends in global integration. These two papers 
found contrasting findings regarding integration dynamics during the crisis period. The former 
find than decoupling prevails during crisis periods, while the later find the opposite. Moreover, 
Bekaert et al. (2014) report that most integrated countries were not the ones that were mostly 
affected during the global financial crisis. And on the other hand, Lehkonen (2014) who 
examines the dynamics of stock market integration process by using a multifactor integration 
measure, on both developed and emerging economies show that higher level of market 
integration helped to propagate the crisis in several countries at the start of the financial crisis. 
Kaltenhauser, (2002), (2003) and Phylaktis and Xia (2009) were amongst these very few 
research studies that examined integration at a sectoral level in equity markets. Phylaktis and 
Xia (2009) use a rolling estimation method to examine time variant correlation, explored the 
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integration of 10 sectors for 29 countries at a regional and global (U.S) level. They find that the 
pattern of the sectors integration changed over time, especially during turmoil periods. For 
instance, during the period from 1990 to 2009, sectors in Europe and Latin America showed a 
stronger integration at a regional level, whereas sectors in Asia were more integrated with the 
global market during the same period of time.  
Hence while identifying contagion from the financial sector, this chapter also explores the 
integration process of the world financial sector and domestic financial sector before the crisis 
and during the   
4.2.3. Reasons for sectoral contagion  
 
There a few research studies conducted on the channels of contagion which tried to explain the 
varied contagion results. For instance, Kenourgios and Dimitriou (2015) argue that a crisis can 
quickly spread across sectors as a result of the rapid process of financialization (for instance, 
increasing derivatives trading, growth in hedge funds and commodity index funds), which has 
made the real economy sectors more vulnerable to financial shocks. They also add that 
multinational corporations are more susceptible to to contagion, as a shock in the host country 
is easily diffused to the home country of the multinational corporation.  Further, According to 
Cravino and Levchenko (2015) stated that, “multinational corporations accounted for about 
one-third of gross output in many developed countries. There are numerous interrelated 
channels through which multinational corporations affect the co-movement of economic 
activities across countries. Firstly, multinational corporations play an important role in 
increasing vertical production linkages across countries, which as a result magnifies the impact 
of bilateral trade on output co-movement. Secondly, investment rates and returns of foreign 
affiliates are strongly correlated with those of their parent companies. And lastly, the sales 
growth of the headquarter is strongly associated with sales growth of affiliates. Hence, the role 
of multinationals (together with the move towards free trade) in recent decades, has facilitated 
the transmission of demand and supply shocks across countries though non-financial firms.” 
Different industry characteristics (such as industry’s debt financing, valuation and investment) 
can also increase the vulnerability to crises (Chiu et al, 2015). Hence if most industries in a 
sector are dependent on external financing, the likelihood of that sector being affected is higher 
when a crisis hits, as industries that are dependent on external debt sometimes encounter 
difficulties to raise funds from the financial sector. And, the probability of finding funds through 
sales of assets or external funding is better in normal times. However, when the financial sector 
is in crisis (or foreign financial sectors, in the event that the sector is dependent on external 
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financing from banks outside the country), credit constraints may prevail and, in these 
situations, industrial sectors may be adversely affected. Rajan and Zingales (1998) also 
emphasis that those industries that are more dependent on external financing are more severely 
affected by crises and are more likely to experience larger contractions in investment, output 
and value-added growth, as a fall in finance have a larger negative impact on industries where 
external finance is more important.  And as far as the industries’ valuation and investment are 
concerned, the higher the industrial sectors’ valuation and investments are, the less likely are 
they going to be dependent on the financial sector, which minimise the impact of contagion 
from a crisis in the domestic financial sector.  Chiu et al (2015) also added that competitive 
industries might be more to suffer from a crisis in the financial sector as compared to 
concentrated industries.  
Another factor that increases the vulnerability of the individual sectors is the financial and 
economic integration with the rest of the world (See Briere et al., 2012; Mendoza and 
Quandrini (2010)).  Forbes (2004) stated that the trade channel has often been associated with 
international spillovers and contagion. “Changes in relative trade structure ratio has been 
significantly associated with the probability of contagion from one country to another”, 
according to Luchtenberg and Vu (2015). They also found that an increase in relative export of 
country i from country j before and during the financial crisis of 2008 is positively related to 
contagion. Moreover, they also find that U.S is more independent than any other markets in 
their study as U.S spreads the most and receives the least financial shock from other countries. 
They argue that the reason is because during the financial crisis, U.S reduced its imports from 
other nations. Bekaert et al. (2014) adds that trade and financial channels can indirectly 
contribute to domestic contagion, if these channels break down during the crisis period. Their 
observation is that, “if international factor exposures are increasing in external integration, and 
domestic factor exposures decreasing. This can lead to a partial segmentation model where 
international firms are priced differently as compared to domestic ones, and the later are still an 
important part of the domestic market portfolio. And if during a crisis, trade and financial flows 
collapse, this could cause a pattern whereby firms are now more correlated with the domestic 
factor and less with international factors.” 
Information asymmetry is another source of contagion, whereby investors rely on easily 
available public information which as a result may lead to increasing co-movements. For 
instance, in the event of imperfect information, investors may believe that other countries 
undergo similar problems and situations during a financial crisis and as a result sell asset in 
other countries (especially those with similar conditions as in where the crisis started). Dumas 
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et al (2011) states that “domestic and foreign investors may have difference of opinion on public 
signals, whereby local investors are better equipped to interpret (local) public news compared 
to foreign investors. And as a result, returns and international capital flows co-move positively 
(as foreign investors erroneously view increases in stock market as a signal of future 
increases).” The wake-up call hypothesis has also been investigated by Bekaert et al. (2014), 
whereby “a crisis is initially restricted to one market segment or country, and new information 
provided may prompt investors to reassess their vulnerability of other market segments or 
countries. Under the wake-up call hypothesis, countries without trade or banking linkages with 
the country in which the crisis started may experience contagion, but the extent of their exposure 
depends on the strength of their local fundamentals and institutional factors.” 
Investors’ behaviour may be determined not only by their information (or lack thereof) on 
countries in their portfolio as mentioned above, but also by information on the action of other 
investors. Investors may find it less costly and therefore more advantageous to follow the 
investment pattern of other informed investors, thereby generating additional effects from 
information asymmetries. Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) define herding as an excessive and 
irrational tendency of traders to ignore fundamental information and flock together which might 
lead to destabilisation of markets and generate excess volatility. Risk aversion and liquidity are 
also factors that might contribute to contagion. As per Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan (2012), 
international asset prices are quite sensitive to risk aversion and liquidity constraints, which are 
two factors that might contribute to contagion. During a crisis period, risk aversion tends to 
increase substantially, and in such circumstances, they might flee to safer assets (e.g. 
government bonds in their country or other advanced economies) and shun the risky assets. 
Additionally, Brunnermeier and Perdesen (2008) and Adrian and Shin (2010) stresses the role 
of illiquity in exacerbating the crisis. For instance, the freezing of credit and interbank markets 
and a liquidity in U.S made it difficult for financial and nonfinancial institutions to obtain 
capital.  
Due to international exposure, one would expect tradable goods (e.g. manufacturing) 
denominated sectors to be more prone to contagion as compared to non-tradable goods (e.g. 
healthcare) denominated sectors. However, a non-tradable denominated sector might not be 
immune to the financial crisis as well if the sector is dependent upon the domestic financial 
sector for funding, whereby access to credit has become more difficult following the outbreak 
of the crisis. 
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4.2.4. Summary of the Literature Review 
 
This chapter differs from the research studies mentioned above, in the way the exposures 
(‘betas’), while testing for contagion and integration between sectoral returns and financial 
sectors are modelled. Previous research studies (such as Bekaert et al. 2004; Dungey and 
Gajurel, 2015) have made global (regional) market exposures, or betas, time-varying by making 
them on some structural information on a latent regime variable. However, as established 
earlier, one of the challenges of this method is that while it allows betas to change with structural 
changes in the economic and financial environment, it cannot account for cyclical variation. 
Moreover, it is not clear which variables exactly should be included in such a model to fully 
capture the impact of fundamentals on interdependencies among markets, which might lead to 
possible model misspecifications due to omitted variable bias and potential incorrect inference 
about existence of contagion. And, lastly, as many empirical proxies of fundamentals are only 
available at low frequencies, a researcher is left with either too few observations in the crisis 
period (when fitting the model to low frequency data), or high persistence and low volatility of 
explanatory variables (when regressing high frequency stock returns on low frequency 
economic variables), especially if the crisis period under investigation was short. For instance, 
Bekaert et al. (2011) and Lekonen (2015) used an annual and monthly frequency of data 
respectively, which prevents them from capturing higher frequency dynamics. Our method not 
only allow the co-movement between weekly stock returns to move over time, as it has been 
widely accepted that market integration process is time-varying (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003; 
Pukthaunthong and Roll (2009), amongst others), but also distinguishes between the start and 
the remainder of the crisis. We also treat the pre-crisis and post-crisis period differently, as 
compared to Baur (2012) and Kenourgios and Dimitriou (2015), for instance, whereby these 
sub-periods are treated similarly, hence leading to potential overestimation or underestimation 
of contagion results.  
However, it is still challenging to attribute a specific reason for heterogeneity in contagion 
results in the real economy as it depends on multiple factors (e.g. rapid financilization process, 
multinational corporations, reliance on external financing, industries’ valuation and investment, 
competitive industries, financial and economic integration, trade channel, information 
asymmetry, herding, risk aversion, amongst others). Moreover, despite the well scrutinized 
research on contagion effects in equity market, controversy remains regarding the definition of 
contagion and the best approach to empirically test of it. Loosely speaking, financial contagion 
is referred to as the diffusion of financial distress from one market to another and most of the 
previous literatures as it is in the aforementioned research studies define contagion as being “a 
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significant increase in linkages between stock returns in different markets during a crisis 
episode, beyond linkages in fundamentals.” The disagreement on whether contagion is 
observed or not is due the lack of agreement on a definition of contagion, and hence also on an 
appropriate testing technique. Understanding the concept of contagion, and its origin is 
important for policy makers and fund managers, who aim to diversity risk.  
4.3. Empirical Methodology 
The methodological framework is based on Chapter 3. In this chapter, the impact of the world 
(and domestic) financial market on the real economy is being examined. Hence, the key 
difference between the equations of the third and fourth chapter is that in the latter, instead of 
looking at the world stock market portfolio as the exogenous variable, world financial market 
is used instead. Moreover, the endogenous variables will no longer be the equity returns across 
countries but will be the equity returns at a sectoral level across the 25 countries investigated 
in this chapter. 
4.3.1. The Sub-period Specific Constant Spillovers Model 
 
For the first part of this study, a standard contagion model, based on Eq. 3.1 is used: 
𝑅𝑆,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛽1𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑤,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑤,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆  +𝜔1𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔2𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 +   𝜀𝑆,𝑖,𝑡    (4.1) 
Where 𝑅𝑆,𝑖,𝑡 denotes sector returns in country i, 𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆  is a dummy variable equal one in crisis 
period and zero otherwise. The coefficients 𝛽𝑖 measures the impact the world financial sector 
portfolio (𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑤,𝑡) on sector (S) during non-crisis (𝛽1) and crisis (𝛽1 + 𝛽2). And on the other 
hand, 𝜔𝑖 measures the impact the domestic financial sector (𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡) on sector (S) during non-
crisis (𝜔1) and crisis (𝜔1 + 𝜔2).  Using the above model (i.e. Eq. 4.1), the presence of contagion 
effects from the world and domestic financial sector on each sectors of country i is examined. 
There is the evidence of contagion determined if 𝛽2(𝜔2) is positive and significant. 
This test assumes that the global financial system has direct impact on non-financial firms, i.e. 
firms lend and borrow globally and hence are directly affected by the GFC. And in order to 
control for an impact of the domestic financial sectors, while testing contagion effects from the 
world financial portfolio to the real economy, I include the domestic financial sector in both 
normal (𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡) and crisis (𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆) periods in the above equation. Moreover, as 
compared to Baur (2012), the sample period is longer, i.e. from October 1979 until March 2012, 
which allows for an extended post crisis period, as I wish to look at the short term changes in 
the integration processes between sectoral returns and the world (domestic) financial sector 
after the turbulent period.   
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The assumptions of Eq. (4.1) have been extensively discussed in Chapter 3, and due to its 
shortcomings and potential biasedness regarding contagion results that may arise from (4.1), 
Eq. (4.2) below is employed to investigate contagion effects and integration processes, more 
precisely. 
4.3.2. Globalisation Model 
𝑅𝑆,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 +  𝛼2𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 +   𝛽1𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑤,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑤,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 +
𝛽
3𝑡
𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑤,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆+ 𝜔1𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔2𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆
+ 𝜔3𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 +    𝜀𝑆,𝑖,𝑡        (4.2) 
where  𝛽1𝑡 =  𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑡,    𝛽2𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑡, and  𝛽3𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑡.  
And where  𝜔1𝑡 =  𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑡,  𝜔2𝑡 =  𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝑡 and 𝜔3𝑡 =  𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑡 
The Globalisation model11 aims to capture the time-varying nature of sector-level integration 
and allows the betas to change over time. Eq. (4.2) shows the integration process of the real 
economy with the world financial sector and domestic financial sector in 3 sub-samples, 
measured by 𝛽 and 𝜔 respectively. 𝛿1(𝜇1) shows the pace of globalisation during the pre-crisis 
period, as measured by the sensibility of sectors “s” returns to returns on world (domestic) 
financial sector portfolio. 𝛿1+ 𝛾1(𝜇1 +  𝜌1) and 𝛿1 +  𝜃1(𝜇1 + 𝜑1) are defined as the pace of 
globalisation during crisis, and post crisis period respectively for the world and domestic 
financial sector with the real economy. Moreover, (4.2) treats the pre-crisis and post crisis 
differently, by assigning a dummy variable (i.e. 𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆) to the latter and the intercept is 
also varied across time, i.e. a dummy is assigned for the constant term during the crisis and the 
non-crisis period. 
And similar to Eq. (4.1), I control for an increased co-movement of the financial sector with the 
domestic financial sector and include the latter in normal (𝜔1𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡), crisis (𝜔2𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆), 
and post crisis (𝜔3𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆  ) periods in the above equation. 
 It should be noted that (4.2) nests (4.1).  If, 𝛿1, 𝛾1, 𝜇1, 𝜌1, 𝛼1, 𝛼2 , 𝜔3𝑡 and 𝛽3𝑡= 0, Eq. (3.1) is 
obtained, i.e. the Baur (2012) model. Hence, the second model is more flexible than the previous 
one as it treats pre-crisis and post-crisis period differently and employs allows for time-varying 
intercepts. But most importantly the coefficients 𝛽𝑡 which measure the co-movement between 
                                                             
11 The use of categorical variables can result in a multicollinearity problem. This predominantly occurs when the 
combinations of all dummy variables included in the regression as explanatory variables, are the same length as 
the full sample dependent variable. This is often referred to as the dummy variable trap. Eq. 4.2 does not fall in 
the dummy variable trap and therefore there is no multicollinearity problem of this type. Multicollinearity has also 
been tested with investigated where interaction variables are in use. Correlation can be reduced by “centering the 
variables” through an exercise of subtracting the mean (constant) from the interaction dummy. However, this 
suggested solution has been shown to have minimal overall benefit to the efficiency of the regression (Wißmann 
and Toutenburg, 2007). 
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the world financial sector portfolio on country i in pre-crisis (𝛽1𝑡), crisis (𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡), and post 
crisis (𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡) period, respectively, and are allowed to change over time within each sub 
period, to allow for globalisation.  
This model is motivated by Eq. 3.2. It attempts to avoid the misidentification of contagion, and 
restrictive specification regarding the post-crisis period having the same characteristics (in 
terms of the coefficients) as the pre-crisis period, as in financial contagion literature (e.g. Baur, 
2012; Kenourgios and Dimitriou, 2015). 
The details on how evidence of contagion is captured by this model are briefly explained below 
(as it has been comprehensively discussed in Chapter 3). 
a) Shock Contagion 
The term “shock” contagion in this chapter refers to a positive jump in the co-movement (𝛽2𝑡) 
between the sectors returns of each 25 countries and the world financial sector, following the 
outbreak of the crisis. In other words, it means that 𝛽2𝑡 > 0 at the starting point of the crisis 
period (𝑡 = 𝜏1). As far as shock contagion from the local financial sectors to the real economy 
is concerned, it is going to be denoted by a positive jump in the co-movement (𝜔2𝑡) between 
the sectors returns of the individual countries in our study and their local financial sectors, 
following the outbreak of the crisis, i.e. 𝜔2𝑡 > 0 at 𝑡 = 𝜏1) 
Following this initial rise in the co-movements of sectors returns with the world financial sector 
(𝛽2𝑡) or domestic financial sector (𝜔2𝑡 ) , there are different scenarios which may occur during 
the crisis period, i.e. contagion might be permanent, transitory, or reversed. 
b) Recoupling Contagion 
Recoupling contagion, here, is a situation where there is an initial fall in the co-movement 
(𝛽2(𝜏1) < 0) between the individual sectors returns and the world financial sector, but 
subsequently the 𝛽𝑡 increases above the level which would have prevailed with no change due 
to the crisis. This situation can be defined as contagion only if there is an increase in the slope 
(𝛾1> 0) during the crisis period, and if  𝛽𝑡 is higher at a certain point during the crisis than what 
it would have been if the slope of integration process would have been the same as the pre-
crisis period. In other words, it means that the 𝛽𝑡 should be higher at the end of the crisis period 
than what it would have been if the same integration process as the pre-crisis period was being 
continued. 
In the case of Recoupling contagion from the domestic financial sector to the other sectors of 
the economy, it is going to be represented by a as an initial fall in the co-movement between 
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the individual stock market and the world stock market (𝜔2(𝜏1) < 0), followed by a subsequent 
rise in 𝜌𝑡 above the level which would have prevailed with no change due to the crisis. 
 
c) Kink Contagion 
“Kink” contagion is whereby there is no abrupt change in co-movement (i.e. 𝛽2(𝜏1)=0) between 
the sectors returns of individual countries and the world financial sector during the first week 
of the crisis. In these instances, contagion is identified provided there is an increase in the slope 
(𝛾1 > 0) during the crisis period and consequently 𝛽𝑡 is higher during the crisis than what it 
would have been if the slope of integration process would have been the same as the pre-crisis 
period.  
And for Kink Contagion to occur from the local financial sector to the real economy, 𝜔2(𝜏1)=0, 
provided there is an increase in the slope (𝜌1 > 0) during the crisis period, and consequently 𝜌𝑡 
is higher during the crisis as compared to what if it would have been if the integration process 
would be the same as the pre-crisis period. 
4.3.3. Tests for Contagion Definitions 
As mentioned in the previous section, the occurrence of contagion can be categorised into three 
scenarios. And in order to determine the type of contagion, a t-test is performed later in order 
to test for the significance of 𝛽𝑡 and 𝜔𝑡  at a specific point of time (more precisely, for the first 
and last week of the crisis period). 
The level of 𝛽𝑡 and 𝜔𝑡 at each point in time across the crisis period is calculated from the 
estimated model (4.2), both the crisis-specific 𝛽𝑡 and 𝜔𝑡  values as well as those values which 
would be observed if the pre-crisis process in continued unchanged into the crisis period: 
?̂? (𝐝𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐜𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐬 𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐨𝐝) =  ?̂?𝟎 +  ?̂?𝟎 + (?̂?𝟏 + ?̂?𝟏) 𝒕  
?̂? (𝐝𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐜𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐬 𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐨𝐝) =  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟎 + (?̂?𝟏 +  ?̂?𝟏) 𝒕  
Where t is  1451 ≤ 𝒕 ≥ 1536 
Given the estimates of model (3.2) parameters as well as their variance-covariance matrix, a t-
test can be performed in order to test for the significance of the difference in 𝛽𝑡(𝜔𝑡) between 
the crisis 𝛽𝑡(𝜔𝑡 ) values and those which would have been observed if crisis outbreak had had 
no effect on the intertemporal movement in 𝛽𝑡(𝜔𝑡), at any point in time. The particular form of 
the t-test (i.e. a one tailed- or two-tailed test) will depend upon the type of contagion which is 
being tested for.
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4.4. Empirical Methodology 
Equation (4.2) is estimated within a GARCH framework, as the OLS estimation technique may 
provide not only inefficient but also potentially inaccurate parameter estimates (Hamilton, 
2010). More specifically, following Chapter 3 of this thesis, the Glosten et al. (1993) or GJR, 
approach is employed to model the process of conditional volatility in residuals. The GJR-
GARCH model also allows to capture asymmetries in volatility’s responses to positive and 
negative shocks. Model (4.2) constitutes the mean equation, whereas the conditional volatility, 
ℎ𝑆,𝑖,𝑡, is modelled as a GJR-GARCH (p,q) process:       
ℎ𝑆,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑆,𝑖 + ∑ (𝛼𝑆,𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑔𝑆,𝑖,𝑗𝐼𝑆,𝑖,𝑡−𝑗)𝜀𝑆,𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
2𝑝
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝑏𝑆,𝑖,𝑘
𝑞
𝑘=1 ℎ𝑆,𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
2            (4.3) 
 
where 𝐼𝑆,𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 = 1 if 𝜀𝑆,𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 < 0 and is equal to zero otherwise, 𝜀𝑆,𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 represents the error 
term from equation (4.2), for sector S in country i, lagged j periods, and it is assumed this error 
can be decomposed as 𝜀𝑆,𝑖,𝑡 = √ℎ𝑆,𝑖,𝑡𝑣𝑆,𝑖,𝑡 with 𝑣𝑆,𝑖,𝑡~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑(0,1). This model allows for the 
impact of past shocks on conditional volatility to be different depending on whether they are 
positive (∑ 𝛼𝑆,𝑖,𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 ) or negative (∑ (𝛼𝑆,𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑔𝑖,𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1 )). Typically for stock market data, one 
expects 𝑔𝑖,𝑗 > 0, i.e., for a negative shock at lag j to exert a larger impact on conditional 
volatility of stock returns than a positive shock of the same magnitude, a phenomenon known 
as the leverage effect (Black, 1976). The GJR-GARCH nests both the GARCH model, which 
imposes no asymmetries 𝑔𝑆,𝑖,𝑗 = 0 and the more restrictive ARCH model, (𝑔𝑆,𝑖,𝑗 =  𝑏𝑖,𝑘 = 0) 
Similar to Chapter 3, the combined model (4.2) and (4.3) is subject to a battery of specification 
tests. Firstly, the (log) indices and returns are tested for stationarity using both the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and the Phillips and Perron (1988) tests using the 
Enders (2010) sequential procedure to select the most appropriate model (with or without the 
constant and the deterministic trend), to make sure that only stationary variables are used in 
equation (4.2) to avoid potential spurious regression problems. Second, we test for cointegration 
between each national and the world (log) index, as existence of cointegration would necessitate 
an inclusion of an error correction term into equation (4.2) to circumvent the omitted variable 
bias; this is accomplished by employing both the Engle and Granger (1987) test using 
Mackinnon (1996) critical values, and the Johansen (1991) cointegration test. For the latter, in 
addition to the trace and eigenvalue statistics, we also employ an alternative approach suggested 
by Gonzalo and Pitarakis (1998) and Anzar and Salvador (2002) to determine the number of 
co-integrating equations in a VECM: a consistent estimator of the number of co-integrating 
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equations is provided by choosing the number of co-integrating equations that minimizes the 
Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC). 
The resulting mean equation (4.2) is firstly estimated by OLS and the residuals are tested for 
heteroscedasticity using the White (1980) test. Existence of heteroscedasticity provides further 
rationale for modelling the error terms within a GARCH framework. The GJR-GARCH model 
is fitted assuming normal distribution of error terms at first, and the resulting residuals are tested 
for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test. Where non-normality is found, model (4.2)-(4.4) is 
re-estimated under the assumption that residuals follow t-distribution or GED (generalised 
error) distribution. Subsequently, the final distribution decision (normal, t, or GED) is made 
based on the information criteria (AIC and BIC), and model (4.2)-(4.3) is re-estimated. Next, 
Ljung-Box Q statistics are employed to test whether there remains autocorrelation in residuals, 
and where required, these are modelled as an ARMA process. Lastly, we test whether using a 
GJR-GARCH specification fully captures the ARCH effects in residuals, by applying Engle’s 
Lagrange multiplier test to standardised residuals. 
A general-to-specific approach in estimation of model (4.2)-(4.3) is employed. Initially, the full 
model allowing for linear trends in coefficients 𝛽𝑡 in each subperiod is estimated. Next, those 
trend coefficients found insignificant are dropped from the regression and the reduced model 
(4.2) is estimated. This ensure that the precision of parameter estimates is not negatively 
affected by the presence of insignificant variables.  
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4.5. Data 
The data comprises of weekly prices (Tuesday to Tuesday closing prices) from October 1979 
to March 2012 of 10 sector stock equity indices12 for 25 countries. The sectors under study are 
as following: Basic Materials, Oil and Gas, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Healthcare, 
Telecommunications, Financials, Industrials, Technology and Utilities. The data has been 
obtained from DataStream and are classified by industry and sector type, for example financials 
is a sector within which several industries are included, such as banks, life insurance and real 
estate. Each sector contains a representative sample of major stocks within that classification. 
The components of each sectors are found in Table 4.1 below. The classification structure is 
based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) jointly created by FTSE and Dow Jones.  
Table 4.1: Sectors classification based on Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB)13 
Sector Industries Included 
Oil & Gas 
Oil & Gas Producers 
Oil Equipment & Services  
Alternative Energy 
Basic Materials 
Chemicals 
Industrial Metals & Mining 
Specialty Chemicals 
Forestry & Paper 
Mining 
                                                             
 
12 For some countries (e.g. Mexico and Russia), and some equity indices are not available for the whole period on 
DataStream, i.e. from October 1979 to March 2012. This is because some sectors (such as Consumer goods and 
Healthcare in Mexico, and Healthcare and Consumer services in Russia) did not exist in these two countries during 
the first few years of the sample period, and hence some sectoral indices are non-existent during that period. This, 
however does not affect the contagion result, as the dataset still covers the crisis and post crisis period. 
13 Source: DataStream Global Indices, User Guide (5), Thomson Reuters 
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Industrials 
Construction & Materials 
Industrial Goods & Services 
Aerospace & Defence 
General Industrials 
Electronic & Electric Equipment 
Industrial Engineering 
Industrial Transportation 
Support Services 
Consumer Goods 
Automobiles & Parts 
Food & Beverage 
Household Goods & Home Construction 
Leisure Goods 
Personal Goods 
Tobacco 
Healthcare 
Healthcare Equipment & Services 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 
Consumer Services 
Food & Drug Retailers 
General Retailers 
Media 
Travel & Leisure 
Telecommunications 
Fixed Line Telecommunications 
Mobile Telecommunications 
Utilities 
Electricity 
Gas, Water & Multi utilities 
Financials 
Banks 
Nonlife insurance 
Life Insurance 
Real Estate investment & Services 
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Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Financial Services 
Equity Investment Instruments 
Non-equity Investment Instruments 
Technology 
Software & Computer Services 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 
The table above gives a breakdown of the Datastream Global Equity Index hierarchy based on ICB. 
All national stock-price indices are used in local currency terms and are based on weekly 
Tuesday closing prices for each market. The advantage of using the local stock indices is that 
it only captures the changes in indices, as compared to if the sector prices would be converted 
in the same currency, where there would exchange rate differences as well. Hence, the issue of 
exchange rate dynamics influencing our analysis is avoided. The sector equity indices are 
transformed into weekly rates of returns taking the first difference of the natural log of each 
equity-price index. Moreover, the World aggregate financial sector index (constructed by 
DataStream) is used as a proxy for the global market, assuming that the crisis caused shifts in 
investors’ global appetite for risk, as international investors might react to a given shock by re-
balancing their portfolios globally in assets 
To determine the precise date of the beginning and the end of the crisis period, the approach of 
Baur (2012) is used. This firstly involves considering both major financial and economic events 
from the timelines provided by the Bank for International Settlements (Filardo et al., 2009). 
The second step uses estimates of conditional volatility in the financial sector returns (as this is 
where the initial shock originated), estimated using a GJR-GARCH(1,1) model with a constant 
in the mean equation, and identifies the crisis as a period where this volatility exceeds a given 
threshold. Baur (2012) combines the results from these two steps and the resulting crisis period 
spans from 7 August 2007 to 24 March 2009. 
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4.6. Empirical Results  
4.6.1. Estimation Results (Eq. 4.1) 
Using Equation 4.1 (assuming that 𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡 = 0), the presence of contagion effects between the 
individual financial sectors in each country and the world financial sector portfolio is being 
tested, as an example, in order to compare how contagion results, differ or might be biased in a 
basic contagion model (i.e. Eq. 4.1) relative to the globalisation model (Eq. 4.2). The results 
are displayed in Table 4.2 below and there is evidence of contagion of 19 financial sectors 
during the recent financial crisis, as  𝛽2 is positive and significant.  
Table 4.2: Contagion to domestic Financial Sector (From the World Financial Sector 
portfolio) 
 𝛼 𝛽1 𝛽2 Contagion 
Australia .0012083 ** .3972421*** .3065287*** C 
Brazil .0020346** .6809292*** .1636065*** C 
Canada .0011045*** .4749424*** .2145499*** C 
Chile .0017454 *** .2691906*** .0860059** C 
China .0000629 .6802793*** .2067327 C 
France .0004519 .678415*** .4340321*** C 
Germany .0007054  .68362*** .1402096*** C 
Hong Kong .0014135** .0014135*** .1063249*** C 
Indonesia .0010109 .5441784*** .1901294** C 
India .0032275*** .4895776*** .5802807*** C 
Italy .0002194 .0002194*** .0083542 C 
Japan -.0008767 .884915*** .0460306 - 
Mexico .0014992** .5244779*** .3351242*** C 
New Zealand -.0001199 .2017622*** -.0050248 - 
Norway . .001111 .6094749*** .3904166** C 
Russia .0050206*** .8901564***  .0356846 - 
South Africa .0029723*** .3659149*** .1890433*** C 
South Korea -.0011189 .7122791 *** -.0608928 - 
Spain .0004861 .7208038*** .1592954*** C 
Sweden .0009786 .8151634*** .031285 - 
Switzerland .0006622   .5545509 *** .5545509*** C 
Taiwan -.0006856    . 6250277*** ..200964*** C 
Thailand .001415 .5103346*** .0257338 - 
U.K. .0001381 .5020889*** .071512 C 
U.S. .0004538 .803150*** .2144841*** C 
Using Baur (2012) model (23rd October 1979 until 27th March 2012) as shown by Eq. 4.1 
As established before, the linkages between countries/sectors equity indices tend to follow an 
upward trend due to the process of globalisation, and hence is time-variant. Therefore if Eq. 4.1 
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(assuming 𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡 = 0) is used to estimate financial contagion, this might lead to the inference 
of biased contagion results. Hence model (4.2), which accounts for a time-varying integration 
process between sectors and the world financial sector/local financial sectors; equity returns 
and whereby the pre-crisis and post crisis period are treated differently. Another benefit of 
employing the globalisation model is that it is more informative as compared to the former one, 
in terms of depicting any integration or segmentation process of the real economy with the 
financial sector while also showing at point of time during the crisis, each sector was affected. 
 
4.6.2. Estimation Results (Eq. 4.2) 
In this section, for financial contagion for a set of 10 sectors across 25 countries is examined 
by estimating Eq. (4.2)-(4.3). Table 4.2 shows the findings from Eq. 4.1 only for Financial 
Sector Contagion, as an example. A summary of the results (estimated from Eq. 4.1) for 
contagion to the financial and non-financial sectors from the world financial sector portfolio 
and contagion to real economy from the domestic financial sector is reported in B.5 and B.6 
respectively. Using the ADF test to test for unit root, it is observed that log indices are non-
stationary and returns in each sector is stationary (Appendix B.1). Eq. (4.2)-(4.4) allows the 
conditional volatility to be expressed using a GJR-GARCH model, with both student-t 
distributed errors and ARMA disturbances. This specification is chosen in order to account for 
non-normality and autocorrelation that have been detected using a Shapiro-Wilk and Ljung 
Box-Q test respectively. Additionally, an Engle ARCH LM test (Engle, 1982), suggests that 
there are no remaining ARCH effects (Appendix B.2) present in the squared residuals, while 
using a GJR-GARCH model, hence supporting the use of this particular specification. 
a) Global Contagion 
Table 4.3 shows a summary of the results pertaining to the type of contagion that prevailed 
during the crisis period across 10 different sectors in 25 countries.  Appendix B.3, on the other 
hand, presents the estimated results from Eq. 4.2 and displays the intercepts (𝛿0, 𝛾0, 𝜃0) and 
slopes (𝛿1, 𝛾1, 𝜃1) of integration process arising from the world financial sector to the real 
economy during the pre-crisis, crisis and post crisis period.  Appendix B.4 displays further 
details for contagion (e.g. point estimates at the beginning and end of the crisis period and their 
t-statistics) from the global financial sector portfolio to the real economies and financial sector 
of the 25 countries. 
It can be observed, from Table 4.3 that there are 60 instances of contagion from the world 
financial sector. France followed by Norway have the highest number with seven, and five (out 
of ten) sectors respectively. The most affected sectors during the crisis period, across the 25 
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countries in our sample are Basic Materials (13), followed by Financial sector and Utilities 
sector with 10 and 9 contagion cases respectively. On the other hand, Technology (2), 
Healthcare (3) and Oil (3) are the least affected sectors across all countries.  
a) Domestic Contagion 
Table 4.3 illustrates a summary of evidence of contagion from Financial Sectors to non-
financial sectors across 25 countries. The estimates from Model (4.2) are shown in detail in 
Appendix B.3 section. The intercepts and slopes of integration process arising from the local 
financial sector to the real economy during the pre-crisis, crisis and post crisis period are 
represented by (𝜇0, 𝜌0, 𝜑0)  and  (𝜇1, 𝜌1, 𝜑1) respectively. Appendix B.5 shows further details 
for contagion (e.g. point estimates at the beginning and end of the crisis period and their t-
statistics) from the domestic financial sector to the real economies of the 25 countries. There 
are 68 cases, as shown by Table 4.4, depicting evidence of “domestic contagion”, and most 
cases of contagion from the local financial sector can be observed in the Oil (10), Utilities (10) 
and Basic Material (9) sectors, whereas Technology and Consumer Goods are the least affected 
ones with 4 and 5 cases of contagion respectively. The non-financial sectors in Hong Kong (8), 
followed by Brazil (7) and New Zealand (7) experienced the most cases of contagion from their 
domestic financial sector. France, Italy, Mexico, South Africa, Switzerland and U.K on the 
other hand did not show any evidence of real economy contagion from their nation’s financial 
sector. 
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Table 4.3: Global Contagion (From World Financial Sector) 
 
 Oil Basic 
Material 
Industrial Consumer 
Goods 
Healthcare Consumer 
Services 
Telecom Utilities Technology Financial 
Australia SC (Level) SC (Level) SC (Level) No Contagion No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) 
Brazil No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
N/A No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
Canada No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) SC (Level) No Contagion No 
Contagion 
SC (Reversal) No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
Chile No 
Contagion 
SC (Transit) SC 
(Reversal) 
SC (Reversal) No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
N/A No 
Contagion 
SC 
(Reversal) 
China No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) 
France SC (Level) SC (Level) SC (Level) SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
Germany No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
RC No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
Hong Kong No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
SC (Transit) 
India SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
No Contagion SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
Indonesia N/A No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
N/A No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
N/A No 
Contagion 
Italy No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) SC (Level) No Contagion No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
Japan No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
Mexico N/A SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
N/A N/A No Contagion No 
Contagion 
N/A N/A No 
Contagion 
Norway No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) N/A SC (Level) N/A No Contagion No 
Contagion 
SC (Transit) SC (Transit) RC 
New 
Zealand 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) No Contagion No 
Contagion 
No Contagion SC (Level) SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
SC 
(Reversal) 
Russia No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
N/A No Contagion N/A No Contagion No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
N/A No 
Contagion 
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South Africa No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
KC 
South Korea No 
Contagion 
SC (Transit) No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) SC (Transit) SC (Level) N/A No 
Contagion 
Spain No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
Sweden No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No Contagion SC (Level) No Contagion No 
Contagion 
N/A No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
Switzerland No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) SC (Level) No Contagion No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
Taiwan No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No Contagion N/A No Contagion No 
Contagion 
N/A No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) 
Thailand No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
U.K. No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
SC (Reversal) No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) 
U.K. No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
No Contagion SC (Level) No Contagion SC (Transit) SC (Level) No 
Contagion 
No 
Contagion 
 
Table 4.3 summarises the findings from Eq. 4.2, in terms of the type of contagion. It shows the impact of the world financial sector portfolio on 10 different sectors across 25 
countries during the crisis period.  
 
Key:  
1. Shock contagion:  SC  3. Kink Contagion: KC 
2. Recoupling Contagion: RC             4. Unavailability of data or non-convergence: N/A 
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Table 4.4. Domestic Contagion (From Local Financial Sector) 
 
 Oil Basic 
Material 
Industrial Consumer 
Goods 
Healthcare Consumer 
Services 
Telecom Utilities Technology 
Australia No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion SC (Reversal) No Contagion No Contagion SC (Reversal) No Contagion 
Brazil SC (Level) SC (Level) SC (Level) No Contagion N/A SC (Transit) SC (Transit) SC (Reversal) SC (Level) 
Canada RC No Contagion No Contagion SC (Level) No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion SC (Level) 
Chile SC (Level) No Contagion SC (Level) No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion SC (Reversal) N/A No Contagion 
China No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) SC (Level) No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion SC (Level) No Contagion No Contagion 
France No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion 
Germany No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion KC No Contagion SC (Transit) No Contagion 
Hong Kong SC (Transit) SC (Transit) SC (Reversal) SC (Reversal) SC (Reversal) SC (Reversal) SC (Reversal) SC (Transit) No Contagion 
India No 
Contagion 
SC (Transit) SC (Reversal) No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion SC (Reversal) No Contagion 
Indonesia SC (Transit) N/A No Contagion No Contagion SC (Level) N/A No Contagion KC N/A 
Italy No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion 
Japan No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion KC No Contagion No Contagion SC (Level) No Contagion 
Mexico N/A No Contagion No Contagion N/A N/A No Contagion No Contagion N/A  
Norway No 
Contagion 
No Contagion SC (Transit) SC (Reversal) N/A N/A No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion 
New 
Zealand 
SC (Level) SC (Level) SC (Transit) SC (Level) SC (Level) SC (Level) No Contagion SC (Level) No Contagion 
Russia SC (Level) SC (Level) No Contagion No Contagion N/A N/A SC (Level) SC (Level) N/A 
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South Africa No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion 
South Korea SC (Transit) No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion SC (Level) No Contagion 
Spain SC (Level) No Contagion SC (Reversal) No Contagion SC (Transit) SC (Reversal) No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion 
Sweden No 
Contagion 
SC (Level) No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion N/A SC (Transit) 
Switzerland No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion 
Taiwan SC (Level) SC (Level) No Contagion No Contagion N/A SC (Level) SC (Reversal) N/A No Contagion 
Thailand SC (Level) SC (Level) No Contagion SC (Level) SC (Level) No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion 
U.K. No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion SC (Reversal) SC (Reversal) No Contagion No Contagion SC (Reversal) 
U.K. No 
Contagion 
No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion No Contagion 
 
Table 4.4 summarises the findings from Eq. 4.2, in terms of the type of contagion. It shows the impact of the domestic financial sector on 9 different sectors across 25 
countries during the crisis period.  
 
Key:  
1. Shock contagion:  SC  3. Kink Contagion: KC 
2. Recoupling Contagion: RC             4. Unavailability of data or non-convergence: N/A
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Identifying different types of Contagion 
Evidence of contagion from both global and domestic financial sectors can be identified in the 
following situations: 
(a) Shock Contagion 
The findings show that most sectors experienced a “shock” contagion, i.e.  (𝛽2(𝜏1) >0) as 
compared to other types of contagion (i.e. Recoupling or Kink Contagion). Similar to “global” 
contagion, the findings pertaining to “domestic” contagion also show that most sectors experienced 
a Shock Contagion (𝜔2(𝜏1) >0), as compared other types of contagion (i.e. Recoupling or Kink 
Contagion). It can be observed from Appendix B.4 that some sectors have experienced contagion 
across the whole crisis period, despite the fact that there have been no changes in the slope of the 
integration process during the crisis period, as compared for the pre-crisis, i.e. there was a level 
shock, whereby 𝛾0> 0 and 𝛾1=0. An example of ‘level’ shock Contagion (whereby there are no 
changes in the slope, but only changes in the level of co-movement) from the Global Financial 
Sector can be observed in the Oil Sector (Australia, France and India), whereby 𝛽2(𝜏1)>0, 𝛾0 > 0 
and 𝛾1 = 0. Moreover, instances of Level Shock Contagion can be observed in Oil, Basic Material, 
Industrial, and Technology (Brazil) from domestic Financial Sectors, whereby  𝜔2(𝜏1)>0, 𝜌0 > 0 
and 𝜌1 = 0 
However, contagion is not always persistent across the all the phases of the crisis period. It might 
occur temporarily. In other words, there might be cases whereby the increasing co-movement fades 
away or even be lower than what it would have been had the crisis not occurred (i.e. a reversal). 
And to differentiate whether the contagious effects from the Global Financial Sector or Local 
Financial sector to the real economy is only temporary or permanent, a t-test is conducted at the 
end of the crisis period to test whether 𝛽t (for global contagion) or 𝜔𝑡 (for domestic contagion) in 
the last week of the crisis (t=𝜏2) is significantly different from its value which would have been 
expected at crisis’ end if the crisis had no impact on the process of financial integration, i.e., if 𝛾0 
= 𝛾1=0. If the estimated 𝛽2(𝜏2) is significantly positive (negative) at crisis’ end, this would imply 
that the initial positive shock in 𝛽t has not completely faded away (has reversed and led to lower-
than-expected integration level), indicating partially persistent (temporary) contagious shocks. 
There are 7 and 13 cases of temporary shock contagion from the world and domestic financial 
sectors respectively. The Financial Sector (Hong Kong), Basic Materials (Japan and Mexico), 
Consumer Goods, Utilities and Technology in Norway, and Telecommunications (U.S.) only 
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experienced a temporary contagious shock, as 𝛽2(𝜏1) >0, accompanied by decreasing slope of 
integration (i.e. 𝛾1< 0). Moreover, the Oil Sector (Hong Kong and South Korea), Basic Materials 
(India and Indonesia), Consumer Goods (Spain), for instance, also experienced a temporary 
contagious shock, as 𝜔2(𝜏1) >0, accompanied by decreasing slope of integration (i.e. 𝜌1< 0). 
There are also occasions where initial shock seems to have been faded away as the crisis evolved. 
For some sectors, there was a reversal contagion shock, whereby, at the end of the crisis period, 
the integration level was at a lower level as compared to what it was supposed to be if the crisis 
had not occurred. There are 6 cases of reversal shock contagion to the real economy from the world 
financial sector and 18 from domestic financial sector. Healthcare and Consumer Services 
(Canada), Industrial, Consumer Goods and Financial Sector (Chile), Financial (New Zealand), and 
Consumer goods (U.K.) experienced a reversal shock contagion from the world financial sector. 
And Healthcare and Utilities (Australia), Telecom (Chile), and Consumer goods (Norway) 
experienced a reversal shock contagion from their local financial sector. The resulting fall in the 
slope of the linkages (𝛾1 < 0) and (𝜌1 < 0) during crisis might be an indication of disintegration 
and hence contagion is not prevalent during the whole crisis. 
(b) Recoupling Contagion 
Contagion effects might also arise if there is a fall in 𝛽𝑡 following the outbreak of the crisis (i.e. 
𝛽2(𝜏1) < 0 at Week 1451), accompanied by steady rise in the level of the 𝛽𝑡 as the crisis unfolds, 
leading to higher level of 𝛽𝑡 at a certain point during this turmoil period, and the co-movement 
being higher by the end of the crisis period (i.e. before Week 1536) than what it would have been 
if the same globalisation processes was being followed (𝛽2(𝜏2)> 0). Contagion effects from 
domestic financial sector might also arise if there is a fall in 𝜔𝑡 following the outbreak of the crisis 
(i.e. 𝜔2(𝜏1) < 0 at Week 1451), accompanied by steady rise in the level of the 𝜔𝑡 as the crisis 
unfolds, leading to higher level of 𝛽𝑡 at a certain point during this turmoil period, and the co-
movement being higher by the end of the crisis period (i.e. before Week 1536) than what it would 
have been if the same globalisation processes was being followed (𝜔2(𝜏2)> 0). 
 The Utilities sector (Germany) and Financial sector (Norway) experienced recoupling contagion 
during the crisis period, as 𝛽2(𝜏1) < 0 and 𝛽2(𝜏2)> 0. Evidence of Recoupling contagion from 
Domestic Financial sectors is found in the Oil sector (Canada), where 𝜔2(𝜏1)<0, 𝜌0 > 0 and 
𝜔2(𝜏2)>0. 
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(c) Kink Contagion 
“Kink” contagion is referred to a situation whereby there is no sudden change in co-movement 
during the first week of the crisis (i.e. 𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0), but contagion can be identified provided there 
is an increase in integration slope  (𝛾1 > 0) during the crisis period and 𝛽𝑡 is higher at a certain 
point during the crisis than what it would have been if the slope of integration process would had 
been the same as the pre-crisis period. Contagion effects from domestic financial sector might also 
arise if there is a fall in 𝜔𝑡 following the outbreak of the crisis (i.e. 𝜔2(𝜏1) < 0 at Week 1451), 
accompanied by steady rise in the level of the 𝜔𝑡 as the crisis unfolds, leading to higher level of 𝛽𝑡 
at a certain point during this turmoil period, and the co-movement being higher by the end of the 
crisis period (i.e. before Week 1536) than what it would have been if the same globalisation 
processes was being followed (𝜔2(𝜏2)> 0). 
From the findings, in Appendix B.4 in the Appendix, it can be observed that there is evidence of 
Kink contagion from the Global Financial Sector to the financial sector in South Africa, as 
𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0 and 𝛾1 > 0. Kink contagion from the Domestic Financial Sector can be observed in 
Japan (Healthcare), Consumer Services (Germany) and Utilities (Indonesia) as 𝜔2(𝜏1)=0 and 
𝜔2(𝜏2)>0. 
It can be observed from Appendix B.3 and B.4 that there are more cases of shock contagion relative 
to recoupling and kink contagion. More precisely, there is evidence of ‘level’ shock contagion from 
both world and domestic financial sector more than any other type of contagion, indicating that 
these sectors were suffering from financial contagion throughout the whole crisis period. 
4.6.3. Integration with the World Financial Sector (Pre-and during Crisis) 
 
In conjunction with examining contagion effects in the real economy, this chapter also investigates 
for time-varying integration between sectors and world financial sector. I am particularly interested 
in examining how the integration processes of the asset returns changed the during the crisis and 
post crisis period, as compared to the pre-crisis. Moreover, I also wish to determine whether 
increased financial integration with the world made the sectors across 25 countries more vulnerable 
and prone to contagion effects.  
𝛿1, 𝛿1 + 𝛾1, and 𝛿1 + 𝜃1 in Appendix B.3 represent the integration process of the real sectors with 
the world financial sector during the pre-crisis, crisis and post crisis period respectively. It can be 
observed that the results are mixed during the pre-crisis, with most of the sectors (65.6%) showing 
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no integration process (𝛿1 =0) with the world financial sector, and some sectors (around 32.6%) 
experiencing a positive slope for the integration (𝛿1 >0) process. And as far as the segmentation 
with the world financial sector is concerned, there are very few cases (e.g. Utilities-Canada; 
Telecommunication and Financial sector-New Zealand), depicted by a negative integration (𝛿1< 0) 
slope. 
 The surprising findings from Eq. (4.2) is that most the sectors that had a positive integration with 
the world financial sector during the pre-crisis, did not suffer from contagion effects during the 
recent global financial crisis, i.e.  𝛽2 = 0 during the whole crisis period. On the other hand, there 
are situations whereby sectors that experienced a negative integration (e.g. Telecommunication and 
Financial sector in New Zealand) during the crisis period, suffered from contagion effects in the 
turmoil period. 
 The reason for sectors not showing evidence of contagion, despite the positive integration process 
during the pre-crisis period might be because of good policies and institutions, and as well as sound 
macro-economic fundamentals in the economy and the fact that the global financial linkages had 
only a minor effect on the crisis transmission. Additionally, it can also be assumed that investors 
would abandon the markets with poor investment environment and move to more secure markets 
(Bekaert et al. 2014).  
As far as integration process between the sectors and world financial sector during the crisis period 
is concerned, it mostly remains the same as the pre-crisis period, i.e. 𝛾1 = 0, and for the rest, the 
speed integration process during the crisis period are lower as compared to the crisis period, i.e. 
𝛿1 + 𝛾1 <0. After the crisis, the integration process of most sectors goes to back to be the same as 
it was during the pre-crisis period (𝜃1= 0), despite the fact that there has been changes during the 
crisis period.  
4.6.4. Discussion 
 
a) Developed vs Emerging countries 
Appendix B.4 and B.5 in the show the estimation results for contagion from the world financial 
sector and local financial sector. When the Basic Contagion Model (Eq. 4.1), i.e., with no separate 
post-crisis period and sub-period specific time-invariant parameters (model 4.1), the results 
reported in both tables (last column) indicate the existence of contagion in 112 and 111 cases from 
the world financial sectors and domestic financial market, respectively, as compared to 60 and 68 
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instances of contagion from model (4.2). Hence, it can be concluded that a model with time-
invariant parameters appears to overestimate the occurrence of contagion in many cases. Moreover, 
model (4.2) shows the type of contagion, which allows to determine at which stage the crisis 
affected the sectors (i.e. whether at the start or end of the crisis period, or it is prevalent during the 
whole period). 
The results show that no country in our sample was immune to the recent global financial crisis, 
except for Russia which shows no evidence of contagion from the global financial sector. The 
results have revealed substantial heterogeneity in contagion across individual country-sector equity 
portfolios, which might be attributed to external exposures of the real economy to the global 
financial sector or to country specific factor. There are 14 developed countries and 11 emerging 
countries in this study and it can be also observed that the occurrence of contagion from the global 
market is more prevalent in the sectors pertaining to developed countries, with 44 cases showing 
evidence of contagion as compared to emerging countries with only 16 displaying signs of 
contagion effect. However, there are 35 and 33 cases of contagion from local financial sector to 
the real economy in developed and emerging markets respectively, showing that both markets were 
more or less equally affected. The fact that developed markets have been showing more evidence 
of contagion from the global financial system can be explained by the fact that the sectors in 
developed markets are comprised of more multinationals as compared to less mature markets. And, 
as multinationals have branches worldwide, this makes them more vulnerable to negative shocks 
due to a crisis. Another possible reason why the sectors of developed nations show are more prone 
to contagion from the world is the strong financial and economic integration before the occurrence 
of the crisis period, making them more vulnerable towards external shocks. . In addition to this, 
there might be limits to foreign investment in certain developing countries (e.g. Russia) or foreign 
investors might lack local knowledge and hence mistrust the local accounting standards and 
practices. This might result into less investment in these developing countries and as a result have 
lower integration with the world stock market. Similar to the findings pertaining to this chapter, 
Baur (2012) also finds that the lowest number of contagion incidences is found in emerging 
markets, as compared to developed ones which displayed the highest incidences of contagion 
across sectors. This indicates that the sectors in developed countries are more globally exposed 
compared to emerging ones. Bekaert et al. (2014) found that the contagion effects from the global 
financial sector are small as compared to the impact from the domestic financial market to 
individual domestic portfolios, which is in line with our results for emerging countries, whereby 
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only 15 sectors suffered from contagious effects from the global financial market and contagion 
effect from the local financial sector has affected 33 sectors.  
b) Financial sector 
In addition to showing whether the real economies experienced contagious effects from the global 
financial market or domestic financial sector, Eq. 4.2 also reveals how the linkages have evolved.  
It can be also be observed that there has been an positive integration between 13 financial sectors 
(Canada, France, Germany, India Italy, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, 
U.K., and U.S.) and the world financial portfolio during the pre-crisis period, and that the slope of 
the integration process remained the same during the turmoil period, i.e. 𝛿1 > 0and 𝛾1 = 0. There 
are also instances where some financial sectors (Brazil, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and 
New Zealand) showed a slower pace of integration with the global financial market across the crisis 
period, as compared to the pre-crisis period where an positive slope of integration can be observed, 
i.e. 𝛿1 > 0and 𝛾1 < 0.  For the financial sectors in Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia and New 
Zealand that experienced Shock Contagion (Reversal or Transitory), and 𝛾1 < 0, this shows potential 
herding behaviour by investors, as the increase in co-movement during the crisis period is short-
lived.  
Contrary to the popular belief and previous research studies, for instance Baur (2012) and 
Kenourgious and Dimitriou (2015), it is observed from the findings of this chapter that financial 
sectors do not show the highest instances of contagion across all countries. Appendix B.4 displays 
evidence of contagion in only 10 financial sectors across 25 countries. Out of the 10, there were 6 
instances of Shock Contagion (Australia, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and U.K.), and with Norway 
and South Africa experiencing Recoupling and Kink Contagion respectively. However, this does 
not mean that the remaining 15 financial sectors in our sample have not been affected by the crisis. 
Moreover, it can be observed that there has been no level shift at the start of the crisis of many of 
the advanced and developing financial sectors. The hypothesis 𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0 is not rejected for 
Brazil, Canada, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Switzerland, and U.S. This may be due to 
the fact that these countries did not experience an exposure to the global systematic risk factor or 
an idiosyncratic risk pertaining to a particular financial sector during the financial crisis. This can 
occur as a result of the nature of the economies in terms of being relatively small and closed (in 
some cases), or having a sound macroeconomic fundamentals and clear legal framework, or due to 
the policy decisions taken by the home country. For instance, Ait-Sahalia et al. (2012) notice that 
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financial policies are normally aimed to restore financial stability, while macroeconomic policies 
help to avoid the vicious feedback between financial sector and the broader economy. However, 
according to Dungey and Gajurel (2015) it is difficult to distinguish that whether policy actions 
undertaken were sufficient to offset any potential change with the World Financial Portfolio.  
It is also observed that some of the financial sectors that did not experience a shock from the global 
financial market at the first week of the crisis, i.e. 𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0, did not spread any contagious effects 
to the local sectors. For example, the real economies of France, Mexico, Switzerland and U.S. did 
not experience any return spillovers from their domestic financial market (which did not experience 
contagion from the world financial sector). On the other hand, despite the fact that 𝛽2(𝜏1) = 0 for 
the Brazilian, Canadian, Indian, Japanese, Russian domestic financial sector, there was still 
contagion effects from the later to the real economies of these above-mentioned countries.  
The Financial sectors of some countries, e.g. Germany, Norway, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Taiwan and Thailand experienced structural break in terms of a fall in co-movement during the 
first week of the crisis, i.e. 𝛽2(𝜏1) < 0. However, during the pre-crisis period, it can be observed 
that these counties were experiencing positive linkages with the World Financial Sector Portfolio, 
i.e. 𝛿1 > 0, and there has been no change in the linkages during the crisis period (i.e. 𝛾1 = 0), 
except for Norway and South Korea where there was an increasing slope of integration during the 
crisis period, i.e.  𝛾1 > 0, which eventually led to Recoupling contagion in the case of Norway. 
The fact Germany, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan and Thailand experienced a positive integration before 
the outbreak of the crisis and did not experience contagion effect might be explained by the fact 
that the policy initiatives were effective in suppressing the transmission of the crisis to the financial 
sector. Financial sector policies include the tools commonly used to resolve systemic banking 
crises, for instance asset purchase, liability guarantees, and recapitalization. 
The findings are quite surprising in the sense that some financial markets (for e.g. Chile, Indonesia 
and Taiwan) that are considered to be generally small have experienced Shock Contagion, whereas 
most of the financial sectors of advanced markets in our sample are not showing evidence of 
contagion. One of the factors might be that the above-mentioned economies are open to foreign 
financial and trade. However, no contagion does not mean that advance markets have not been 
affected by the recent financial crisis, as the financial sectors of mature markets have either 
experienced a significant decrease in co-movement following the outbreak of the crisis, or 
experienced a disintegration with the World Financial Sector, or both (in some cases).  
110 
 
Moreover, as stated before, there is a general perception that the financial sector of a particular 
country has to be affected by the crisis in order for the real economy to experience contagion. 
However, it is observed from the findings that the financial sector of a country does not need to be 
affected for the real sectors of the economy to show evidence of domestic contagion. This is mainly 
due to the fact that the global financial crisis has a direct impact in non-financial companies (i.e. 
they borrow and lend globally) and hence are directly affected by the global financial crisis, and 
sectors that comprises of industries that trade more or competitive industries are more vulnerable 
to a crisis compared to domestically centred industries. Even economies that are not interconnected 
through bank or trade linkages might be affected. This can be explained through the “wake-up call” 
hypothesis, which has been explained in chapter 2 of this thesis, whereby a default in one country 
prompts investors to revise their priors, not only for the country in question, but for all countries 
with similarly bad fundamentals. Investors’ behaviour might be another reason as well. For 
instance, risk aversion during a crisis period, might induce investors to flee into safer assets and 
shun risky ones. 
c) Tradable vs non-tradable sectors 
Findings pertaining to the real economy are heterogeneous which makes it difficult to attribute a 
specific cause which might lead contagion in the non-financial sectors. The highest incidence of 
contagion from the global financial sector are found in Basic Materials (13), followed by Financial 
(10) and Utilities (9). The least affected during the crisis period are Oil (3), Healthcare (3) and 
Technology (2). Baur (2012) and Kenourgious et al. (2015) also finds that Basic Materials depicts 
the highest number of contagion occurrences during the recent financial crisis as compared to other 
sectors.  
One of the reasons leading to a high occurrence of contagion in the Basic Materials Sector that 
tradable sectors are more vulnerable to shocks compared to non-tradable sectors. And it can be 
observed from Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 that overall, tradable sectors (e.g. basic materials, utilities, 
consumer goods, industrial, and oil) were more likely to experience contagion during the recent 
financial crisis as compared to non-tradable sectors (consumer services, healthcare, telecom, 
technology and financial). The vulnerability of the tradable sectors to the crisis might be due to the 
increasing economic integration over the past decade.  
Another potential reason for contagion in tradable sectors is herding behaviour, whereby investors 
dismiss their private beliefs and follow the market in the asset valuation and trades. According to 
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Calvo and Mendoza (2000), herding might be rational or as per Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and 
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000), it might be due to reputational and conformist preferences. Klein 
(2013) finds that herding behaviour intensifies during turmoil periods and high volatility by 
employing a time-varying Markov regime switching model. Gebka and Wohar (2013) shows that 
there is herding is prevalent in Basic Materials, Consumer Services, and Oil and Gas during the 
recent financial crisis, which might be due to might be due to overconfidence or excessive flight 
of quality. Flight of quality occurs when investors sell their assets which they perceive as being 
risky and purchase safe assets instead, leading to severe disruptions in financial markets. Moreover, 
according to Shleifer and Summers (1990), individual investors may herd if they decide to follow 
the same signal (e.g. overreacting on recent news). This might exacerbate the spillovers across 
international markets. Litimi (2017) also detected herding behaviour in tradeable sectors during 
both a crisis and non-crisis period. The author postulate that these sectors overall bear a higher risk 
than others and hence due to prevailing uncertainties, investors might decide to enter a herd. The 
findings are in conjunction with that of Bekaert et al. (2014) who show that the sectors that depicted 
evidence of contagion across all regions from their sample are the Industrial, Energy, Basic 
Materials and Utility sector, whereas Technology was the sector showing the least evidence of 
contagion during the recent financial crisis. 
Whether there is contagion between the individual sectors and World Financial Sector not only 
depends on the sound macroeconomic fundamentals of the economy, irrationality of investors but 
also depends on the individual sectors’ characteristics. For instance, Chiu et al. (2015) found 
industrial characteristics such as Net debt issuance, industry valuation and industry investment 
have an impact on the number of joint extreme negative returns occurrences in an industry.    
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4.7. Conclusion 
Following the severity and global reach of the recent financial crisis, this paper investigates how 
the real economies across a set of 25 countries experience contagion from the global financial 
market and domestic financial market.  A new approach, as in Chapter 3, is used to determine the 
different situations whereby financial contagion can arise and the changing linkages across the pre-
crisis and crisis also explored. The detailed results are presented in Appendix B.3, B.4 and B.5. 
The results show that at least one sector of all countries in our sample were affected during the 
crisis, either by global or local factors. If this is compared to the findings of Eq. 3.2 in Chapter 3, 
it can be observed than there are 12 markets (Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Mexico, Russia, 
South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.S) showing no evidence of 
contagion. However, it can be clearly seen from Appendix B.4 and B.5 that the real economy of 
these countries depicts evidence of financial contagion.  
There is also evidence of more cases of contagion in real sectors of economies of developed 
markets as compared to emerging markets.  Moreover, the findings show that real economies 
experienced Shock Contagion more often as compared to any other type of contagion, and Basic 
Material was more vulnerable to exposures from the global financial sector, Oil and Gas Industry 
showed the highest occurrence of contagious effects from the local financial sector. One of the 
apparent reasons might be since trade linkage is an important determinant of a country’s exposure 
to crisis arising in other countries. And this is not surprising as Basic Materials (which includes 
metals and mining) has one of the highest tradability indexes. Other reasons (for Shock Contagion) 
might be attributed to the “Wake up” call hypothesis or herding behaviour by investors. Moreover, 
the analysis also shows that there are cases whereby the sectors did not show any evidence of 
contagion but was still affected in terms of a negative shock following the outbreak of the crisis or 
changing linkages during the crisis period with the world or domestic financial sector. Hence it can 
be observed that there is a heterogeneity in the contagion results. 
The findings pertaining to this chapter have implications for investment decisions and regulations, 
since contagion has relevance for optimal asset allocation and risk measurement. The evidence 
shows that the real economy of developed markets has been more vulnerable to some extent, 
following the recent financial crisis compared to the developing markets. There are a few sectors, 
particularly tradable industries that investors need to be careful about when including them in their 
investment portfolios since they exhibit high contagion occurrence with the world financial sector, 
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in either developed or emerging countries or both. In addition to this, the diversification potential 
during the crisis seemed to have decreased given the rising integration with the world. During the 
years after the crisis (3 years, in this case), the intertemporal integration process has reversed to the 
pre-crisis level for almost all the markets. The results show that sectors involving tradable goods 
are more prone to contagion, as compared to non-tradable goods.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
B.1.: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test  
ADF Test (Full Sample) - 
Australia 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% 
C.V 
 T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% 
C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
World Financial -1.883  -17.829 
Australia Financial -2.478  -23.091 
Utilities -2.579  -31.554 
Telecommunication -2.376  -23.547 
Technology -1.981  -29.037 
Oil -2.587  -42.843 
Industrial -2.181  -44.597 
Healthcare -2.458  -43.788 
Con. Services -1.350  -43.026 
Con. Goods -1.848  -44.710 
Basic Materials -2.179  -42.266 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) - Brazil 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
Australia Financial -1.977  -24.723 
Utilities   -2.689  -18.651 
Telecommunication -3.569  -34.669 
Technology   -1.316  -23.038 
Oil    0.302    -23.425 
Industrial -1.706  -14.098 
Healthcare -2.572  -14.936 
Con. Services -1.438  -10.967 
Con. Goods -2.725    -31.697 
Basic Materials -0.640  -32.985 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) - Can 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
Australia Financial -2.181    -41.450 
Utilities   -2.483  -42.957   
Telecommunication -2.412  -43.928 
Technology -1.892  -19.999 
Oil -2.770  -43.138 
Industrial -1.923  -43.928 
Healthcare -0.967  -31.384 
Con. Services -2.025     -29.653 
Con. Goods -1.881  -43.425   
Basic Materials   -3.055    -42.388 
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ADF Test (Full 
Sample) - Chile 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
Chile Financial -3.062    -17.655 
Utilities -2.414  -23.153 
Telecommunication -2.998  -24.754 
Technology -2.248  -15.405 
Oil -3.266    -26.321 
Industrial -2.163  -19.137 
Healthcare -2.996  -36.712 
Con. Services   -3.245    -23.610 
Con. Goods -3.842  -23.703 
Basic Materials   -2.361  -18.936   
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) - China 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
China Financial -2.799  -33.711 
Utilities -2.344  -33.906 
Telecommunication -2.302  -33.029 
Technology -2.290  -32.139 
Oil -1.790  -29.520 
Industrial -2.139  -14.819 
Healthcare -1.968  -22.204 
Con. Services -2.924  -23.589 
Con. Goods -2.988  -16.376 
Basic Materials -3.201  -15.695 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) - France 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
France Financial -1.748  -43.965   
Utilities -1.483    -28.740 
Telecommunication -2.943   -30.704 
Technology -1.768  -42.286 
Oil -1.827  -31.882 
Industrial -2.131  -44.213 
Healthcare -1.805  -30.955   
Con. Services -1.876  -41.272 
Con. Goods -2.029  -43.317   
Basic Materials -2.733  -31.094   
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ADF Test (Full 
Sample) - Germany 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
Germany Financial -1.972  -19.990 
Utilities 0.035  -30.028 
Telecommunication -1.597  -44.644 
Technology -1.796  -37.651 
Oil -1.789  -15.778 
Industrial -2.813  -30.314 
Healthcare -3.222  -42.785 
Con. Services -1.970  -43.926 
Con. Goods -2.864  -32.472 
Basic Materials -2.742  -44.803 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – Hong 
Kong 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
HK Financial -2.258  -28.851 
Utilities -2.603  -44.245 
Telecommunication -2.337  -27.759 
Technology -2.494  -35.884 
Oil -3.034  -19.382 
Industrial -2.365  -28.616 
Healthcare -2.373  -29.526 
Con. Services -2.945  -19.900 
Con. Goods -4.001  -26.600 
Basic Materials -2.588  -37.020 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – India 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
India Financial -3.369  -15.397 
Utilities -2.174  -36.002 
Telecommunication -1.995  -33.637 
Technology -1.837  -20.042 
Oil -2.705  -16.133 
Industrial -2.146  -16.319 
Healthcare -2.940  -36.879 
Con. Services -2.338  -37.052 
Con. Goods -1.726  -37.752 
Basic Materials -2.228  -15.979 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – Indonesia 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
Indo Financial -1.087  -36.272 
Utilities -1.508  -11.976 
Telecommunication -2.832  -23.148 
Technology -2.947  -6.716 
Oil -1.635  -33.717 
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Industrial -1.696  -25.104 
Healthcare -2.502  -25.911 
Con. Services -2.239  -18.994 
Con. Goods -2.122  -36.920 
Basic Materials -2.289  -13.477 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – Italy 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
Italy Financial -2.942  -20.059 
Utilities -1.821  -31.081 
Telecommunication -1.176  -24.444 
Technology -2.107  -19.072 
Oil -2.456  -39.628 
Industrial -3.348  -19.096 
Healthcare -2.243  -37.743 
Con. Services -2.795  -28.707 
Con. Goods -2.128  -19.825 
Basic Materials -2.693  -17.522 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – Japan 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
Japan Financial -2.260  -20.587 
Utilities -1.965  -43.517 
Telecommunication -2.115  -30.454 
Technology -1.856  -14.082 
Oil -2.521  -44.055 
Industrial -2.877  -20.717 
Healthcare -2.307  -30.314 
Con. Services -1.675  -30.299 
Con. Goods -2.767  -20.655 
Basic Materials -2.277  -20.228 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – Mexico 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
Mex Financial -3.514  -16.651 
Utilities -1.520  -7.443 
Telecommunication -1.946  -36.445 
Industrial -3.204  -17.617 
Healthcare -0.852  -30.432 
Con. Services -3.412  -20.356 
Con. Goods -2.392  -18.079 
Basic Materials -2.042  -17.474 
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ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – Norway 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
Norway Financial -3.158  -19.783 
Utilities -1.907    -19.817 
Telecommunication -2.070  -14.697 
Technology -2.115  -42.379 
Oil -2.344  -20.710     
Industrial -1.633  -40.509   
Healthcare -2.310  -20.966   
Con. Services -4.599    -18.028 
Con. Goods -2.042  -24.305 
Basic Materials -3.766  -19.049 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – New 
Zealand 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
NZ Financial -2.784  -17.101 
Utilities -2.798  -23.254 
Telecommunication -2.330  -27.238 
Technology -2.718  -18.445 
Oil -1.984  -38.948 
Industrial -1.787  -23.782 
Healthcare -1.638  -27.894 
Con. Services -2.212  -19.591 
Con. Goods -1.584  -36.639 
Basic Materials -2.659  -24.987 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – Russia 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
Russia Financial -1.699     -18.905    
Utilities -1.699    -29.045   
Telecommunication    -1.792  -29.371 
Oil    -1.807    -13.462 
Industrial -2.554  -9.203   
Healthcare -1.492  -18.146 
Con. Services -4.076    -19.891    
Con. Goods -1.586  -24.091   
Basic Materials -2.547  -27.760 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – South 
Africa 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
SA Financial -1.666    -30.525 
Utilities -2.789  -33.144    
Telecommunication -2.128    -23.750   
Technology -1.447  -29.851 
Oil -3.121  -43.512 
Industrial -1.759  -44.265 
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Healthcare -1.773  -41.266   
Con. Services -1.224        -15.121 
Con. Goods   -2.224  -35.355   
Basic Materials -2.291  -43.125 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – South 
Korea 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
SK Financial -2.401  -27.446 
Utilities -3.445  -38.241 
Telecommunication -2.305  -24.234 
Technology -1.427  -32.204 
Oil -2.302  -38.671 
Industrial -2.256  -26.273 
Healthcare -3.436  -28.654 
Con. Services -2.601  -38.714 
Con. Goods -2.571  -27.534 
Basic Materials -1.994  -38.726 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – Spain 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
Spain Financial -1.588  -36.935 
Utilities -1.580  -39.300 
Telecommunication -1.214  -26.903 
Technology -2.874  -30.609 
Oil -1.908  -38.086 
Industrial -2.357  -25.648 
Healthcare -2.599  -20.345 
Con. Services -2.114  -29.717 
Con. Goods -2.261  -21.068 
Basic Materials -2.111  -14.115 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – Sweden 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
Sweden Financial   -1.595  -19.899   
Utilities -0.452  -22.451 
Telecommunication -2.383    -22.775   
Technology   -2.821  -14.681   
Oil -1.428  -13.092   
Industrial   -2.707  -19.058 
Healthcare -0.924    -43.892 
Con. Services -2.721  -16.861 
Con. Goods -2.453  -21.331 
Basic Materials -3.219    -20.677 
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ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – 
Switzerland 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
Switz Financial   -1.595  -19.899   
Utilities -0.452  -22.451 
Telecommunication -2.383    -22.775   
Technology   -2.821  -14.681   
Oil -1.428  -13.092   
Industrial   -2.707  -19.058 
Healthcare -0.924    -43.892 
Con. Services -2.721  -16.861 
Con. Goods -2.453  -21.331 
Basic Materials -3.219    -20.677 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – Taiwan 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
Taiwan Financial -3.759  -34.929 
Telecommunication -6.353  -29.388 
Technology -1.812  -17.535 
Oil -2.115  -19.209 
Industrial -2.353  -16.550 
Con. Services -3.283  -16.775 
Con. Goods -2.902  -38.304 
Basic Materials -2.916  -36.322 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – Thailand 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
Thailand Financial -1.915    -25.162 
Utilities   -2.031  -17.464 
Telecommunication   -2.122    -18.786   
Technology   -3.020  -19.136 
Oil   -1.733    -26.728 
Industrial -3.147  -17.013 
Healthcare -1.231  -37.679 
Con. Services   -1.757  -38.812   
Con. Goods -2.645      -15.920   
Basic Materials -3.178  -16.849 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – Thailand 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
Thailand Financial -1.915    -25.162 
Utilities   -2.031  -17.464 
Telecommunication   -2.122    -18.786   
Technology   -3.020  -19.136 
Oil   -1.733    -26.728 
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Industrial -3.147  -17.013 
Healthcare -1.231  -37.679 
Con. Services   -1.757  -38.812   
Con. Goods -2.645      -15.920   
Basic Materials -3.178  -16.849 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – U.K. 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
U.K. Financial   -1.521      -25.162 
Utilities   -2.812  -17.464 
Telecommunication   -2.970  -18.786   
Technology -1.770    -19.136 
Oil -2.161    -26.728 
Industrial -3.539     -17.013 
Healthcare   -2.156  -37.679 
Con. Services -2.334    -38.812   
Con. Goods -3.386    -15.920   
Basic Materials -2.731  -16.849 
 
ADF Test (Full 
Sample) – U.S. 
Prices Returns 
T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V  T 
Stats 
1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% C.V 
-3.960 -3.410 -3.120 -3.960 -3.410 -3.120 
US Financial -1.352  -31.858 
Utilities -2.653  -44.567 
Telecommunication -1.387  -32.115 
Technology -1.649  -31.711 
Oil -3.344  -46.819 
Industrial -2.109  -44.728 
Healthcare -1.645  -31.568 
Con. Services -2.436  -44.951 
Con. Goods -2.268  -43.851 
Basic Materials -3.417  -25.008 
ADF test is conducted for the weekly log indices and aggregate stock market returns for all sectors each of the 25 
countries for the full sample (Oct 1979 – Mar 2012). The lag length is selected using SIC, and the t-statistics and 
critical values are compared in order to test the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. 
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B.2: ARCH LM EFFECTS AFTER GJR REGRESSIONS 
Australia Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1   0.025   1 0.8740 
Basic Materials 1   0.046    1    0.8308 
Industrial 1    0.009 1   0.9264 
Consumer Goods 1 0.003   1    0.9577 
Healthcare 1   0.000   1 0.9863 
Consumer Services 1 0.001 1 0.9695 
Telecommunication 1   0.006   1    0.9361 
Utilities 1 0.156   1 0.6927 
Technology 1   0.126    1 0.7223 
Financial 1   0.000    1 0.9924 
 
Brazil Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1    0.025    1 0.8739 
Basic Materials 1    0.050    1   0.8231 
Industrial 1   0.010 1 0.9216 
Consumer Goods 1    0.006    1   0.9401 
Consumer Services 1   0.004   1   0.9526 
Telecommunication 1   3.580 1 0.0585 
Utilities 1   0.002 1     0.9610 
Technology 1   0.000 1   0.9832 
Financial 1 0.010 1 0.9211 
 
Chile Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1   0.015   1 0.9037 
Basic Materials 1   0.188   1   0.6643 
Industrial 1 0.050 1   0.8235 
Consumer Goods 1   0.004    1 0.9485 
Healthcare 1    0.475 1   0.4905 
Consumer Services 1 0.034     1 0.8544 
Telecommunication 1     0.022 1 0.8810 
Technology 1   0.118 1     0.7309 
Financial 1   0.001    1   0.9737 
 
China Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1   0.046     1 0.8307 
Basic Materials 1   0.008 1    0.9289 
Industrial 1   0.014 1 0.9072 
Consumer Goods 1   0.053 1 0.8173 
Healthcare 1   0.000    1   0.9867 
Consumer Services 1   0.003   1   0.9561 
Telecommunication 1 0.081 1   0.7764 
Utilities 1 0.005   1   0.9442 
Technology 1 0.065 1   0.7982 
Financial 1   0.011   1   0.9163 
 
France Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1   0.000      1 0.9848 
Basic Materials 1   0.208      1   0.6482 
Industrial 1 0.001 1   0.9734 
Consumer Goods 1   0.003    1   0.9536 
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Healthcare 1    0.525   1 0.4686 
Consumer Services 1 0.054   1   0.8165 
Telecommunication 1    0.066    1   0.7968 
Utilities 1 0.030   1 0.8623 
Technology 1   0.002    1 0.9643 
Financial 1 0.005 1    0.9455 
 
Germany Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1   0.046      1   0.8309 
Basic Materials 1 0.080   1   0.7766 
Industrial 1   1.270 1     0.2598 
Consumer Goods 1 0.001   1 0.9737 
Healthcare 1   0.000     1   0.9930 
Consumer Services 1    0.039   1   0.8439 
Telecommunication 1 0.007     1 0.9312 
Utilities 1   0.138      1   0.7106 
Technology 1 0.005    1    0.9424 
Financial 1   0.002 1    0.9684 
 
HK Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1 0.000 1   0.9917 
Basic Materials 1   0.215   1    0.6427 
Industrial 1 0.148 1   0.7008 
Consumer Goods 1 0.002     1   0.9610 
Healthcare 1 0.005 1 0.9416 
Consumer Services 1 0.030 1 0.8625 
Telecommunication 1 0.009 1   0.9249 
Utilities 1    0.069 1   0.7923 
Technology 1 0.450 1 0.5026 
Financial 1 0.001     1 0.9746 
 
India Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1   0.001 1   0.9755 
Basic Materials 1 0.000 1   0.9981 
Industrial 1    0.003   1 0.9576 
Consumer Goods 1   0.005      1   0.9429 
Healthcare 1   0.008   1 0.9289 
Consumer Services 1 0.002     1 0.9625 
Telecommunication 1    0.115   1 0.7344 
Utilities 1    0.061   1   0.8042 
Technology 1   0.003 1 0.9555 
Financial 1   0.001     1 0.9763 
 
Indonesia Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1  1   
Basic Materials 1  1  
Industrial 1 0.002    1 0.9661 
Consumer Goods 1   0.007 1 0.9322 
Healthcare 1    0.376   1   0.5399 
Consumer Services 1 0.013   1   0.9103   
Telecommunication 1 0.003 1 0.9591 
Utilities 1   0.020 1 0.8867 
Financial 1   0.016 1   0.8991 
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Italy Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1   0.066    1 0.7965 
Basic Materials 1 0.000   1 0.9887 
Industrial 1 0.007 1 0.9342 
Consumer Goods 1   0.004 1 0.9518 
Healthcare 1   0.067     1   0.7956 
Consumer Services 1    0.012   1 0.9137 
Telecommunication 1   0.118 1   0.7309 
Utilities 1   0.272   1   0.6021 
Technology 1   0.001   1   0.9787 
Financial 1 0.022    1    0.8808 
 
Japan Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1 0.012 1 0.9113 
Basic Materials 1 0.003 1 0.9553 
Industrial 1 0.086 1 0.7691 
Consumer Goods 1 0.158 1 0.6914 
Healthcare 1 0.098 1 0.7548 
Consumer Services 1 0.001 1 0.9729 
Telecommunication 1 0.005 1 0.9420 
Utilities 1 0.002 1 0.9647 
Financial 1 0.040 1   0.8406 
 
 
Mexico Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1 144.500 1 0.0000 
Basic Materials 1 235.667   1   0.0000 
Industrial 1 0.004     1    0.9508 
Consumer Goods 1   0.004    1 0.9497 
Healthcare 1    1  
Consumer Services 1 0.002   1 0.9650 
Telecommunication 1 0.070 1 0.7917 
Financial 1    0.238 1   0.6253 
 
Norway Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1    0.075    1 0.7836 
Basic Materials 1    2.367 1     0.1239 
Industrial 1 0.000   1   0.9835 
Consumer Goods 1 0.179 1 0.6722 
Consumer Services 1 0.001 1    0.9788 
Telecommunication 1 0.395   1 0.5295 
Utilities 1   0.014   1    0.9048 
Technology 1 0.003 1    0.9551 
Financial 1 0.075    1 0.7846 
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NZ Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1   0.031   1    0.8600 
Basic Materials 1 0.007 1   0.9334 
Industrial 1    0.006 1 0.9392 
Consumer Goods 1     0.013 1 0.9087 
Healthcare 1 2.110   1 0.1463 
Consumer Services 1 0.014   1   0.9049 
Telecommunication 1     0.264     1 0.6072 
Utilities 1   0.007    1   0.9347 
Technology 1 0.047   1   0.8287 
Financial 1 0.013 1   0.9099 
 
Russia Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1    0.029   1   0.8656 
Basic Materials 1   0.003   1 0.9540 
Consumer Goods 1    0.008    1 0.9303 
Consumer Services 1   0.002 1 0.9624 
Telecommunication 1   0.010    1 0.9214 
Utilities 1   1.257      1    0.2622 
Financial 1   1.725   1    0.1891 
 
South Africa Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1       0.007   1   0.9355 
Basic Materials 1   0.020 1   0.8869 
Industrial 1 0.001 1    0.9788 
Consumer Goods 1 0.371 1   0.5423 
Healthcare 1    0.004   1 0.9504 
Consumer Services 1   0.002    1 0.9653 
Telecommunication 1   0.057    1   0.8120 
Utilities 1 0.082    1   0.7749 
Technology 1 0.002 1 0.9690 
Financial 1 0.085 1 0.7712 
 
South Korea Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1   0.033 1 0.8553 
Basic Materials 1 0.773   1 0.3793 
Industrial 1 1.260 1 0.2617 
Consumer Goods 1   0.820 1 0.3651 
Healthcare 1   0.001 1    0.9744 
Consumer Services 1    0.513 1 0.4740 
Telecommunication 1    0.018   1   0.8939 
Utilities 1 0.003   1 0.9553 
Technology 1 0.002 1   0.9690 
Financial 1 0.000 1   0.9978 
 
Spain Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1 13.008 1 0.0003 
Basic Materials 1    0.556   1   0.4559 
Industrial 1   3.942 1 0.0471 
Consumer Goods 1 0.063   1    0.8019 
Healthcare 1    0.002 1 0.9666 
Consumer Services 1   0.001 1 0.9796 
Telecommunication 1    0.855   1 0.3553 
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Utilities 1 0.102 1 0.7489 
Technology 1 0.006 1 0.9396 
Financial 1   0.019 1 0.8912 
 
Sweden Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1   0.005 1 0.9434 
Basic Materials 1   42.669   1    0.0000 
Industrial 1 3.088 1   0.0789 
Consumer Goods 1 0.044     1 0.8332 
Healthcare 1    0.347 1    0.5557 
Consumer Services 1 0.244 1 0.6215 
Telecommunication 1   0.000   1 0.9997 
Technology 1   0.025 1   0.8745 
Financial 1 0.098 1 0.7548 
 
Switzerland Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1    0.007 1 0.9356 
Basic Materials 1 2.828 1 0.0926 
Industrial 1 0.029 1   0.8641 
Consumer Goods 1 0.007 1 0.9331 
Healthcare 1 0.001 1     0.9766 
Consumer Services 1 0.032 1 0.8586 
Telecommunication 1    0.043 1   0.8352 
Utilities 1   0.034   1 0.8545 
Financial 1   0.011    1 0.9179 
 
Taiwan Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1 0.007 1 0.9317 
Basic Materials 1 0.160 1 0.6889 
Industrial 1 0.007 1 0.9349 
Consumer Goods 1 0.002 1 0.9687 
Consumer Services 1   0.002   1 0.9636 
Telecommunication 1 0.002 1 0.9636 
Technology 1 0.000    1 0.9972 
Financial 1   0.002   1 0.9616 
 
Thailand Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1    0.085     1   0.7710 
Basic Materials 1   0.572   1   0.4494 
Industrial 1    1.877   1    0.1707 
Healthcare 1 0.296     1 0.5866 
Consumer Services 1   0.006    1 0.9373 
Telecommunication 1    0.131 1    0.7179 
Utilities 1 0.155    1 0.6942 
Technology 1 0.045 1   0.8326 
Financial 1 0.017    1 0.8954 
 
U.K. Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1 0.001 1 0.9760 
Basic Materials 1    0.854 1 0.3555 
Industrial 1   0.057   1 0.8113 
Consumer Goods 1 0.333 1 0.5637 
127 
 
Healthcare 1 6.707 1 0.0096 
Consumer Services 1   0.001 1    0.9714 
Telecommunication 1 0.010   1 0.9185 
Utilities 1 0.050 1 0.8229 
Technology 1 0.016    1    0.8990 
Financial 1 0.019    1     0.8917 
 
U.S. Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Oil 1   0.111   1   0.7391 
Basic Materials 1   0.013   1 0.9090 
Industrial 1   0.024 1   0.8759 
Consumer Goods 1   0.408 1 0.5229 
Healthcare 1   0.035 1 0.8507 
Consumer Services 1   0.039 1 0.8433 
Telecommunication 1   0.433 1 0.5107 
Utilities 1    0.000    1   0.9858 
Technology 1 0.106 1   0.7453 
Financial 1   0.023   1   0.8783 
Engle’s ARCH LM test is conducted after modelling equation (4.2)-(4.3) for ARCH effects. Given the p-values are 
compared to the alphas (5% significance level) in order to determine whether there are any remaining ARCH effects 
in the residuals after estimating Model 4.2with a GJR GARCH framework
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B.3.: Estimation results for Equation 4.2 
World Financial Sector Returns 
Australia 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil -.0636464 .0002119** .2862246**  .1709803  
Basic Mat   .1067239***  .4892814***    .4676907***  
Industrial   .117956***.  .168926***  .0990863  
Cons. Goods .0944449***   .000125**    6.676481** -.0045232** -.0423999  
Healthcare   .1209533***  .000437  -.0483086  
Cons. Ser .2160029***  -.1141036*  -.0617736  
Tele.   .1448927**  -.0052552  -.1581481  
Utilities .0439203  .0066816  .0027846  
Tech. 3.600563*** .0030422***   9.923613** -.0071357** 4.762188* -.0036206** 
Financial .3669687***    .332405***    .2070348***  
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
Australia 𝜇0(ausfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil .7327458*** -.0002643***   -.4004428***  .1200774  
Basic Mat .9200518*** -.0002753*** -.4264326***    -.0862427  
Industrial .5927778***      4.136045* -.0028496* -.04643  
Cons. Goods .503238***  -.0937987  -4.161769** .0024868** 
Healthcare .5749611***  14.21875*** -.0096833*** -.156593*  
Cons. Ser .8241529*** -.0002582*** .090169  .0468332  
Tele. .3082775***  -.1116415  -.0075693    
Utilities   .6439895***   -.0001908** 6.708346** -.0045093**   -3.801317** .0024834** 
Tech. .3833116***  -.0813837  .0622554  
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World Financial Sector Returns 
Brazil 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎   𝜸𝟏  𝜽𝟎  𝜽𝟏 
Oil .4834158***  -.2927354*  .1675143  
Basic Mat -.5143023   .0008*** -.5658096***  -.1309337  
Industrial .3263042***  -.2404242**  -.1630703**  
Cons. Goods .2951287***  -.1366311  -.2201524***  
Cons. Ser   .673441***  -.8324322***  -.5973466***  
Tele. .4574854***  -.3962817***  -.3410684***  
Utilities   .3793045***  -.5271235***  -.3967766***  
Tech. 1.505769**  -1.479819 **  -1.431893**  
Financial -1.199928*** .0016647*** 11.7901** -.0081342** -.7992782***  
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
Brazil 𝜇0(ausfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil .9061115*** -.0003897** .3890226**  .0289908  
Basic Mat   .3607405***  .4441938***  .0142011  
Industrial .6714966*** -.0002787** .3456938***  .2452228**  
Cons. Goods .3364164***  -.1769288**    .0458332  
Cons. Ser   .3582091***    11.56188*** -.0074692***   .201736**  
Tele. 1.982135 *** -.0012329*** 7.084672** -.0046038** .303732 **  
Utilities   1.240995*** -.0004789***   9.361423*** -.0062392*** -.0831504  
Tech.    11.0247*** -.0079085***   1.296307***  -9.315845* .0071189** 
World Financial Sector Returns 
Canada 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil .1838468 ***    .205306  .3537118***  
Basic Mat -.0259461   .0004285***   .4450694***  -.2163901*  
Industrial -.042261 .0004666*** .2948048***  -.4333354***  
Cons. Goods .3538034***  -.2556026***  -.1379128  
Healthcare .1960639***    9.895044*** -.00668*** -.0788886  
Cons. Ser .1798068***     7.381037*** -.0048897*** -.0910535***  
Tele. -.013600 .0001642*** -.094205  -.3340428    
Utilities   .1177999*** -.0000956***   .1410629**    .2135367***  
Tech. -.136319**    .0005427*** -.8726043***  -.4957629**  
Financial .2386165*** .0002585***   -.0203873  -.1994019***  
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Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
Canada 𝜇0(ausfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil   .5055573*** -.0002848*** -17.83214***   .0118705*** .3193477**  
Basic Mat .7241774*** -.0004049*** -.8953528***  .1655434  
Industrial .8738444*** -.0004235*** .1814187  .2490933*  
Cons. Goods    .3150748***  .20367**  .1062294  
Healthcare .537758*** -.0001416*** .0933701  -.1411083  
Cons. Ser .458691***  -.2401777***  -3.942504** .0023347** 
Tele. .0002762***    -.3179988***  -.1569983  
Utilities .3201853***  -.1005402  -.119026*  
Tech.    .54512***    17.50536**   -.0112848*   .1170136  
 
World Financial Sector Returns 
Chile 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎  𝜸𝟏 (r3) 𝜽𝟎 (D4) 𝜽𝟏 (r5) 
Oil -.2018645* .0002021* -.2385976**  -.037711  
Basic Mat .1055963***  9.292373***   -.006158*** .0975074  
Industrial .0729807**  13.94309*** -.0092831*** -7.301987*** .0045607*** 
Cons. Goods .1611971***  13.95091***   -.0092926*** -.1256039*  
Healthcare .0021653  -.1520803**  .0366007  
Cons. Ser .1478279***  -.1339314**   .2049768***  
Tele. .3857454***  -.2917657***  -.3254143***  
Tech. -.1968869  .2661955  .4252287  
Financial -.4141297***   .000603*** 11.6727*** -.0078322*** -.2166693***  
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
Chile 𝜇0(ausfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil -.3731451*** .0006474***   1.142379***  .3492096***  
Basic Mat -.2391918*** .0006569*** -.0036806  -.1328472  
Industrial .3592687***  .4222701***  .5082302***  
Cons. Goods   .377268***  .200122  .2108144**  
Healthcare -.1691797***   .0003141*** -11.59458** .0080703** 5.119041* -.0031214* 
Cons. Ser .2865392***  .7715064***    
Tele. -.0670299 .0005925***   27.84973*** -.0186308*** -.446744***  
Tech. -69.20355* .0491613** .0491613** -.0620116** 67.04323* -.0476492** 
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World Financial Sector Returns 
China 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil .0155071    -.172901  .2209088**  
Basic Mat -.8005567**   .0007072** -.4886391**    -.2222472  
Industrial .0008442  -.1798762  .0731283  
Cons. Goods -.0186201  -.1528284    .158155  
Healthcare -.0220486  -.0490384  -.0198445  
Cons. Ser .0265121  -.2332693    -.0125061  
Tele. .0637843  -.2130643    .0832424  
Utilities .0222449    -.2490636  -.0147633  
Tech. .0859597  -.3987751    .0647111  
Financial -1.013044** .0012539*** 20.70133*** -.0136861*** -.1133527  
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
China 𝜇0(ausfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil -.4367648*   .000588*** .0595361  4.939125*** -.0032448*** 
Basic Mat   .2235493***    .4073679 ***    9.767629 *** -.0058711*** 
Industrial .2707486***    .190199*  5.223235***   -.0031778*** 
Cons. Goods -.0941947 .0003086** .0007551    6.587198*** -.0041892*** 
Healthcare -.2091539   .000399*** -.1858613  -.2699939**  
Cons. Ser .2374362***  .1737032  6.35025*** -.0038052*** 
Tele. .2467256***    .345325***  -.0927365  
Utilities .2467827***  .1362577    3.813224** -.0023035** 
Tech. .2395852***  -8.941528*   .0061152** -.0003405  
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World Financial Sector Returns 
France 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil .0766661**  .4932247***  .6866733***  
Basic Mat   .1390502***  .6862201***  .6930013***  
Industrial .1593966***  .4053669***  .5474579***  
Cons. Goods .1411097***     .42061***  .6070122***  
Healthcare   .10467    -.1355753  .3333438  
Cons. Ser   .1326454 ***  .4617216***    .482639***  
Tele. .3200787**  -.2028088  -.0777533  
Utilities .0739215    .6777524***  .1749278  
Tech. .1372397***  .4896644***    .5891669***  
Financial -.0420915   .0008122*** -.0739583  -3.795727** .0023847** 
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
France 𝜇0(ausfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil .568567***  -.6657228***  -.497834***  
Basic Mat .706247*** -.0001208*** -.6878462  -.4410183***  
Industrial .6492268***  3.587362 -.0027116** -.4952507***  
Cons. Goods .678517***  3.497402 -.0027497* -.6844706***  
Healthcare .7166696*** -.0001979***   -.1688586  -.3574468***  
Cons. Ser   .5910125 *** -.0000807** -.4450351 ***  -.3354401***  
Tele. .5243661***  -.4986107***  -.2946603**  
Utilities .6280186***  -.9076931***    -.2131693*  
Tech. .5156235***   .000317*** -.869716***  -.9124173***  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
133 
 
World Financial Sector Returns 
Germany  𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil 2.034141***    -1.63149***  -1.276159***  
Basic Mat -.0118753 .0001285*** -.107169  .3752335***  
Industrial -.0907702*** .0002295*** -.0970055      .247394  
Cons. Goods -.1257109***   .000281*** .2823034**  .2369994**  
Healthcare .0651875***  -.136101**  .0220929  
Cons. Ser -.0642645 .0002918*** -.1620355  .0473493  
Tele. .0506742*  -.2664174*  .0181485  
Utilities .0531373***    -24.51294*** .0164457*** .0288965  
Tech. .0897221  -.0755054    .3688801***  
Financial .2316179***    .0005063*** -.1865879***  -5.941582*** .0035952*** 
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
Germany 𝜇0(ausfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil -.1314933  .5933332    .3559764    
Basic Mat   .6252184***  .0434341  -.2577802***  
Industrial .7038287***  .0800787  3.957266** -.0025861*** 
Cons. Goods .6332915***  -.4209429***  -.3388395***  
Healthcare .6063416*** -.0001834***   -.0577812  -.0867136  
Cons. Ser .6431514*** -.0000964* -6.141887** .0041873** -.1021693  
Tele. .7056845***  -.2174042  -.3188615**  
Utilities .3342288*** -.0002478***   17.91711** -.0117539** .693254***  
Tech. .4066361*** .0003854***   -.3499223**  -.7308257***  
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World Financial Sector Returns 
Hong Kong 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil   .1125938  .1092187  .3867253  
Basic Mat -.0734657*    -.2326189    .3948726***  
Industrial   .0536226***  -.1045453*  .1268692*  
Cons. Goods -.4590869 .0006201** -11.52026**   .0074143** -.3905627**  
Healthcare -.0434386  .2491076    .1847112    
Cons. Ser -.0344261   .0001093** -10.66151**   .007026** -.0728329  
Tele. -.0586728 .0002656* -.0591815  -.3231216  
Utilities -.0020202    .0688361  .0604198  
Tech. -.3793666*   .000559*** -.3259491*    -.2828912  
Financial .4698451*** .0001753**   10.20342*** -.0067271*** .1259599  
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
Hong Kong 𝜇0 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil   .652528***  17.09992*** -.0109448*** |  -1.229224 .0008064** 
Basic Mat 1.135819*** -.0003561***   9.74095** -.0061037**   .256514**  
Industrial 1.043672*** -.0000685**   7.927667*** -.005294*** -.1708046**  
Cons. Goods -.0936848   .0006076*** 30.08185*** -.0201336*** -.2857842**  
Healthcare -1.271481     .0011489   15.13527** -.0102225** 8.633625**   -.0053021** 
Cons. Ser .7934579***    19.00454*** -.0126851*** |  -4.785054*** .0029985*** 
Tele.   .1098572 .0006687***   13.74816*** -.0094406*** -.7251568***  
Utilities .9097044*** -.0004758***   8.405808*** -.0055413*** -3.391692*** .0021563*** 
Tech. .5723438*** .0004019*** -.2258891  -.5194077***  
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World Financial Sector Returns 
India 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil   .1838219***  .1394704***  -.0445135  
Basic Mat .076048**  .0427408  6.005339*** -.0034251** 
Industrial   .165917***  -.1267327  -.0578497  
Cons. Goods    .1658704***  -.0623765***  -.1564743**  
Healthcare   .1028069***    .0015299  .0303922  
Cons. Ser -.2839022 .0003428* -.244454  -.1634866  
Tele. .0883203  .275372**  -.0096075  
Utilities .0150612     .1192363     .1065933  
Tech. .2994693***  -.0001253   .0377585  
Financial -1.140122*** .0014577*** .0132143  5.584263* -.0037664** 
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
India 𝜇0(ausfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil -.220419***   .0006343*** 6.805485** -.0047142** -.3302781***  
Basic Mat   -.0267701 .0005361*** 5.414931* -.0036108* -.2621056***  
Industrial .0408572   .0004799***   6.556578*** -.0044163*** -.1267327**  
Cons. Goods .0156462 .0004474***   8.834088***   -.0061*** -.4161058***  
Healthcare .2929428*** .0001208** -.2361033***  -.3343255***  
Cons. Ser   -.0305105 .0005059***   -.178723**  -.2831646***  
Tele. -.1888602* .0007543***   9.183346*** -.0064536*** 2.820875 -.002082* 
Utilities .1760618***   .0003626***   12.98202*** -.0087538*** -.1986512***  
Tech. .1417413*** .000274*** -.3289401***  -.3391582***  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
136 
 
World Financial Sector Returns 
Indonesia 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏(r1) 𝜸𝟎  (D2) 𝜸𝟏 (r3) 𝜽𝟎 (D4) 𝜽𝟏 (r5) 
Oil Use OLS      
Basic Mat .1481961***  .0116983  6.006489**    -.00353** 
Industrial -.1017523***  .1533715  .3652875***  
Cons. Goods -.1427899  -.206911  -.2401987*  
Healthcare   .2271857***  -.2131318**  -.0194926  
Tele. .4591112***    -.3155408**  -.4032458***  
Utilities .4780087**  -.3285038  -.2244965  
Financial -.4302728*   .000921*** 16.74174*** -.0112624*** -.4348772**  
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
Indonesia 𝜇0(ausfin) 𝜇1(r6) 𝜌0(d5) 𝜌1(r7) 𝜑0(d6) 𝜑1(r8) 
Oil       
Basic Mat .0050389   .0004149*** 13.42532** -.00883** -.067882  
Industrial   -2.084885 .0019686***   .0714488  -.4950401***  
Cons. Goods .0208822 .000437*** .0934365  -.1202608  
Healthcare .3839423***  .2077905***  .2519832**  
Tele.    .051839   .0003967*** -.0796285  -.3772684***  
Utilities .5295586***  -15.41157*** .0105609*** -.0796985  
 
World Financial Sector Returns 
Italy 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil -.2199434**   .000422***   -.1141203  -11.30046*** .0070577*** 
Basic Mat .0438736 -.0000266    .678437***  1.157604***  
Industrial   -.0080953 .0001447*** .1256384  .361737  
Cons. Goods .0386524    .4402754***    .827176***  
Healthcare   .015288     .30875***  .3627638***  
Cons. Ser -.1689421*** .0003162*** 8.547773***   -.005772*** .1508089  
Utilities   .0020208    .0694753  .2769931***  
Tech. .0553729    -.0402521  .2639105**  
Financial    .0700043    .0005729*** -7.645113***    .0050148*** -5.261543** .0034491** 
 
 
 
137 
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
Italy 𝜇0(ausfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil .708657*** -.0002762*** -.0482231     7.146579*** -.0044249*** 
Basic Mat .8551992*** -.0001591*** -.4869624**  -.6973303***  
Industrial    .7770791***  -.4819567***  -.4892729***  
Cons. Goods .8950074***  -.6429192***  -.8057655***  
Healthcare    .6562648***  -.5919789***  -.5303361***  
Cons. Ser .8741705***   -.0003373*** .1180407  -.0184356  
Utilities .8555343*** -.0002405*** -.1267277  -.1751507***  
Tech. .871396***  .0627276    2.608132 -.0019536** 
 
World Financial Sector Returns 
Japan 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil   .1816134***  .1224156  .2810419***  
Basic Mat   .1961606***  8.097122** -.0052986**   .1384892**  
Industrial   .3170299***  -.0878522    .0180025  
Cons. Goods .2606244***  -.1042849  -.0877606  
Healthcare .1780863***  -.1262173  -.1506996***  
Cons. Ser .1919049***  -.0792386  -.1628576  
Tele.    .0474133 .000326*** -.5013826***  -.5103402***  
Utilities .1071592***  -.1384267*    -.1699059***  
Financial .2610779   .0009479*** 22.29286*** -.0153157*** -1.316025***  
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
Japan 𝜇0(japfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil   .1816134*** .0002438*** -.1721466*    .0611892  
Basic Mat .2603505*** .2603505*** -.1913652***     .0286153  
Industrial -.0019385   .0004506*** -.1188635**  -.0510869  
Cons. Goods .092399***   .0002962*** -.0575742  .0976144**  
Healthcare .450326*** -.0001562*** -4.086262** .0028089* .2246638***  
Cons. Ser    .399362*** .0000889*** 2.861237* -.002096** -.1219323***  
Tele. .4026538***  -.0769862  -.0505273  
Utilities .7193729*** -.0005108*** .2376792***  .2489054***  
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World Financial Sector Returns 
Mexico 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Basic Mat -.1839973 .0005754*** 14.98944*** -.0099316*** 8.34284*** -.0052279*** 
Industrial   -.1096809 .0004528*** -.0935916    -.2411969**  
Cons. Ser -.0369207    .000316** -.2132867**  5.47655*** -.0035685*** 
Tele. .5466785***  -.0576317  -.1949114**  
Financial .4879001***  -.1043562**  -.0840567  
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
Mexico 𝜇0(ausfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Basic Mat .4308496***  .0645409  .0132029  
Industrial    .321477*** .0001352** -.0112716  -.1999042**  
Cons. Ser .1152537** .0002466***     -.0466371    -.200974**  
Tele. .1817567** .000257*** -.2437473*  4.077934 -.0027909* 
 
World Financial Sector Returns 
Norway 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil .1876755***    .1569223  .3821753***  
Basic Mat .0722094 .0001649** .5154479***  .3963155***  
Con. gds .2308226***  12.68166** -.0083509** .3070183***  
Cons. Ser -.1610322*   .0005795*** -.3214672**  -.0120681  
Tele. .5974229***  -.2201282    11.10201*** -.0069386*** 
Utilities -.009803 .0002795***   26.92938*** -.0176702***    -.285959**  
Tech. -.5933655*** .0011549***    23.69854*** -.0161894*** -.9154268***  
Financial .0905958   .0003856*** -27.46403*** .0185923*** .3671219***  
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Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
Norway 𝜇0(norwfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0 𝜑1 
Oil .315644*** .0001028* 9.096573** -.0061389** -.1954788*  
Basic Mat .4394547***  -.2538955**  -.1274933*  
Cons. Goods .294847***    9.481874** -.0062433* -.0737364    
Cons. Ser .2690698*** .0001188* 17.80147*** -.0117513*** -.0386007  
Tele. -1.226641 .0011726** 8.074046* -.0056763* -.4965454**  
Utilities .3695675*** -.0001737** -.158344  .0469359  
Tech. .1219889 .0001835* -.1665574  -.1757496  
 
World Financial Sector Returns 
New Zealand 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 (D4) 𝜽𝟏 
Oil .1311675***  .0401828  -.0067582  
Basic Mat    .195139***  -.0847797    .1222878  
Industrial .1050415**  .1078578*    .1877074***  
Cons. Goods   .1392005***  -8.827166** .0058544**   .09834  
Healthcare   .1029463 ***  -.1147449*  .0295227  
Cons. Ser   .163298***  .0366122  .0679714  
Tele.   .5801631*** -.0003797** .22365*  .2830523**  
Utilities .0678233**  .1226466**  .0665088  
Tech. -.8095646    .8747107  .9604491  
Financial .6572476*** -.0003235*** 2.98398*   -.0019726* 1.47496 -.0009278* 
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
New Zealand 𝜇0(nzfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil .1141211***    .374515*  -12.70039* .0082445** 
Basic Mat   .6445853*** -.0002588*** .5875929***  .2680981  
Industrial .9611657***   -.0005203**   10.91419* -.0070157* .1468694  
Cons. Goods .3080156***    .4857895***  .0532338  
Healthcare    .2752758***  .5660061***  -.1235104  
Cons. Ser .1416186***   .0001719*** .3739562***  -.2600349**  
Tele.   .3324804***  -.0200624  -13.86054** .0087396** 
Utilities   .2316205***  .4062832***  -.0074679  
Tech. -2.173753  2.563729  2.271076  
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World Financial Sector Returns 
Russia 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil .5317007***  -.4496847***  -.194451*  
Basic Mat .5962602***  -.2647309*  -.293865**  
Cons. Goods .0634151    -.0966464    .0584733  
Cons. Ser .1504818  -.1930932      .2983936*  
Tele.   .3502451***  -.2347094***  -.2452177**  
Utilities .3061243    -.4884243***  -.2114662  
Financial -2.125081*   .0022369** -.3275292    12.64629*** -.0080648*** 
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
Russia 𝜇0(russfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil 1.019715***   -.0004453***   .3997451***  .1962617**  
Basic Mat .3502096***  .2888739***  .2387487***  
Cons. Goods -.9933805* .0008365* -.0002773***  4.893931*** -.003172*** 
Cons. Ser 1.075243*** -.0004616*** .1377057  -.1135719  
Tele.    1.322885*** -.0008251*** .2364718***  .2716033***  
Utilities   1.227233*** -.0006669*** .311118***  .4506276***  
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World Financial Sector Returns 
South Africa 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil   .2050746***  -14.08375*** .009605*** .1936501**  
Basic Mat .2649773***  .3428916**  .2094506**  
Industrial   .1844682***  .0295753  .0309741  
Cons. Goods .1598255***  -.0557462    .0433314  
Healthcare .0665939**     .07137  .006782    
Cons. Ser -.1576467 .0003037***   -.0500749    -.1300702  
Tele.   .2524047***    .1574526  -.2156225*  
Tech.    .059333    -.1073694  .1404568    
Financial -.0842488 .0005485*** -.1997099***    -.3251416***  
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
South Africa 𝜇0(safin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil .3059806***  -.1394578  -7.437455 .0047958* 
Basic Mat .2227072*** .0001691**   -.4374323***    -.05869  
Industrial .3476115*** .0002298*** -.1827857***  -.1234551  
Cons. Goods -.2755967*** .0006405***   6.96525** -.0048561** -3.874429** .0021792* 
Healthcare .1738797***   .0002733*** -.1510717*    4.893343** -.0030874** 
Cons. Ser -.0155007   .0004907*** 7.069597** -.0048803** -.2238896**  
Tele. .7505674***  -.3854877***  -.0529897  
Tech. .0884305*    .0376064      -12.36486***   .007624*** 
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World Financial Sector Returns 
South Korea 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil -.2464262* .0004105*** -.0956565  .1510526  
Basic Mat -.2116911* .0005253*** 15.88821*** -.0105463*** -.3040335**  
Industrial   -.1719682    .000486*** -.3134594**  -.3838783**  
Cons. Goods -.1014639 .0003171** -.1263786  -.2729992*  
Healthcare .1302473**           .0086324    -.0313015  
Cons. Ser .1641132***  .2116056**  -.229716**  
Tele. .2447077***  10.79641** -.0071016** -.3736692***  
Utilities   .2076539***  .1675703**  -.106146  
Tech.   .3784618***  -.0921164  -.3688679**  
Financial -.3901014**   .0011339*** -.623032***  -.655339***  
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
South Korea 𝜇0(skfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil   .4398362***     8.786256* -.0056734* -.0688063  
Basic Mat .5292159***  -.0643663  -.0241498  
Industrial .5474979***  .1615823  -3.578062* .0022871* 
Cons. Goods .5330621***  -.1727554***  -.2303987***  
Healthcare .2918154***    12.12986** -.0081429** -.0273265    
Cons. Ser .6242961***  -.3320715***  -.0795848  
Tele. .3290339***  -.3889282***  -5.702411*** .0035913*** 
Utilities .8622742*** -.0005003***   .1987066**  .4388296***  
Tech.   .634075***  -.1840434**  -7.467241***   .004613*** 
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World Financial Sector Returns 
Spain 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil .1321021***  -.1394928*     .4106088***  
Basic Mat .1018576***    .2838545***  .6008944***  
Industrial .1496933***  .0753426  .3974176***  
Cons. Goods .0613516  -.0510151  .2155726***  
Healthcare .0438102  -.0537475  -5.156509*** .0033758*** 
Cons. Ser   .0902951***  .2231115***  .5082834***  
Tele. .0282605  -.0795231  .2214862***  
Utilities    .0523055*  .0432102    .1960213**  
Tech.   .2003398*  .0434136     .3196664*  
Financial -.129507** .0007929** -.1859995***  -.1189872  
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
Spain 𝜇0(spainfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil   .9170856*** -.0004192*** .2616518***  .0616929  
Basic Mat .6040451***    -.2025386***  -.4283474 ***  
Industrial .7538812*** -.000241*** 17.78176*** -.0117001*** -2.437905** .0014728** 
Cons. Goods   .4096204***  -.1827271**  -2.455225**    .0012994** 
Healthcare 1.078008***   -.000643*** 20.31967*** -.0132649***   .2035582**  
Cons. Ser .557807 ***  14.56442*** -.0097204***   -.3596418***  
Tele.   .528531*** .0002698*** -.4190458***  -3.844811***    .0020055** 
Utilities .8703319*** -.0003159*** -.0127926  .0880665  
Tech. .7584792***    12.78499*** -.0088386*** -.6314016***  
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World Financial Sector Returns 
Sweden 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil -4.600749* .0035415** -.0735788     5.57753 -.003838 
Basic Mat -.1248741**   .0003324***   10.7443*** -.0073112*** .1111438  
Industrial -.2108439*** .0005099*** -.3097138***  -.3614875***  
Cons. Goods -.0896566   .000332*** -.2936086***  -.4303164***  
Healthcare .1601115***  .1961506*  -.0185083    
Cons. Ser   -.088525 .0003283*** -.1106239    -.4141832***  
Tele. .3338137***  -.0653285  -.2719393*  
Tech. -.0776347 .0006174*** -.6909693***    -.9194633***  
Financial   .084831   .0006795*** -.2732642***  -.1833774**  
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
Sweden 𝜇0(swedenfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil .3989224***  .0811296  .2254636  
Basic Mat    .5639545*** -.0001459** .4219127***  -3.254003**    .002178** 
Industrial .4813649***  10.44252*** -.0067858***   .2607143***  
Cons. Goods      .528898***  -.0030495  .0598258    
Healthcare   .289765***  .015079    .1107374  
Cons. Ser .1116881*** .0002808*** 10.45993***   -.0071501*** -.0429638  
Tele. .5329701***  -.3406202***  -.119177    
Tech. .457873***    9.513287** -.0062859* .0769116  
 
World Financial Sector Returns 
Switzerland 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil .8122427  .2708971    .1438219  
Basic Mat .0580686***    .3707663***  -5.51964***   .0036132*** 
Industrial .0266446   .000194*** .2885768**    .1877571  
Cons. Goods -.1093472   .0002507*   .0965489  -.0599072  
Healthcare .0477043**  -.0085931  5.368887** -.0033105* 
Cons. Ser   .0898618***     .0014796  -4.381292*** .0029257*** 
Tele. .1756609**    -.158447  -.0081375  
Utilities .0608414***  .2573081**     .0263379  
Financial .0333401 .0007199*** -.0471052  -.2714638***  
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Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
Switzerland 𝜇0(skfin) 𝜇1(r6) 𝜌0(d5) 𝜌1(r7) 𝜑0(d6) 𝜑1(r8) 
Oil   .515735      -.362919  .1658291  
Basic Mat .6098866*** -.0000758** -.4092727***  -.2043538**  
Industrial   .7434773*** -.000168*** 5.966218** -.0041008** -.0624398    
Cons. Goods .9128734*** -.0003258***   -.443446***  -4.5553*** .0026554*** 
Healthcare .8901996*** -.000377*** -.1525578**  -10.97039*** .006766*** 
Cons. Ser .7540944***   -.0001477*** 8.010424*** -.0055177***   -.3153355***  
Tele.   .148492***    .082247    -3.438158**   .0021111** 
Utilities .3717817*** -.0002488*** .0611233     -3.800092*** .0025628*** 
 
World Financial Sector Returns 
Taiwan 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏(r1) 𝜸𝟎  (D2) 𝜸𝟏 (r3) 𝜽𝟎 (D4) 𝜽𝟏 (r5) 
Oil   .1914751  -.0452428    .0284179  
Basic Mat   .1469026***  -.1039246    .0972872    
Industrial -.3423446**   .0006583*** -.5740607***  -.4971633***  
Cons. Goods   .1383793***  -.2603666***  -.0032873    
Cons. Ser   .1875556***  -9.730527*** .0062657*** -.0638424  
Tele.   -1.128143** .0009061** -.1769522*    2.818813* -.0019581** 
Tech. .4341896***  -.1696968  -.180709**  
Financial .5581804***    .266812***    .2017499***  
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
Taiwan 𝜇0(taiwanfin) 𝜇1(r6) 𝜌0(d5) 𝜌1(r7) 𝜑0(d6) 𝜑1(r8) 
Oil   .2361725***  .2124727*  .1313357  
Basic Mat .6852639*** -.0001737***   .1999758**  .0438711  
Industrial   .7468922*** -.0001583** .1208452  .0982408  
Cons. Goods .3387252*** .0003038*** .0418251  3.075459** -.0020618** 
Cons. Ser   .7705137*** -.000246*** .3771787***     .0450095  
Tele.    1.008481*** -.0006102***   9.231421*** -.0061174*** .0849917  
Tech.   .8691045*** -.0002216** .0183201  -.1015621  
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World Financial Sector Returns 
Thailand 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil .1317807**  .1359527  .3070304***  
Basic Mat .043686   .1964009**    .2720924***  
Industrial    .1471874*  -.0488954  .0188111  
Cons. Goods .1618367***  -.0138583    -.1282086    
Healthcare   .1051627**  -.0123391  -.3030852***  
Cons. Ser   .1192891***  -.105315    -.22209***  
Tele.    .1338356**  -.1129651  -.2295024**  
Utilities .0416492  .0111941  -.0393278  
Tech.   .2500782***  -.2722906***  -.2320086**  
Financial -.1430139    .0007154*** -.3730895***  -.4107574***  
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
Thailand 𝜇0(thaifin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil .5320113***  .3552337***  .1182149  
Basic Mat   .873322***   -.0001865*** .1975234*  .310645***  
Industrial .2164671   .0002409* .0837283        4.0281*** -.0023796*** 
Cons. Goods .6324819***  .1731944**  .0830625    
Healthcare .5884378*** -.0002884*** .2872077***    .3222497***  
Cons. Ser .2211264*** .0002035***    .0201614  -3.306769** .0021485** 
Tele.   .6763047***  -.2400307**  -.2596727***  
Utilities   .3950872***    -.0249351  -.1738969***  
Tech. 1.090612***   -.0003443*** -.1501325  -.1270965    
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World Financial Sector Returns 
U.K. 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil -.248028***   .0004455*** .1234727    .177419    
Basic Mat .0554321***     1.52571***  .8941668***  
Industrial -.2438762*** .0004858*** -.1989267**  -.2673652**  
Cons. Goods .0263304      5.100295** -.0033952**   -2.777452** .0018102** 
Healthcare -.0069249 .0001164** -.0886259  -.1620235    
Cons. Ser .0876354***  -21.00349***   .0139506*** .0915632  
Tele. .0659167**    .1225386    -.0679848  
Utilities .0557993*  .3700032***  .2000773*  
Tech.   -.0814492 .0003488*** -15.0136**   .009886** -.262062**  
Financial    .3121897*** .0003776*** .1489306***    .1111702*  
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
U.K. 𝜇0(ukfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil .889314*** -.0004529*** -.2405504*  .0006274  
Basic Mat .9324614***   -.0003284*** -.8850486***  -.0164177  
Industrial   1.024753*** -.0004987*** 7.415186***   -.0049195*** .2274482**  
Cons. Goods .6542199***  -.3849232***  -.4123949***  
Healthcare .9042951*** -.0004107***   7.747076*** -.0052095*** -5.59414*** .0034713*** 
Cons. Ser .8873596*** -.0002718***   28.28175*** -.0187894*** -2.193634** .0013124** 
Tele. .7186761***  -.6051906***  -.3041336***  
Utilities .6311002*** -.0002919*** -.3140017***  -.0830962  
Tech. .0473127   .0004367***   23.74303*** -.0160147*** -.3198009  ***  
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World Financial Sector Returns 
U.S. 𝜹𝟎(wdfin) 𝜹𝟏 𝜸𝟎 𝜸𝟏 𝜽𝟎 𝜽𝟏 
Oil -.1423477 **   .0004142 *** -.0396929  -.0284327    
Basic Mat  -.1669508***   .0005454*** .1370463    -.1898869  
Industrial   -.1260013*** .0003255*** -.0498193    -.1380823  
Cons. Goods   .0838971***  .0719895  .110661*  
Healthcare .0524485***  .1108117*  .1402708*  
Cons. Ser .0199911  .0315345  .1672625*  
Tele.   -.041912 .0001607***   7.345191***   -.0048477*** -.0263422  
Utilities .0554634***  .1885169**  .1885192***  
Tech.   -.107498*   .0003006*** -.0451663  -.0520918     
Financial .5874581***   .0002362*** .0625162      -.1397181**  
 
Country Specific Financial Sector Returns  
U.S. 𝜇0(usfin) 𝜇1 𝜌0 𝜌1 𝜑0  𝜑1  
Oil   .5467677 *** -.000294*** -6.616911 **   .0043845**    .2940694**  
Basic Mat .9806046*** -.0004743*** -.2192346**  .3681043***  
Industrial .8968847*** -.0002647*** -.2141838***  .1738514*  
Cons. Goods .8343682***   -.0001268*** -.4885761***  -.3193987***  
Healthcare .7969756*** -.000215*** -.381935***  -.1100401  
Cons. Ser   .9486662*** -.0001509*** -.2639905***  -.2436295***  
Tele. .560173***  -.2891341***  -.271386 ***  
Utilities .4842754*** -.000081** -4.404169**    .0027059** -.1587108**  
Tech.    .926354***   -.000163* -.4407684***    -.2127214  
Note: Parameters stem from model (4.2): 𝑅𝑆,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 +  𝛼2𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 +   𝛽1𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑤,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑤,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆
+ 𝛽
3𝑡
𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑤,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆+ 𝜔1𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜔2𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆
+ 𝜔3𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 +    𝜀𝑆,𝑖,𝑡, where  𝛽1𝑡 =  𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑡,    𝛽2𝑡 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑡,  𝛽3𝑡 =  𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑡,  and 𝜔1𝑡 =  𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑡,  𝜔2𝑡 =  𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝑡 and 𝜔3𝑡 =
 𝜑
0
+ 𝜑
1
𝑡. 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denotes stock returns in sector i at time t, 𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 (𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆) is a dummy variable equal to one during the crisis (post-crisis) period and zero otherwise. 
and  𝑅𝑊,𝑡 is the return of the world financial index whereas 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return on domestic financial sector. Error terms are modelled as a GJR-GARCH (1,1) process, 
corrected for autocorrelation in residuals where required. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Insignificant trend terms (𝛿1, 𝛾1, 𝜃1) and 
(𝜇
1
, 𝜌1, 𝜑1) are excluded and model (4.2) is re-estimated where relevant. 
 
 
149 
 
 
B.4: Estimation for Model (4.2): Contagion from World Financial Market Portfolio 
 
Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Australia  First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil .2862246**  0.2862246**  0.2862246**  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
Basic Material .4892814***  0.4892814***  0.4892814***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
Industrial .168926***  0.16892***  0.16892***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
Con. gds 6.676481** -.004523** 0.11331681 0.865727 -0.2711552 -3.04571 No Contagion C 
Healthcare .000437  0.000437  0.000437  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser. -.1141036*  -0.1141036*  -0.1141036*  No Contagion - 
Telecom -.0052552  -0.0052552  -0.0052552  No Contagion - 
Utilities .0066816  0.0066816  0.0066816  No Contagion C 
Technology 9.92361** -.007136** -0.4302877 -1.48164 -1.036822*** -3.42839 No Contagion - 
Financial .332405***  0.332405***  0.332405***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
 
Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Brazil  First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 t- statistic 
Oil -.2927354*  -.2927354*  -.2927354*  No Contagion C 
Basic Material -.565809***  -.565809***  -.5658096***  No Contagion C 
Industrial -.2404242**  -.2404242**  -.2404242**  No Contagion C 
Con. gds -.1366311  -.1366311  -.1366311  No Contagion C 
Con. Ser. -.832432***  -.832432***  -.8324322***  No Contagion C 
Telecom -.396282***  -.396282***  -.3962817***  No Contagion C 
Utilities -.527124***  -.527124***  -.5271235***  No Contagion C 
Technology -1.479819 **  -1.479819 **  -1.479819 **  No Contagion - 
Financial 11.7901** -.008134** -0.0126242 -0.05189 -.7040312*** -3.7257 No Contagion (decoupling) C 
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Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Canada First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil   .205306  0.205306  0.205306  No Contagion - 
Basic Material   .445069***    .445069***    .4450694***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
Industrial .2948048***  .2948048***  .2948048***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) - 
Con. gds -.255603***  -.255603***  -.2556026***  No Contagion C 
Healthcare   9.89504*** -.00668*** 0.202364 1.219230457 -0.365436 -3.50192 No Contagion - 
Con. Ser.    7.3810*** -.00489*** 0.2860823** 2.431654337 -0.1295422** -1.96572 Shock Contagion (Reversal) - 
Telecom -.094205  -0.094205  -0.094205  No Contagion - 
Utilities   .1410629**    .1410629**    .1410629**  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) - 
Technology -.872604***  -.872604***  -.8726043***  No Contagion - 
Financial   -.0203873  -0.0203873  -0.0203873  No Contagion C 
 
 
 
 
Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Chile First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- 
statistic 
?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil -.238598**  -0.2385976  -0.2385976  No Contagion C 
Basic Material 9.29237***   -.006158*** 
0.35711 0.064228 -0.166315 -0.02908 
Shock Contagion (Transitory 
Shock) 
C 
Industrial 13.9431*** -.009283*** 0.47331 2.831733 -0.3157516*** -4.00595 Shock Contagion (Reversal) C 
Con. gds 13.9509***   -.009293*** 
0.4673474 2.687784 -0.3225236*** -3.46853 
Shock Contagion (Reversal 
Shock) 
C 
Healthcare -.152080**  -0.1520803  -.1520803**  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser. -.133931**   -0.1339314  -.1339314**   No Contagion C 
Telecom -.291766***  -0.2917657  -.2917657***  No Contagion C 
Technology .266196  0.2661955  0.266195  No Contagion C 
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Financial 11.673*** -.007832*** 0.3081778 2.322847 -0.35756*** -3.75652 Shock Contagion (Reversal) C 
 
Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
China First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil   -.17290  -0.17290  -0.172901  No Contagion C 
Basic Material -.488639**  -0.488639**  -0.488639**  No Contagion C 
Industrial -.179876  -0.179876  -0.1798762  No Contagion C 
Con. gds -.152828  -0.152828  -0.1528284  No Contagion - 
Healthcare -.049038  -0.049038  -0.0490384  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser. -.233269  -0.233269  -0.2332693  No Contagion C 
Telecom -.213064  -0.213064  -0.2130643  No Contagion - 
Utilities -.249063  -0.249063  -0.2490636  No Contagion C 
Technology -.398775  -0.398775  -0.3987751  No Contagion C 
Financial 20.7013*** -.013686*** 0.842798 3.292809 
-0.320519 
-1.4918 
 
Shock Contagion (Transitory) C 
 
 
 
 
Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
France First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil .4932247***  .4932247***  .4932247***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
Basic Material .6862201***  .6862201***  .6862201***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
Industrial .4053669***  .4053669***  .4053669***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
Con. gds    .42061***     .42061***     .42061***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
Healthcare -.1355753  -.1355753  -.1355753  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser. .4617216***  .4617216***  .4617216***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
Telecom -.2028088  -.2028088  -.2028088  No Contagion - 
Utilities .6777524***  .6777524***  .6777524***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
Technology .4896644***  .4896644***  .4896644***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
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Financial -.0739583  -.0739583  -.0739583  No Contagion C 
 
Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Germany First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil   -1.63149***    -1.6315***    -1.63149***  No Contagion - 
Basic Material -.107169  -.107169  -.107169  No Contagion - 
Industrial -.0970055    -.0970055    -.0970055    No Contagion - 
Con. gds .2823034**  .2823034**  .2823034**  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Healthcare -.136101**  -.136101**  -.136101**  No Contagion C 
Con. Ser. -.1620355  -.1620355  -.1620355  No Contagion - 
Telecom -.2664174*  -.2664174*  -.2664174*  No Contagion - 
Utilities   -24.5129*** .0164457*** -0.650223** -2.41014 0.7476552*** 3.30588 Recoupling contagion - 
Technology -.0755054  -.0755054  -.0755054  No Contagion - 
Financial -.1865879***  -.186588***  -.1865879***  No Contagion C 
 
 
 
 
 
Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Hong Kong First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- 
statistic 
?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil .109218  0.1092187  0.1092187  No Contagion C 
Basic Material   -.232618  -0.2326189  -0.2326189  No Contagion C 
Industrial -.104545*  -0.104545*  -0.104545*  No Contagion C 
Con. gds -11.5202**   .007414** -0.76211*** -3.00732 -0.13189*** -0.68731 No Contagion C 
Healthcare .249107  0.249107  0.2491076  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser. -10.66151**   .007026** -0.46678*** -2.92877 0.130426*** 0.866916 No Contagion C 
Telecom -.0591815  -0.0591815  -0.0591815  No Contagion - 
Utilities   .068836  0.0688361  0.0688361  No Contagion - 
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Technology -.325949*  -0.3259491*  -0.3259491*  No Contagion - 
Financial   10.2034*** -.00672*** 0.442398*** 3.005977 -0.1294056 -1.47159 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C 
 
Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
India First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil .1394704***  .1394704***  .1394704***  Shock Contagion (Level) - 
Basic Material .0427408  .0427408  .0427408  No Contagion C 
Industrial -.1267327  -.1267327  -.1267327  No Contagion C 
Con. gds -.062376***  -.062376***  -.0623765***  No Contagion - 
Healthcare   .001529    .0015299    .0015299  No Contagion C 
Con. Ser. -.244454  -.244454  -.244454  No Contagion - 
Telecom .275372**  .275372**  .275372**  Shock Contagion (Level) - 
Utilities    .1192363        .1192363        .1192363     No Contagion - 
Technology -.0001253   -.0001253   -.0001253   No Contagion - 
Financial .0132143  .0132143  .0132143  No Contagion C 
 
 
 
Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Indonesia First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Basic Material .0116983  .0116983  .0116983  No Contagion C 
Industrial .1533715  .1533715  .1533715  No Contagion - 
Con. gds -.206911  -.206911  -.206911  No Contagion - 
Healthcare -.213131**  -.2131318**  -.2131318**  No Contagion - 
Telecom -.315540**  -.3155408**  -.3155408**  No Contagion - 
Utilities -.328503  -.3285038  -.3285038  No Contagion C 
Financial 16.7417*** -.011262*** 0.39999 1.547121 -0.55730*** -3.02992 No Contagion C 
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Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Italy First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil   -.1141203    -.114120    -.1141203  No Contagion - 
Basic Material    .67844***     .67844***     .67844***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Industrial .1256384  .1256384  .1256384  No Contagion C 
Con. gds   .440275***    .440275***    .440275***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Healthcare    .30875***     .30875***     .30875***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Con. Ser. 8.54777***   -.00577*** 0.172601 1.499647 -0.318019** -2.58414 No Contagion - 
Telecom   .0694753  0.0694753  0.0694753  No Contagion - 
Utilities   -.0402521  -0.040252  -0.0402521  No Contagion C 
Technology -7.64511***   .00501*** -0.36863*** -3.24972 0.0576198 0.703833 No Contagion - 
Financial   -.114120  -0.1141203  -0.1141203  No Contagion C 
 
 
 
Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Japan First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil .122415  122415  0.1224156  No Contagion - 
Basic Material 8.09712** -.005299** 0.40885** 2.48998 -0.041527 -0.60541 Shock Contagion (Transitory) - 
Industrial -.087852    -.087852    -0.087852  No Contagion - 
Con. gds -.104285  -.104285  -0.104284  No Contagion - 
Healthcare -.126217  -.126217  -0.126217  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser. -.079239  -.079239  -0.079238  No Contagion - 
Telecom -.501382***  -.501382***  -0.501383  No Contagion - 
Utilities -.138427*  -.1384267*  -0.138427  No Contagion - 
Technology 22.2929*** -.01531*** 0.06978 0.363143 -1.232055*** -9.7547 No Contagion - 
Financial .122416  .122416  0.1224156  No Contagion - 
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Mexico First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟐) 
Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Basic Material 14.9894*** -.009932*** 0.57869*** 3.14306 -0.2654976 -1.4318 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C 
Industrial -.093591    -0.0935916  -0.0935916  No Contagion C 
Con. Ser. -.2132867**  -0.2132867  -0.2132867  No Contagion - 
Telecom -.0576317  -0.0576317  -0.0576317  No Contagion - 
Financial -.1043562**  -0.1043562   -0.1043562  No Contagion C 
 
 
Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Norway First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil   .156922  0.1569223  0.1569223  No Contagion - 
Basic Material .515448***  0.5154479***  0.5154479***  Shock Contagion (Level ) C 
Con. gds 12.6816** -.008351** 0.5645041* 2.461541 -0.1453224 -0.8116 Shock Contagion (Transitory) - 
Con. Ser. -.3214672**  -0.3214672**  -0.3214672**  No Contagion - 
Telecom -.2201282  -0.2201282  -0.2201282  No Contagion - 
Utilities   26.929*** -.01767*** 1.28991*** 4.888285 -0.21204*** -0.96249 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C 
Technology    23.6985*** -.016189*** 0.207726*** 0.001016 -1.168378*** -0.0054 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C 
Financial -27.4640*** .018592*** -0.486603*** -2.95823 1.093742*** 8.868686 Recoupling Contagion C 
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Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
New Zealand First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil .0401828  0.0401828  0.0401828  No Contagion - 
Basic Material -.0847797    -0.0847797  -0.0847797  No Contagion - 
Industrial .1078578*  0.1078578*  0.1078578*  Shock Contagion (Level) - 
Con. gds -8.827166** .005854** -0.332431** -0.04349 0.1651924 0.020415 No Contagion - 
Healthcare -.11474*  -0.1147449*  -0.1147449*  No Contagion C 
Con. Ser. .0366122  0.0366122  0.0366122  No Contagion - 
Telecom .22365*  0.22365*  0.22365*  Shock Contagion (Level) - 
Utilities .1226466**  0.1226466  0.1226466  Shock Contagion (Level ) C 
Technology .8747107  0.8747107  0.8747107  No Contagion - 
Financial 2.98398*   -.001972* 0.1217374** 1.362364 -0.0459336 -0.689844 Shock Contagion (Reversal) - 
 
 
Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Russia First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil -.449684***  -.449684***  -.449684***  No Contagion C 
Basic Material -.2647309*  -.2647309*  -.2647309*  No Contagion C 
Con. gds   -.0966464    -.0966464    -.0966464  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser. -.1930932    -.1930932    -.1930932    No Contagion C 
Telecom -.234709***  -.234709***  -.2347094***  No Contagion - 
Utilities -.488424***  -.488424***  -.4884243***  No Contagion - 
Financial -.3275292    -.3275292    -.3275292    No Contagion - 
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Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
South Africa First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil -14.0837*** .009605*** -0.146895 -0.69775 0.66953*** 3.974248 No Contagion C 
Basic Material .3428916**  .3428916**  .3428916**  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Industrial .0295753  .0295753  .0295753  No Contagion - 
Con. gds -.0557462  -.0557462  -.0557462  No Contagion C 
Healthcare .07137  .07137  .07137  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser. -.0500749  -.0500749  -.0500749  No Contagion - 
Telecom .1574526  .1574526  .1574526  No Contagion C 
Utilities -.1073694  -.1073694  -.1073694  No Contagion - 
Technology -.199709***  -.199709***  -.1997099***  No Contagion C 
Financial -14.0837*** .009605*** -0.146895 -0.69775 0.66953*** 3.974248 Kink Contagion C 
 
Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
South Korea First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil -.0956565  -0.0956565  -0.0956565  No Contagion - 
Basic Material 15.8882*** -.0105*** 0.585527* 2.39821 -0.310906 -1.85173 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C 
Industrial -.313459**  -0.313459***  -0.3134594**  No Contagion - 
Con. gds -.126378  -0.1263786  -0.1263786  No Contagion C 
Healthcare .0086324  0.0086324  0.0086324  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser. .2116056**  0.2116056**  0.2116056**  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Telecom 10.7964** -.00710** 0.4919884** 2.297755 -0.1116476 -0.8758 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C 
Utilities .167570**  0.1675703**  0.1675703**  Shock Contagion (Level ) C 
Technology -.092116  -0.0921164  -0.0921164  No Contagion - 
Financial -.62302***  -0.623032***  -0.623032***  No Contagion - 
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Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Spain First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil -.1394928*  -.1394928*  -.1394928*   C 
Basic Material   .283854***    .283854***    .283854***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Industrial .0753426  .0753426  .0753426   - 
Con. gds -.0510151  -.0510151  -.0510151   - 
Healthcare -.0537475  -.0537475  -.0537475   - 
Con. Ser. .223111***  .223111***  .223111***  Shock Contagion (Level) - 
Telecom -.0795231  -.0795231  -.0795231   C 
Utilities .0432102  .0432102  .0432102   - 
Technology .0434136  .0434136  .0434136   - 
Financial -.185999***  -.185999***  -.185999***   C 
 
 
 
Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Sweden First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil -.073578  -0.0735788  -0.073578  No Contagion - 
Basic Material 10.7443*** -.007311*** 0.1357488 0.73910 -0.48570*** -3.07635 No Contagion - 
Industrial -.309713***  -.309713***  -.309713***  No Contagion - 
Con. gds -.293608***  -.29360***  -.29360***  No Contagion - 
Healthcare .1961506*  .1961506*  .19615*  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Con. Ser. -.1106239  -.1106239  -.1106239  No Contagion - 
Telecom -.0653285  -.0653285  -.0653285  No Contagion - 
Technology -.6909693***  -.690969***  -.690969***  No Contagion - 
Financial -.273264***  -.273264***  -.273264***  No Contagion - 
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Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Switzerland First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil .2708971  .2708971  .2708971  No Contagion - 
Basic Material   .370766***    .370766***    .370766***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Industrial .288577**  .288577**  .288577**  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Con. gds   .0965489    .0965489    .0965489  No Contagion C 
Healthcare -.0085931  -.0085931  -.0085931  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser.    .0014796     .0014796     .0014796  No Contagion - 
Telecom   -.158447    -.158447    -.158447  No Contagion - 
Utilities .2573081**  .2573081**  .2573081**  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Technology -.0471052  -.0471052  -.0471052  No Contagion - 
Financial .2708971  .2708971  .2708971  No Contagion C 
 
 
 
Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Taiwan First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil -.045242  -0.0452428  -0.0452428  No Contagion - 
Basic Material -.103924  -0.1039246  -0.1039246  No Contagion - 
Industrial -.574060***  -0.5740607  -0.5740607  No Contagion C 
Con. gds -.260366***  -0.2603666  -0.2603666  No Contagion C 
Con. Ser. -9.73052*** .0062657*** -0.638996*** -4.35755 -0.1064118* -1.12263 No Contagion C 
Telecom -.176952*  -0.1769522  -0.1769522  No Contagion - 
Technology -.169696  -0.1696968  -0.1696968  No Contagion - 
Financial   .26681***  0.266812***  0.266812***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
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Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Thailand First week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟏) Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕 =  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- 
statistic 
?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 t- 
statistic 
Oil .1359527  0.1359527  0.1359527  No Contagion - 
Basic Material .1964**  0.1964**  0.1964**  Shock Contagion (Level) - 
Industrial -.0488954  -0.0488954  -0.0488954  No Contagion - 
Con. gds -.0138583  -0.0138583  -0.0138583  No Contagion - 
Healthcare -.0123391  -0.0123391  -0.0123391  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser. -.105315  -0.105315  -0.105315  No Contagion - 
Telecom -.1129651  -0.1129651  -0.1129651  No Contagion - 
Utilities .0111941  0.0111941  0.0111941  No Contagion - 
Technology -.272291***  -0.2722906***  -0.2722906***  No Contagion - 
Financial -.373089***  -0.3730895***  -0.3730895***  No Contagion - 
 
 
Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
U.K. First week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟏) Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil .1234727    0.123472  0.1234727  No Contagion C 
Basic Material    1.5257***  1.5257***  1.5251***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Industrial -.198926**  -0.198926**  -0.198926  No Contagion C 
Con. gds   5.100295** -.003395** 0.173859** 1.587564 -0.114732* -1.06713 Shock Contagion (Reversal) - 
Healthcare -.088625  -0.08862  -0.088625  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser. -21.0035***   .013950*** -0.761169*** -4.696 0.424631*** 3.777213 No Contagion - 
Telecom   .1225386    0.122538  0.122538  No Contagion - 
Utilities .3700032***  0.370003***  .370003***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Technology -15.0136**   .00988** -0.66901*** -2.33742 0.17129* 1.106275 No Contagion - 
Financial .14893***  0.14893***  0.14893***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
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Global Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
U.S. First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?
𝟎
 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?
𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?
𝟎
+ ?̂?
𝟏
𝒕 t- 
statistic 
Oil -.03969  -0.03969  -0.03969  No Contagion C 
Basic Material .13704  0.13704  0.13704  No Contagion C 
Industrial -.04981  -0.04981  -0.04981  No Contagion C 
Con. gds .07199  0.07199  0.07198  No Contagion C 
Healthcare .110811*  0.11081*  0.11081  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Con. Ser. .03153  0.03153  0.03153  No Contagion - 
Telecom 7.3451***   -.004848*** 0.3111*** 2.9604 -0.10087 -0.9522 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C 
Utilities .18851**  0.18851  0.18851  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Technology -.04516  -0.04516  -0.04516  No Contagion C 
Financial .0625162    0.06251  0.06251  No Contagion C 
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B.5: Estimation for Model (4.2): Contagion from Domestic Financial Sector 
 
Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Australia  First week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟏) Last week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟐) 
Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕 =  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil   -.4004***  -0.4004***  -0.4004***  No Contagion C 
Basic Material -.42643***  -0.42643***  -0.42643***  No Contagion C 
Industrial   4.13604* -.0028496* 0.0012754 0.014863 -
0.2409406*** 
-2.844768 No Contagion C 
Con. gds -.093798  -0.0937987  -0.0937987  No Contagion - 
Healthcare 14.2187*** -.0096833*** 0.1682817** 1.655220 -0.654798*** -6.289739 Shock Contagion (Reversal) C 
Con. Ser. .090169  0.090169  0.090169  No Contagion - 
Telecom -.1116415  -0.1116415  -0.1116415  No Contagion - 
Utilities 6.708346** -.0045093** 0.1653517* 1.239387 -0.2179388* -1.600125 Shock Contagion (Reversal) - 
Technology -.0813837  -0.0813837  -0.0813837  No Contagion - 
 
Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Brazil First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil .389022**  0.389022**  0.389022***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Basic Material .444193***  0.444193***  0.444193***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Industrial .3456938***  0.345693***  0.345693***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Con. gds -.1769288**  -0.176928**  -0.176928**  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser.   11.5618*** -.00746*** 0.724070*** 5.980198 0.0891888 0.643476 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C 
Telecom 7.084672** -.004603** 0.404558*** 2.78916 0.0132352 0.120615 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C 
Utilities   9.36142*** -.00623*** 0.308343*** 2.70178 -0.221988 -1.67338 Shock Contagion (Reversal) - 
Technology   1.29630***  1.29630***  1.29630***  Shock Contagion (Level) - 
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Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Canada First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil -17.8321***   .01187*** -0.60804*** -2.18719 0.400948*** 1.796878 Recoupling contagion - 
Basic Material -.89535***  -0.89535***  -0.89535***  No Contagion C 
Industrial .1814187  0.1814187  0.1814187  No Contagion - 
Con. gds .20367**  0.20367**  0.20367**  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Healthcare .0933701  0.0933701  0.0933701  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser. -.24017***  -0.24017***  -0.24017***  No Contagion C 
Telecom   -.31799***  -0.31799***  -0.31799***  No Contagion - 
Utilities -.1005402  -0.1005402  -0.1005402  No Contagion - 
Technology   17.50536**   -.011284* 1.1311152*** 3.044625 0.1719072 0.538401 Shock Contagion (Level) C 
 
 
 
 
 
Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Chile First week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟏) Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil   1.14239***  1.14239***  1.14239***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Basic Material -.0036806  -0.0036806  -0.00368  No Contagion C 
Industrial .422270***  0.42227***  0.42227***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Con. gds .200122  0.200122  0.200122  No Contagion C 
Healthcare -11.59458** .00807** 0.115425 0.62497 0.801400*** 3.351086 No Contagion C 
Con. Ser. .7715064***  0.771506***  0.771506***  No Contagion C 
Telecom   27.84973*** -.01863*** 0.81643*** 3.39454 -0.76717*** -3.17193 Shock Contagion (Reversal) C 
Technology .0491613** -.06201** -89.9296*** -141.177 -95.2006*** -35.4425 - C 
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China First week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟏) Last week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟐) 
Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕 =  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil .0595361  0.0595361  0.0595361  No Contagion C 
Basic Material   .4073679 ***  0.4073679***  0.4073679***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Industrial   .190199*  0.190199*  0.190199*  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Con. gds .0007551  0.0007551  0.0007551  No Contagion - 
Healthcare -.1858613  -0.1858613  -0.1858613  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser. .1737032  0.1737032  0.1737032  No Contagion - 
Telecom   .345325***  0.345325***  0.345325***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Utilities .1362577  0.136257  0.1362577  No Contagion - 
Technology -8.941528*   .006115** 
-0.06837 
   -0.00043 
 
0.4514192 0.002665 No Contagion C 
 
Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
France First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil -.665722***  -0.6657***  -0.66572***  No Contagion C 
Basic Material -.687846  -0.6878462  -0.6878462  No Contagion C 
Industrial 3.58736 -.00271** -0.34716*** -3.01276 -0.57765*** -6.74545 No Contagion C 
Con. gds 3.497402 -.0027497* -0.49241*** -3.87683 -0.72613*** -7.49251 No Contagion C 
Healthcare   -.16885  -0.168858  -0.168858  No Contagion C 
Con. Ser. -.445035***  -0.44503***  -0.44503***  No Contagion C 
Telecom -.49861***  -0.49861***  -0.49861***  No Contagion - 
Utilities -.907693***  -0.90769***  -0.90769***  No Contagion C 
Technology -.869716***  -0.86971***  -0.86971***  No Contagion C- 
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Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Germany First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil .5933332  0.5933332  0.5933332  No Contagion - 
Basic Material .0434341  0.0434341  0.0434341  No Contagion - 
Industrial .0800787  0.0800787  0.0800787  No Contagion - 
Con. gds -.42094***  -0.42094***  -0.42094***  No Contagion C 
Healthcare   -.0577812  -0.0577812  -0.0577812  No Contagion C 
Con. Ser. -6.141887** .0041873** -0.0661147 -0.50187 0.289805*** 2.503716 Kink Contagion - 
Telecom -.2174042  -17.2723131  -0.2174042  No Contagion - 
Utilities   17.91711** -.011753** 17.91711*** 62.7183 -0.1368804 -0.54892 Shock Contagion (Transitory) - 
Technology   -.349922**  -0.349922**  -0.349922***  No Contagion - 
 
 
Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Hong Kong First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil 17.0999*** -.01094*** 1.21901*** 5.436288 0.2887072* 1.217997 Shock Contagion (Transitory ) C 
Basic Material   9.74095** -.006103** 0.88448*** 5.769689 0.3656668* 1.592709 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C 
Industrial   7.92766*** -.00529*** 0.24607*** 3.190192 -0.203917** -1.93272 Shock Contagion (Reversal) - 
Con. gds 30.08185*** -.02013*** 0.86799*** 4.415771 -0.84335*** -4.11689 Shock Contagion (Reversal) C 
Healthcare   15.13527** -.010222** 0.30242 0.857249 -0.56649* -1.25745 Shock Contagion (Reversal) - 
Con. Ser.   19.0045*** -.01268*** 0.59846*** 4.983969 -0.47977*** -2.92727 Shock Contagion (Reversal) C 
Telecom   13.7481*** -.00944*** 0.04985 0.245076 -0.75260*** -3.81755 Shock Contagion (Reversal) C 
Utilities   8.40581*** -.00554*** 0.36538*** 4.110179 -0.1056288 -0.89826 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C 
Technology -.225889  -0.225889  -0.2258891  No Contagion - 
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Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
India First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil 6.805485** -.004714** -0.0348192  -0.33296 -0.43552*** -3.40137 No Contagion - 
Basic Material 5.414931* -.0036108* 0.1756602** 1.829039 -0.13125** -1.08701 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C 
Industrial   6.55657*** -.00441*** 0.1485267** 2.006656 -0.22686** -2.29948 Shock Contagion (Reversal) C 
Con. gds   8.83408***   -.0061*** -0.017012 -0.24518 -0.53551*** -6.49707 No Contagion - 
Healthcare -.2361***  -0.2361***  -0.2361***  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser.   -.178723**  -0.178723**  -0.178723**  No Contagion - 
Telecom   9.18334*** -.00645*** -0.1808276* -1.58412 -0.72939*** -6.13736 No Contagion - 
Utilities   12.9820*** -.00875*** 0.2802562** 1.953157 -0.46381*** -3.40934 Shock Contagion (Reversal) - 
Technology -.32894***  -0.32894  -0.32894  No Contagion C 
 
Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Indonesia First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Basic Material 13.42532** -.00883** 0.61299*** 4.246798 -0.13756 -0.50973 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C 
Industrial   .0714488  0.0714488  0.0714488  No Contagion C 
Con. gds .0934365  0.0934365  0.0934365  No Contagion C 
Healthcare .2077905***  0.2077905***  0.2077905***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Telecom -.0796285  -0.0796285  -0.079628  No Contagion - 
Utilities -15.4115*** .0105609*** -0.0877041 -0.42976 0.8099724*** 4.250632 Kink Contagion - 
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Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Italy First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil -.048223  -0.0482231  -0.0482231  No Contagion C 
Basic Material -.48696**  -0.48696***  -0.48696***  No Contagion C 
Industrial -.48196***  -0.48196***  -0.48196***  No Contagion C 
Con. gds -.64291***  -0.6429***  -0.64291***  No Contagion C 
Healthcare -.591978***  -0.59197***  -0.591978***  No Contagion C 
Con. Ser. .1180407  0.1180407  0.1180407  No Contagion C 
Telecom -.1267277  -0.1267277  -0.1267277  No Contagion - 
Utilities .0627276  0.0627276  0.0627276  No Contagion C 
Technology -.0482231  -0.0482231  -0.0482231  No Contagion C 
 
 
Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Japan First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil -.1721466*  -0.1721466*  -0.1721466*  No Contagion - 
Basic Material -.191365***  -0.191365***  -0.191365***  No Contagion - 
Industrial -.1188635**  -0.1188635**  -0.1188635**  No Contagion - 
Con. gds -.0575742  -0.0575742  -0.0575742  No Contagion - 
Healthcare -4.086262** .0028089* -0.0105481 -0.16015 0.2282084 2.053969 Kink Contagion - 
Con. Ser. 2.861237* -.002096** -0.180059*** -3.62423 -0.358219*** -4.45302 No Contagion C 
Telecom -.0769862  -0.0769862  -0.0769862  No Contagion - 
Utilities .2376792***  0.2376792***  0.2376792***  Shock Contagion (Level) - 
Technology -.1721466*  -0.1721466*  -0.1721466*  No Contagion - 
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Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Mexico First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Basic Material .0645409  0.0645409  0.0645409  No Contagion - 
Industrial -.0112716  -0.0112716  -0.0112716  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser.     -.0466371  -0.0466371  -0.0466371  No Contagion - 
Telecom -.2437473*  -0.2437473*  -0.2437473  No Contagion - 
 
Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Norway First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil 9.096573** -.0061389** 0.1890291 1.03526 -0.33277*** -2.85908 No Contagion - 
Basic Material -.2538955**  -0.2538955**  -0.2538955**  No Contagion C 
Con. gds   9.481874** -.0062433* 0.4228457** 2.178003 -0.1078348 -0.88064 Shock Contagion (Transitory) - 
Con. Ser. 17.80147*** -.011751*** 0.7503337*** 3.211303 -0.248526** -1.7825 Shock Contagion (Reversal) - 
Telecom 8.074046* -.0056763* -0.1622653 -0.72523 -0.64475*** -3.09632 No Contagion C 
Utilities -.158344  -0.158344  -0.158344  No Contagion C 
Technology -.1665574  -0.1665574  -0.1665574  No Contagion C 
 
Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
New Zealand First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil   .374515*  0.374515*  0.374515*  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
Basic Material .5875929***  0.5875929***  0.5875929***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
Industrial   10.91419* -.0070157* 0.7344093*** 2.667291 0.1380748 0.632441 Shock Contagion (Transitory) C 
Con. gds   .485789***  0.4857895***  0.4857895***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
Healthcare .5660061***  0.5660061***  0.5660061***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
Con. Ser. .3739562***  0.3739562***  0.3739562***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
Telecom -.0200624  -0.0200624  -0.0200624  No Contagion - 
Utilities .4062832***  0.4062832***  0.4062832***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) C 
Technology 2.563729  2.563729  2.563729  No Contagion - 
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Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Russia First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil   .399745***  0.3997451***  0.3997451***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Basic Material .2888739***  0.2888739***  0.2888739***  Shock Contagion (Level) - 
Con. gds -.000277***  -0.000277***  -0.000277***  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser. .1377057  0.1377057  0.1377057  No Contagion - 
Telecom .2364718***  0.2364718***  0.2364718***  Shock Contagion (Level) - 
Utilities .311118***  0.311118***  0.311118***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
 
Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
South Africa First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil -.1394578  -0.1394578  -0.1394578  No Contagion - 
Basic Material   -.43743***  -0.43743***  -0.43743***  No Contagion C 
Industrial -.18278***  -0.1827***  -0.18278***  No Contagion - 
Con. gds   6.96525** -.004856** -0.0809511 -0.6657 -0.493719*** -3.35088 No Contagion - 
Healthcare -.1510717*  -0.1510717*  -0.1510717  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser. 7.069597** -.004880** -0.0117183 -0.10838 -0.426543*** -3.63178 No Contagion - 
Telecom -.38548***  -0.38548***  -0.38548***  No Contagion C 
Utilities   .0376064    0.0376064  0.0376064  No Contagion - 
Technology -.1394578  -0.1394578  -0.1394578  No Contagion - 
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Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
South Korea First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil    8.78625* -.0056734* 0.5541526*** 3.042328 0.0719136 0.44263 Shock Contagion (Transitory) - 
Basic Material -.0643663  -0.064366  -0.064366  No Contagion - 
Industrial .1615823  0.1615823  0.1615823  No Contagion - 
Con. gds -.17275***  -0.17275***  -0.172755***  No Contagion C 
Healthcare   12.1298** -.00814** 0.3145121 0.058901 -0.3776344 -0.06877 No Contagion C 
Con. Ser. -.33207***  -0.33207***  -0.33207***  No Contagion C 
Telecom -.38892***  -0.38892***  -0.38892***  No Contagion C 
Utilities   .198706**  0.198706**  0.198706**  Shock Contagion (Level) - 
Technology -.184043**  -0.184043**  -0.184043**  No Contagion C 
 
Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Spain First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil .261651***  0.26165***  0.2616518***  Shock Contagion (Level Shock) - 
Basic Material   -.20253***  
-0.20253***  
-
0.2025386***  
No Contagion - 
Industrial 17.78*** -.0117*** 0.804915*** 6.235834 -0.1895936** -2.09546 Shock Contagion (Reversal) C 
Con. gds -.182727**  -0.182727**  -0.1827271**  No Contagion - 
Healthcare 20.319*** -.01326*** 1.07230*** 6.263583 -0.0552164 -0.38375 Shock Contagion (Transitory) - 
Con. Ser. 14.564*** -.00972*** 0.460119*** 3.060767 -0.366114*** -2.69065 Shock Contagion (Reversal) - 
Telecom -.419045***  -0.41904***  -0.419045***  No Contagion - 
Utilities -.012792  -0.0127926  -0.0127926  No Contagion C 
Technology   12.7849*** -.00883*** -0.039818 -0.21681 -0.791099*** -5.72624 No Contagion - 
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Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Sweden First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil .0811296  0.081129  0.0811296  No Contagion - 
Basic Material .421912***  0.42191***  0.421912***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Industrial 10.44252*** -.00678*** 0.596324 4.617172 0.0195312 0.231788 No Contagion - 
Con. gds -.0030495  -0.003049  -0.0030495  No Contagion - 
Healthcare .015079  0.01507  0.015079  No Contagion - 
Con. Ser. 10.4599***   -.00715*** 0.085134 0.645251 -0.52262*** -4.83748 No Contagion C 
Telecom -.340620***  -0.3406***  -0.34062***  No Contagion C 
Technology   9.513287** -.0062859* 0.39244** 1.866927 -0.1418554** -0.6619 Shock Contagion (Transitory) - 
 
Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Switzerland First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil   -.362919  -0.362919  -0.36291  No Contagion C 
Basic Material -.409272***  -0.40927***  -0.409272***  No Contagion C 
Industrial 5.96621** -.0041** 0.015957 0.120835 -0.33261*** -3.02512 No Contagion C 
Con. gds   -.44344***  -0.44344***  -0.44344  No Contagion C 
Healthcare -.1525578**  -0.152558**  -0.152558  No Contagion C 
Con. Ser. 8.01042*** -.00552*** 0.0042413 0.03195 -0.464763*** -3.81001 No Contagion C 
Telecom   .082247  0.082247  0.082247  No Contagion - 
Utilities .0611233     0.0611233  0.0611233  No Contagion - 
Technology   -.362919  -0.362919  -0.362919  No Contagion - 
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Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Taiwan First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil .2124727*  0.2124727*  0.2124727*  Shock Contagion (Level) - 
Basic Material   .199975**  0.19997**  0.19997**  Shock Contagion (Level) - 
Industrial .120845  0.120845  0.120845  No Contagion - 
Con. gds .0418251  0.0418251  0.0418251  No Contagion C 
Con. Ser. .377178***  0.3771787***  0.3771787***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Telecom   9.2314*** -.00612*** 0.355074*** 4.082235 -0.1649054* -1.40811 Shock Contagion (Reversal) - 
Technology .0183201  0.0183201  0.0183201  No Contagion - 
 
Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
Thailand First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil .355234***  0.355234***  0.3552337***  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Basic Material .1975234*  0.197523*  0.197523*  Shock Contagion (Level) - 
Industrial .0837283    0.0837283  0.0837283  No Contagion - 
Con. gds .173194**  0.173194**  0.1731944**  Shock Contagion (Level) C 
Healthcare .287208***  0.287208***  0.2872077***  Shock Contagion (Level) - 
Con. Ser.    .020161  0.0201614  0.0201614  No Contagion - 
Telecom -.240031**  -0.240031**  -0.2400307**  No Contagion C 
Utilities   -.024935  -0.0249351  -0.0249351  No Contagion - 
Technology -.150133  -0.1501325  -0.1501325  No Contagion C 
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Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
U.K. First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil -.24055*  -0.24055*  -0.24055*  No Contagion C 
Basic Material -.88505***  -0.88505***  -0.88505***  No Contagion C 
Industrial 7.41519***   -.0049*** 0.27699 0.108802 -0.141166 -0.05392 No Contagion C 
Con. gds -.38492***  -0.38492***  -0.38492***  No Contagion C 
Healthcare   7.74708*** -.00521*** 0.18809** 1.1207 -0.254716** -2.51123 Shock Contagion (Reversal) C 
Con. Ser.   28.2818*** -.01879*** 1.0183306*** 7.368728 -0.57877*** -6.88912 Shock Contagion (Reversal) - 
Telecom -.605191***  -0.60519***  -0.6051906  No Contagion C 
Utilities -.314001***  -0.31400***  -0.3140017  No Contagion C 
Technology   23.743*** -.01601*** 0.5057** 2.176753 -0.855549*** -7.0702 Shock Contagion (Reversal) - 
 
Domestic Financial Contagion of the Real Economy Sector 
U.S. First week of the crisis 
(t=𝝉𝟏) 
Last week of the crisis (t=𝝉𝟐) Decision Model 
(4.1) 
Sectors ?̂?𝟎 ?̂?𝟏 ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + 𝝆𝒕 
t- statistic ?̂?𝟐𝒕
=  ?̂?𝟎 + ?̂?𝟏𝒕 
t- statistic 
Oil -6.616911 **   .0043845** -0.2550015* -1.54871 0.117681* 0.824456 No Contagion C 
Basic 
Material 
-.2192346**  
-0.2192346**  -0.2192346**  
No Contagion C 
Industrial -.2141838***  -0.214183***  -0.2141838***  No Contagion C 
Con. gds -.4885761***  -0.488571***  -0.4885761***  No Contagion C 
Healthcare -.381935***  -0.381935***  -0.381935***  No Contagion C 
Con. Ser. -.2639905***  -0.263990***  -0.2639905***  No Contagion C 
Telecom -.2891341***  -0.289134***  -0.2891341***  No Contagion C 
Utilities -4.404169**    .002705** -0.477908*** -4.53219 -0.2479066*** -2.80699 No Contagion C 
Technology -.4407684***  -0.440768***  -0.4407684***  No Contagion C 
Note: Parameters stem from model (4.2): 𝑅𝑆,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 +  𝛼2𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 +   𝛽1𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑤,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑤,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆
+
𝛽
3𝑡
𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑤,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆+ 𝜔1𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜔2𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆
+ 𝜔3𝑡𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑖,𝑡𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 +    𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where  𝜔1𝑡 =  𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝑡,  𝜔2𝑡 =  𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝑡 and 𝜔3𝑡 =  𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑡. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denotes stock returns in sector i at time t, 𝐷𝑡 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆  (𝐷𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇−𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆) is a dummy variable equal to one during the crisis (post-crisis) period and zero otherwise. 
and  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return on domestic financial sector. ‘Constant betas model’ is identical to model (4.1) but with time-invariant 𝜔1, 𝜔2, and 𝜔3. Insignificant trend 
terms (𝜇
1
, 𝜌1, 𝜑1) are excluded and model (4.2) is re-estimated where relevant. Error terms are modelled as a GJR-GARCH (1,1) process, corrected for 
autocorrelation in residuals where required. The hypotheses for shock contagion are: 𝐻0: 𝜔2(𝜏1) ≤ 0,   𝐻1:  𝜔2(𝜏1) > 0  , for recoupling contagion: 
𝐻0:  𝜔2(𝜏1) ≥ 0,   𝐻1:  𝜔2(𝜏1) < 0 and  𝐻0:  𝜔2(𝜏2) ≤ 0,   𝐻1:  𝜔2(𝜏2) > 0, and for kink contagion: 𝐻0:  𝜔2(𝜏1) = 0,  𝐻1:  𝜔2(𝜏1) ≠ 0  and  𝐻0: 𝜔1 ≤ 0, 
𝐻𝐴: 𝜔1 > 0.
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Chapter 5. Stock Market contagion across the days of the week 
5.1. Introduction 
Many recent research studies have explored financial contagion among developed and 
emerging markets, across different crisis periods (e.g. Asian Crisis, Dot-com crisis, and global 
financial crisis). This includes studies (e.g. Kenourgios and Dimitriou, 2015) on how contagion 
differs across different stages of a crisis, depending on the conditions of the economy and 
investors’ behaviour. It was observed in Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis that contagion patterns 
are not similar across various stages of a crisis and that it affects countries and sectors 
heterogeneously. In this chapter, I propose to combine insights from two vast but previously 
disjoint strands of the finance literature, on financial contagion and on day-of-the-week effects 
in stock returns. 
On one hand, there exists a wealth of research studies into causes, channels, and implications 
of financial contagion across markets (for e.g. Forbes, 2012). As mentioned in the earlier 
chapters of this thesis, despite a disagreement on what constitutes contagion, most authors 
currently apply the definition proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2001), where contagion arises 
with a significant increase in comovements between stock markets following a shock to one of 
them. This is usually operationalised by estimating models which employ daily or weekly (e.g., 
Baur, 2012) data and which assume identical comovements across weekdays.  
On the other hand, a large number of research studies have been devoted to calendar effects in 
stock returns (for e.g. Dzhabarov and Ziemba, 2010). One of the earliest and most prominent 
phenomena is the Monday effect, whereby returns on Mondays were found to be significantly 
lower than on other weekdays. Subsequent research studies demonstrated systematic effects for 
other weekdays, most notably Fridays, while others have suggested that the Monday effect has 
either disappeared, reversed or migrated to other weekdays (for e.g. Pettengill, 2003).  
In this chapter, I propose a model of contagion which accounts for day-of-the-week effects. I 
postulate that any conclusions on the existence and severity of financial contagion derived in 
the existing literature may be misleading or incomplete, as current testing approaches fail to 
account for the existence of weekday effects in return spillovers. Firstly, if contagion occurs 
only on specific weekdays, any approach treating all weekdays equally may fail to recognise 
those contagious but infrequent days. Additionally, even if contagion can be detected by 
treating all weekdays as identical, a model which accounts for day-of-the-week effects in 
contagion, as proposed here, will generate a fuller picture of when exactly the contagion risk is 
most severe. 
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Why would one assume that spillovers and contagion can differ across weekdays? I posit that 
factors leading to the day-of-the-week effect in returns can also lead to uneven occurrences of 
contagion. For instance, the differences in intensity of short-sales activities in different 
economies (e.g. due to local restrictions on short-selling during the crisis), the strengthening of 
the ‘blue Monday’ effect following the crisis outbreak, and the surge in the number of investors 
taking a short view due to liquidity needs during the recent financial crisis might all lead to 
changes in the day-of-the-week effect domestically, but also affect cross-border investment 
decisions. Moreover, announcements of macroeconomic14 data take place on different 
weekdays in different countries which could also lead to contagion effects being different across 
weekdays. 
In this chapter, I start off by looking at one of the most puzzling anomalies in calendar effects, 
which is the day-of-the-week effect, according to which stock returns are significantly higher 
on some days of the week than on others (Lakonishok and Smidt, 1988). One of the most 
examined day-of-the-week effects is the Monday effect, which is the focal point of this study. 
Cho et al. (2007) describe Monday effect as a phenomenon whereby Monday stock returns, on 
average, are lower than the returns on any other day of the week and returns are negative. Cross 
(1973) is among the authors that first studied this anomaly, and since then, extensive research 
has been conducted in the international equity market and the findings have suggested that 
Monday effect is a global phenomenon. In the 1990s, Chang et al. (1993) and Kamara (1997) 
confirm the presence of Monday effect. And later on, Tong (2000), Chen and Singal (2003), 
Cho et al. (2007) provide evidence of Monday effects in different countries. However, until 
now there has not been any convincing explanation for this anomaly even though there are 
numerous potential factors that may cause the Monday effect. The explanations include timing 
of corporate releases after Friday’s close (e.g. Damodaran 1989), speculative short sales (e.g. 
Chen and Singal, 2004), statistical errors (e.g. Sullivan, Timmermann and White, 2001), 
                                                             
14 Announcement of macro-economic data take place on different weekdays, for instance Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) decisions are announced on Wednesdays and non-farm payrolls are released on Fridays. 
These announcements have been documented to affect asset prices. For example, Flannery and Protopapadakis 
(2002) examined the impact of macro-economic series’ announcements on daily equity returns from 1980 until 
1996 and find that 6 announcements series (i.e., CPI, PPI, Balance of Trade, Employment and Money Aggregate) 
do affect equity returns and increases market conditional volatility. And more recently, Birz and Lott (2011), found 
that there was a strong statistical relationships between S&P 500 returns and newspaper headline about 
unemployment and GDP from January 1991 until June 2004.  
Hence, in this chapter, I hypothesize that news originating abroad will interact with those domestic announcement 
effects, the latter being of various intensity across countries. Hence, country-specific weekday effects in return 
spillovers and contagion can be observed. Moreover, even in absence of domestic announcement effects these 
could be carried over from an important foreign market in form of spillovers being more intensive on foreign 
announcement days. 
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information asymmetry (e.g. Foster and Viswanathan), Blue Monday hypothesis (e.g. 
Pettengill, 2003) and differential trading activities of market participants (e.g. Lakonishok and 
Maberly, 1990; Sias and Starks, 1995), amongst others. 
There have also been various methodologies adopted to investigate the Monday effect 
phenomenon empirically. The methods range from basic OLS regressions involving F-tests 
and t-tests (e.g. Rogalski, 1984 and Chang et al., 1993) to more complicated and robust 
bootstrap procedures (e.g. Sullivan, Timmermann and White, 2001) and GARCH models 
(Choudry, 2000 and Chen et al., 2001). The early tests of Monday effect have been criticised 
on their methodology, as non-normality of data, the presence of heteroscedasticity and ARCH 
effects are not accounted for. More recently, the ARCH/GARCH family of models (Engle, 
1982; Bollerslev, 1986) have become very common as they enable researchers to model 
variance as conditional on past variance and error, rather than fixed throughout the series, as 
in regression.   
 
Additionally, even though there are numerous research studies, as established above, suggesting 
evidence of Monday effects, there have been some contradictory results, i.e. diminishing or 
reversal of Monday effects. For example, Kamara (1997) finds since the introduction of 
S&P500 futures contracts in 1982, there has been a significant reduction in the Monday effect 
anomaly. And more recently, the same evidence was presented by Marquering, et al., (2006) 
for Dow Jones Industrial Average (DIJA) from the year 1960 to 2003. While some research 
studies found a diminishing Monday effect, some showed a complete reversal in returns. For 
instance, Brusa and Pu (2000) find that returns of large U.S stocks were positive on Mondays 
and largest compared to any other days of the week during the 1990s. Mehdian and Perry (2001) 
also confirm a reversal of the anomaly for large U.S. stocks from 1987 to 1998. 
Based on the efficient market hypothesis, such anomalies (Monday effect, in this case) should 
indeed vanish over time, as suggested by Kohers, et al. (2004), as rational investors arbitrage 
this opportunity away. This statement is confirmed by Mossman et al. (2015) when they find 
that like any stock anomaly, Monday effect also disappears in the long run. Doyle and Chen 
(2009) on the other hand find a wandering weekday effect, where the day of the week shows 
systematically higher or lower returns are very sensitive to the choice of sub-period. 
Hence, this chapter is motivated by the ‘Monday effect’ puzzle as previous research studies 
provide mixed evidence, in terms of the existence, explanations and methods used to investigate 
this phenomenon and whether this has an impact of spillover and contagion effects. There also 
appear to be very few research studies that examine Monday effect during the recent financial 
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crisis and are concentrated on very few markets. The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 
triggered by the U.S.A subprime crisis was one of the most tumultuous economic events in the 
recent history, which has affected both financial activities and macroeconomic conditions in 
numerous countries. Following, the evidence found by Urquhart and McGroarty (2014) that 
“Monday effect behave differently depending on certain market conditions, and that the effect 
is more pronounced during bear markets and market crashes, by separating their data into 
various periods depending on market conditions”, I believe it would be interesting to see 
whether there is existence of Monday effect across various stock markets, and whether the 
effect changes (e.g. reversal or disappearance of Monday effects) under different market 
conditions, namely as a result of a financial crisis. One of the potential reasons for these 
variations might be due to changes in factors explaining Monday effects during the crisis period, 
including a temporary short sale restriction in several countries, different trading patterns of 
institutional investors, a more pronounced information asymmetry and changes in investors’ 
perception of risk.   
The aim of the paper is thus firstly to investigate whether there are any Monday effects in 13 
stock markets from 24th July 2004 until 27th March 2009, and accounting for the outbreak of 
the 2007 financial crisis in our sample date. Having looked at the existence of Monday effect, 
this paper also examines how spillovers from the U.S. market differs across the day of the week 
during both the pre-and crisis period. Following the outbreak of the financial crisis, there have 
been numerous research studies on contagion effects (For e.g.  Baur, 2012, Dungey and Gajurel, 
2014, 2015, Fry-McKibbin et al., 2014. Beirne and Gieck, 2014, Chiu et al., 2015) in the stock 
market. Despite a myriad of research studies on the topic of contagion, none of them has looked 
at how contagion effects differ across the days of the week, i.e. whether the Monday effect has 
an impact on spillover across markets during normal and turmoil period. Subsequently, one of 
the novelty of this paper is not only limited to examining Monday effects in stock returns under 
different market conditions, but also looks at the impact of Monday effects on spillover from 
the U.S. market to other countries, and whether the pattern of Monday effect in spillover (if 
there is any) during the crisis period changes relative to the pre-crisis period.  
The findings show evidence of disappearing Monday effect, with none and two out of thirteen 
equity markets showing evidence of Monday effect before and during the financial crisis, 
respectively. However, evidence of reversal of Monday effects is observed in some countries, 
whereby other days of the week (i.e. any other day apart from Monday) have the lowest return. 
One of the uniqueness of this chapter is that spillover from the U.S. market is investigated on a 
daily basis. Many of the research studies on contagion chose an arbitrary day of the week (for 
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e.g. Tuesday or Wednesday) to examine weekly contagion effect, and as a result, might not 
identify contagion that might occur on specific days of the week. The findings illustrate that 
spillovers and contagion from the U.S. does not occur across all days of the week and occurs 
only on a particular day of the week or only once a week. The novel contagion model captures 
excess co-movement which would not have been identified by a standard contagion model, 
which would be only comparing average co-movement during the crisis period relative to pre-
crisis period.  The results can potentially add to the literature of contagion as it shows how 
spillovers and contagion effect are different across the days of the week. This study is also 
relevant for financial managers, market professionals and investors in general, and all those 
interested in developing trading strategies. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section discusses the relevant 
literature on Monday effects while Section 5.3 presents the Methodology Framework. Section 
5.4 presents the data, while Section 5.5 reports the empirical results. Finally, Section 5.6 
concludes. 
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5.2. Literature Review 
5.2.1. Monday effect 
A well-documented seasonal anomaly is the Monday effect. Since the results provided by Cross 
(1973) attesting that returns on the S&P index are significantly negative on Mondays, many 
researchers started to investigate this effect. For example, Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) 
examine DJIA patterns from the year 1887 until 1986. Further, Keim and Stambaugh (1984) 
study the S&P500 returns from 1928 to 1982, and Schwert (1990) tests the effects using 
different indexes from 1802 to 1987. According to the three research studies mentioned above, 
abnormal losses were observed on Mondays relative to other days of the week. The literature 
on Monday effect also attempts to explain the reasons behind this phenomenon, but the findings 
are quite inconclusive.  
(a)  Potential explanations of the Monday effect 
 
 Statistical Errors 
Some researchers (e.g. Connoly, 1989) suggest than a deceptive Monday effect might arise by 
using flawed statistical methods. One reason leading to this argument is data mining. Sullivan, 
Timmermann, and White (2001) question “whether apparent regularities in stock returns really 
imply a rejection of simple notions of market efficiency, or they are just a large, collective data-
mining exercise.” They apply a new bootstrap procedure (by constructing a large number of 
calendar trading rules using permutation arguments) and fail to identify any calendar effects.  
Moreover, they find that the apparent statistical significance of the best calendar effects is not 
robust to data-mining effects.  
Moreover, a separate but related issue is that recent studies have cast doubt on the favourable 
evidence from the initial studies, as they found mixed evidence regarding Monday effects while 
employing more advanced statistical procedures. For instance, some statistical tests assume 
return distributions is normal despite evidence that equity return does not follow a normal 
distribution and ignore heteroscedasticity and ARCH effects. However, after adjustments, 
Monday effect might lose its significance. For example, Chien, Lee, and Wang (2002) find if 
heteroscedasticity is corrected for, this diminishes the weekday effect. Further, Connolly (1989) 
and Lin, Najand and Yung (1994) find by employing GARCH methods, the hypothesis that 
average returns are equal across weekdays cannot be rejected. Another example, is by using the 
method of rolling sample test (the least square regression model) and a GARCH model to 
investigate the day-of the-week anomalies in the stock returns of 28 markets around the globe, 
Zhang, Lai and Lin (2006) found evidence of day-of-the-week effects on the stock markets on 
both emerging and developed markets. In other words, they find that Monday effects are most 
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prominent for some samples, but also identify Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday 
effects are present for other markets.  
 Short selling activity 
Another factor that may explain the Monday effect, is short selling (Fields, 1934; Chen and 
Singal, 2003). According to these authors, the intuition is straightforward, “the inability to trade 
over the weekend causes short sellers to close their speculative positions on Fridays and re- 
establish new short positions on Mondays, causing stock prices to rise on Fridays and fall on 
the subsequent Mondays.” Their argument is that speculative short sellers are not willing to 
hold their position over the weekend, as it represents a long non-trading period compared to 
weekdays. They show that there is a temporary upward price pressure when the investors are 
closing their short positions on Fridays, and on the other hand, a temporary downward price 
pressure when and when they re-establish their short positions on Mondays. Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1987) and Blau, et al. (2009) posit that “a significant portion of short sales are 
executed by investors with information on a certain security, i.e. short sellers are informed about 
the true value of stocks.” Therefore short-selling activities may temporarily move the security 
price from its equilibrium and as a result lead to a Monday effect.   
Christophe, Ferri and Angel (2003), on the other hand, show that there is no apparent pattern in 
daily short trade data from the NASDAQ ACT-trade reporting system for a period of 3 months. 
They suggest that their findings might be consistent with either of two propositions: “(1) the 
arbitrage opportunity available from a pattern of lower stock returns on certain days (e.g., 
Mondays) is not large enough to exceed the costs of short selling and, therefore, does not induce 
higher levels of short selling on the previous days; or (2) if a day-of-the-week effect exists, 
short selling is not one of several possible causes of the phenomenon.” Moreover, Blau et al. 
(2009) suggest that they found more short selling activity during the middle of the week, by 
employing short-sale transactions data for NYSE securities in 2005. Furthermore, Christophe, 
Ferri, and Angel (2009) find that short selling does not explain an economically meaningful 
portion of the weekend effect in returns. However, Gao, et al. (2015) looked at the impact of 
the possibility of short selling in Hong Kong Exchange Market in 1994 on Monday effect, as 
this activity was prohibited before 1994. They find that the anomaly exists in both sub-periods.  
This study consists of two subsets in terms of the period, i.e. pre-financial crisis and financial 
crisis. And one of the distinguishing characteristic of the global financial crisis that has erupted 
in 2007 is that short selling was banned almost simultaneously across many parts of the world 
(Reuters, 2009 and Makintosh et al. 2009). The onset of a crisis seemed to have aroused the 
appetite of regulators in favour of banning short-selling opportunities and their logic is that a 
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downward movement in stock prices will be intensified by short sellers. Several countries 
imposed restrictions of various durations and severity.  Amongst the countries in our sample, 
Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, U.K and 
U.S introduced a ban around September/October 2008, (Bohl et al., 2015). Some of them still 
have the short selling ban whilst other have had them removed. Countries in the Eurozone tend 
to have banned shorting financial stocks, with most retaining a prohibition on naked short 
selling well after the financial crisis. In countries such U.S. and U.K., the bans were short lived. 
Hence, it would be interesting to find out whether the ban on short selling across various parts 
of the world have had an impact on Monday effect during the recent financial crisis. 
Since short selling activity may lead to a temporary price pressures and hence resulting into the 
lower prices on Mondays, it is crucial and interesting to investigate whether this explanation 
applies to other equity markets besides the U.S market, and the suspension of short selling 
activities during the crisis period for some countries in our sample provides a unique 
opportunity to investigate this issue, i.e. whether Monday effect is present before the outbreak 
of the crisis, and if there is any change regarding the evidence of this anomaly after the short 
sale ban. The result of this ban might induce investors to conduct short sales activities in 
markets where it is not prohibited, and subsequently, leading to an irregular contagion effect 
across the days of the week. 
 Differential trading patterns of various market participants 
There has been considerable research focused on the behaviour of individual versus institutional 
investors and the potential patterns which may emerge from their unique trading activities. 
Miller (1988) and Abraham and Ikenberry (1994), for instance posit that the behaviour of 
individual investors partially explains the tendency for negative Monday returns on equity. 
Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) also points out that there is evidence of an increase in trading 
activity by individual investors on Monday (especially on the sell side) while institutional 
investors tend to decrease their trading activity on the same day of the week. One reason that 
might potentially explain this behaviour is that individual investors tend to make financial 
decision over the weekend and as a result, are relatively more active than institutions on 
Mondays. In other words, individual investors are generally viewed as unsophisticated traders, 
who have a preference for short term investments, whereas institutional investors are viewed as 
being better-informed, rational traders, having a preference of a long-term investment. A second 
motive, according to Abraham and Ikenberry (1994) might be due to the liquidity-needs 
hypothesis or information-processing hypothesis. The former states that individuals are more 
likely to assess their need for liquidity over the weekend and place sell orders early in the week, 
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and the latter suggests that individual investors tend to make portfolio rebalancing decisions 
over the weekend (which are dependent upon prevailing market conditions). In essence, the 
information-processing hypothesis claims that positive feedback trading (i.e. aggressive selling 
activity following the receipt of negative information) on the part of individual investors is a 
primary source of the Monday effect, which has been confirmed by Chan, Leung, and Wang 
(2004). 
There are however some contradicting results, whereby Sias and Starks (1995) finds that 
Monday effect is closely related to stocks with “high institutional ownership” than to stocks 
with 2low institutional ownership”. Moreover, according to the findings of Wang and Walker 
(2000), in the Taiwanese equity market, weekday patterns are caused mostly by individual 
investors whereas in the Japanese market, it is the institutional investors who cause the weekday 
pattern and in Hong Kong, it is both types of investors that cause the weekday pattern.  
Long-term investors sometimes face short term liquidity needs too and may have 
underestimated liquidity buffer needs during the pre-crisis era and as a result allocated to more 
illiquid and risky assets. And when favourable conditions are brusquely reversed and funding 
conditions in the market deteriorate, almost all investors have to sell their investment as soon 
as possible in order to raise capital. Kalemli‐Ozcan et al. (2013) find that many institutional 
long-term investors have engaged in pro-cyclical investment actions during the recent financial 
crisis. Avoiding a pro-cyclical behaviour in the middle of a financial crisis may be difficult. 
From an individual investor perspective, pro-cyclical behaviour may be even rational, as if the 
investors have made risk risky investments during a favourable time and they will need liquidity 
in a crisis.  
Hence, the change in trading pattern of institutional investors might lead to an accentuating 
Monday effects since they tend to disregard their long-term view and liquidate their assets on 
Fridays as they are more focused on liquidity needs. Following the fact that equity markets 
might be de-stabilised following the pro-cyclical behaviour of institutional investors in terms 
of preference of short term horizon over long term horizon investment, this might have an 
impact of contagion patterns as well. 
 Information Asymmetry 
Foster and Viswanathan (1990) argues that asymmetric information can explain the Monday 
effect anomaly. In their model, there are informed traders and two types of uninformed traders. 
They assume that informed traders receive private information throughout the weekend; 
however, public information is released only on weekdays. Hence, uninformed traders, who 
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suffer from larger information asymmetry on Mondays, will avoid trading in the early part of 
the week.  
“The uninformed trader knows that on Mondays the informed will exploit his information 
advantage in trades. The uninformed trader’s best strategy is to withdraw liquidity and postpone 
trades until the market thickens and the price is more informative. The first type of uniformed 
trader trades strategically and can delay trades. The second type trades only for rebalancing 
reasons and does not trade strategically. Uninformed discretionary traders are unwilling to trade 
on Monday when the informed have greater information and these uninformed traders wait until 
the price is more informative and the information effect diminishes. Since, some uninformed 
traders believe it is best to withdraw liquidity from the market, it might potentially lead to 
negative returns on Mondays”, (Foster and Viswanathan, 1990). 
During the recent financial crisis, there has been a more pronounced degree of information 
asymmetry as the default risk of banks were increasing. Hence, this uncertainty might 
potentially lead to a more negative return on Mondays and changes in spillovers pattern across 
the days of the week. 
 Investors’ behaviour 
There are also research studies which investigates psychological link to trading behaviour. 
Pettengill (1993), for instance, provides support for the blue Monday hypothesis in an 
experimental study of investor trading behaviour. According to him, the basic principle of the 
so called blue Monday hypothesis asserts that “investors are affected by systematic mood 
changes that cause price pressures on Monday and positive pressures on Friday." Further, the 
findings of Rystrom and Benson (1989) show that mood swings influences the decisions made 
by investors. An experiment was conducted by Pettengill (1993), where investors were given 
the choice between risky and risk-free assets. When the experiment was conducted on Fridays, 
investors were significantly more likely to invest in risky assets than were investors when the 
experiment was conducted on Mondays.  
Following the outbreak of the recent financial crisis, there has been a change in investors’ risk 
tolerance and perception which might have had altered Monday effects. According to Hoffman 
et al. (2013), during the crisis, there has been significant fluctuation of investors’ behaviour. 
Guiso et al. (2013) postulate that investor’s risk tolerance is time-varying, and there is evidence 
that in the worst months of the crisis period, investors’ return expectations and risk tolerance 
diminishes while their risk perception increase due to uncertainty. Hence, following the 
outbreak of the crisis, one would expect a more pronounced “Blue Monday” effect, which 
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would also have an impact on international investments, and hence have an effect of spillovers 
across the equity markets.  
5.2.1.1. Reversal of Monday effects 
One of the first calendar effects being discovered was the Monday effect and as mentioned 
above, there are numerous research studies that suggested that the effect has been quite strong. 
However, there are also evidence that this anomaly has reduced considerably and, in some 
cases, even reversed over time. The wandering and reversal of Monday effect is in line with 
the Adaptive Market hypothesis (AMH) which was proposed by Lo (2004). According to the 
AMH, market efficiency evolves over time instead of being subject to the conventional view 
of all-or-nothing efficiency. In other words, this theory enables market efficiency and 
inefficiencies to co-exist in an intellectually consistent manner.  
 
For example, Connolly (1989), Chang, Pinegar, and Ravichandran (1993) and Kamara (1997) 
report that the Monday effect has diminished significantly. And more recently, Nisser, and 
Valla (2006), Alt, Fortin, and Weinberger (2011) and Mossman et al. (2015) also found that 
Monday effect seems to have disappeared in the long-run.  
By using average Monday returns and the average difference between Monday returns and 
average daily returns for the rest of the week from 1981 until 1998, Chan, Leung, and Wang 
(2003) suggest that the upsurge of institutional investors could have caused the Monday effect 
anomaly to disappear. By inference, they link the occurrence of Monday effect to the existence 
of individual investors. They suggest that the growth of institutional ownership may eliminate 
the Monday effect, as these investors actively arbitrage a seasonal pattern created by individual 
investors. Moreover, according to Pettengill (2003), the anomaly may re-appear due to 
investor inattention, or even reverse if investors overreact in their efforts to exploit the 
anomaly.  
 
And on the other hand, some research studies found that there has been a complete reversal in 
returns. Brusa, Liu, and Schulman and Mehdian and Perry (2001) are amongst the group of 
researchers that find that Monday returns were positive and largest relative to any other day of 
the week and hence confirm a reversal effect in US stocks returns. Moreover, “contrary to the 
assumption that irrational effects will be automatically traded away once brought to light, there 
is evidence that markets over-react” (De bondt and Thaler, 1985; Lehman, 1990). If enough 
investors acted on the idea, “Buy Monday and sell on Friday”, this might lead to an overreaction 
to the anomaly which as a result might push Monday returns up beyond equilibrium, leading to 
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a new seasonality pattern, which would eventually be reacted to, and so on. Gu (2004) also adds 
to this hypothesis by stating that as an anomaly becomes well-known, more investors would 
take act upon this anomaly to exploit excess returns. Consequently, the excess-return activities 
may sometimes reverse the effect or eventually make it vanish. 
In addition to a diminishing and reversal Monday effect, some authors also concluded that 
Monday effects wander depending on market conditions. For example, Doyle and Chen (2009) 
showed evidence of a wandering weekday effect, using major stock markets returns from the 
year 1993 until 2003. Their findings show that the day of the week return were with 
systematically higher or lower, depending on choice of sub-periods. Likewise, by breaking 
their samples into bear and bull market periods, Boudreaux (1995) find weekend returns are 
greater than non-weekend returns only in bull markets for DJIA, S&P500 and the NASDAQ 
from 1976 to 2002.  They argue that it is due to a wealth effect where as stock prices rise, 
investors gain confidence and are more likely to act upon broker recommendations during the 
week. 
 
A diminishing Monday effect would mean that investors can no longer generate abnormal 
returns by capitalising on this anomaly. One of the reasons of possible disappearance of day-
of-the-week evidence in general might be because investors took the opportunity to spot the 
effect and hence taken advantage of the anomaly which has priced away any advantage. 
Moreover, according to Wong et al. (2006), disappearance of calendar anomalies suggests that 
markets are more efficient, due to more knowledgeable and experienced investors and 
advances in information technology and communications, and lower cost of information. Also, 
as explained in the previous section, the use of advanced statistical procedure might be a 
potential reason for mixed Monday and day-of-the-week effect in general. According to Doyle 
and Chen (2009) there are two different ways to interpret the disappearance of Monday effects. 
The first one, as mentioned earlier, is that existence of public knowledge will not let 
seasonality effects survive, which shows that markets have become more efficient. The second 
reason might be because seasonal effects evolve continuously, and this may appear as a 
weakening seasonality effect a particular point in time, or when averaged of a period of time. 
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5.2.2.  Summary 
Early work on Monday effects in stock market was very consistent in finding significantly 
negative return on Mondays relative to other days of the week. And despite the fact there have 
been numerous explanations, (such as data mining, different flows of information, market 
microstructure, differential trading patterns of various market participants, investor’s 
behaviour), researchers seem unable to fully explain the causes of this anomaly. 
 
Over the years, researchers developed new datasets and statistical methods which recognizes 
the fact that returns are non-normally distributed, auto-correlated and that the residuals of 
linear regressions are variant over time. Henceforth, following the use of statistically robust 
estimation methodologies, the anomaly began to reverse, drift to other days, wander, and even 
disappear. Among the possible explanations for the loss of Monday effect, is the fact that early 
critics who dismissed the effects as spurious or being the result of data mining were correct. 
Another possible reason is that investors pay attention to patterns in asset prices, hence 
exploiting this anomaly and as a result causing those patterns to change or disappear.  
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5.3. Methodology Framework 
This section provides a detailed overview of the methodology framework employed to 
investigate Monday effect, contagion effect during the crisis period and whether spillover and 
contagion differs across the day of the week. 
Table 5.1 below shows a brief description of the coefficients pertaining to the equations 
below: 
Eq. Parameters  Explanations 
Monday effect 
5.1 𝛼𝑖,𝑀 Average Monday returns  
 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 Monday effect if 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 > 0 
5.2 (a) 𝛼𝑖,𝑀 Average Monday returns during pre-crisis  
 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 Monday effect during pre-crisis if 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 > 0  
5.2 (b) (𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑀
∗ ) Average Monday returns during crisis 
 𝛼𝑖,𝑀
∗  Effect of crisis on Monday returns 
 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗  Monday effect during crisis period 
 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗  Effect of the crisis on Monday effect 
Spillover effect 
5.3 𝛽𝑖 Spillover from U.S. 
5.4  𝛽𝑖 Spillover during the pre-crisis  
 𝛽𝑖
∗ Contagion effect (crisis) if 𝛽𝑖
∗ > 0 
Spillover effect across days of the week 
5.5 𝛽𝑖,𝑀  Spillovers on Monday  
 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 Monday effect in spillovers if 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 ≠ 0 
5.6 (a) 𝛽𝑖,𝑀  Spillovers on Monday (pre-crisis) 
5.6 (b) 𝛽𝑖,𝑀  Spillovers on Monday (pre-crisis) 
 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 Monday effect in spillovers during pre-crisis if 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 ≠ 0   
 𝛽𝑖,𝑀 +  𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 Spillovers across other days of the week during pre-crisis 
5.6 (c) 𝛽𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗  Spillovers on Mondays during the crisis 
 𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗  Contagion on Monday (during the crisis period) 
5.6 (d) 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗  Monday effect in spillover during crisis 
 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗  Shows how contagion is different from Mondays compared to 
other days of the week (during the crisis) 
5.6 (e) 𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ + 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗  Effect of crisis on non-Monday spillovers (Contagion) 
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5.3.1. Monday effect 
I start by estimating a basic model to test for Monday effect, by using the following equation: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                     (5.1) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 denotes stock returns of a European country i at time t. 𝛼𝑖,𝑀 (the constant term) 
captures the mean return on Mondays. 𝛼𝑖,𝐷𝑂𝑊 , on the other hand is a vector of intercepts for 
remaining days of the week, relative to Mondays (𝛼𝑖,𝐷𝑂𝑊 = (𝛼𝑖,𝑇𝑢 , 𝛼𝑖,𝑊𝑒 , 𝛼𝑖,𝑇ℎ , 𝛼𝑖,𝐹𝑟)).  𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊  
is a vector of dummy variables (𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 = (𝐷𝑇𝑢 , 𝐷𝑊𝑒  , 𝐷𝑇ℎ , 𝐷𝐹𝑟)) which take the value of 1 if 
corresponding return for each of the following day is a Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday or 
Friday, respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
As mentioned above, the average Monday return is given by 𝛼𝑖,𝑀, as 𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑊 = 0 for Mondays. 
And as far as non-Mondays (i.e. Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays) are concerned, 
their average returns are given by 𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊, as 𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊  = 1 for non-Mondays. For 
example, 𝛼𝑖,𝑇𝑢 ≠ 0, Tuesday returns are 𝛼𝑖,𝑀 +  𝛼𝑖,𝑇𝑢. Therefore, the difference between 
Mondays and non-Mondays (any other particular day) average returns is measured by 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊  
and there is presence of Monday effects if any of the non-Mondays coefficients is positive and 
significant (i.e. 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 > 0). A reversal in Monday effect would be detected if 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 < 0. 
Equation 5.1 is also used to test for Monday effect during two distinct periods of time, i.e. pre-
crisis period (29th July 2004 until 5th August 2007) and crisis period (6th August 2007 until 27th 
March 2009). 
Monday effect is also tested for across the whole period using the following equation:  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑀
∗ 𝐷𝑐 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ 𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷𝑐   + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡            (5.2) Eq. 5.2 
nests Eq. 5.1 𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 𝛼𝑖,𝑀 ,  𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊   and 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 are as defined above. However, Eq. 5.2 differs 
from Eq. 5.1 in a few aspects. Firstly, Monday effects is tested across the whole sample period, 
i.e. (29th July 2004 until 27th March 2009) while making a distinction between the pre-crisis 
and crisis period, by using a dummy 𝐷𝑐 which takes on the value of 1 during the crisis period, 
and 0 otherwise.  Eq. 5.2 is testing whether Monday effect, defined as above is different between 
the pre-crisis and crisis period. And to illustrate this, Eq. 4.2 is separated into 2 parts: 
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(a) Return equation (pre-crisis),  𝐷𝑐 = 0 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷 𝐷.𝑂.𝑊+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Here, the average return on Mondays during the pre-crisis period (whereby 𝐷𝑐 = 0) is denoted 
by 𝛼𝑖,𝑚  and Monday effect is captured by 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊  and is existent if any of the non-Monday 
coefficients during the pre-crisis is significant, i.e.  𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 > 0. 
(b) Return equation (crisis),  𝐷𝑐 = 1 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑀
∗ + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ 𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 =  (𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑀
∗ ) + (𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ )𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
The average return on Mondays during the crisis period is represented by (𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑀
∗ ). 
Therefore, the difference between average return on Mondays during the pre-crisis and crisis 
period is given by (𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑀
∗ ) −  𝛼𝑖,𝑀 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑀
∗ . 
Moreover, from Equation 5.2(b), it can be observed that Monday effects during the crisis is 
given by (𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ ) and hence the difference between Monday effects during the pre 
and crisis period is (𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ ) − 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 =  𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ .  
Hence, if 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗  (i.e. any of 𝛼𝑖,𝑇𝑢
∗ , 𝛼𝑖,𝑊𝑒
∗ , 𝛼𝑖,𝑇ℎ
∗ , 𝛼𝑖,𝐹𝑟
∗ ) is significant, it means that following the 
outbreak of the crisis, Monday effect was affected.  
5.3.2. Spillover effect 
 
In this section, a basic model is adopted in order to test for spillover and contagion effect from 
the U.S. market15 to a European equity markets and operationalises Forbes and Rigobon (2001) 
definition of shift-contagion as a significant increase in comovements between markets 
following a shock to one market (the U.S.). The equation to be estimated is as follows16: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                  (5.3) 
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represents the stock returns of a European country i, and 𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡 represents the Stock 
returns of U.S. 𝛼𝑖 is the constant term and 𝛽𝑖 captures the spillover from U.S. stock market to 
country i. Equation 5.3 is also used to test for spillover effects during two different periods of 
                                                             
15 For the purpose of the chapter, I am looking at spillovers from U.S. stock market instead of World Stock market 
(as in the previous sections) as time-aligned data retrieved from DataStream is being employed to test for day of 
the week effects in spillovers. And it is not possible to find time-aligned stock prices for World Stock market 
16 Unlike Chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis, a simple model to estimate contagion is employed instead of a model with 
trend, as the aim of this chapter is to only test for contagion across the days of the week. 
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time, i.e. pre-crisis period (29th July 2004 until 5th August 2007) and crisis period (6th August 
2007 until 27th March 2009). There are spillover effects if 𝛽𝑖 is significant i.e.  𝛽𝑖 ≠ 0. 
Spillovers can also be tested across the whole period, allowing for a change during the crisis 
period by using the following: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛼𝑖
∗𝐷𝑐 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡 +𝛽𝑖
∗𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡𝐷𝑐+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡               (5.4) 
Eq. 5.4 nests Eq. 5.3 and hence 𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 can be defined as above. Eq. 5.4 looks at whether 
there is any difference in the spillovers from U.S. stock market to other markets during the crisis 
period, as compared to the pre-crisis period. Hence, the crisis dummy (𝐷𝑐), defined previously, 
is added to the equation. 𝛽𝑖
∗ captures the excess spillover during the crisis period, relative to the 
pre-crisis one from U.S equity market to Country i. Contagion effects during the crisis period 
will be determined if 𝛽𝑢𝑠
∗  is positive and significant. 
One of the drawbacks of approaches represented by (5.3) and (5.4) is that they average out 
spillover and contagion effects across the days of the week. Accordingly, models such as (5.3) 
and (5.4) may not detect contagion if there is an increase in spillovers only during a specific 
day of the week but this is offset by a decline during other days of the week, hence potentially 
concealing the day-specific contagion effect. Another issue arises when (5.3) and (5.4) show 
evidence of contagion during the crisis period (therefore, necessarily, existence of contagion 
across all days of the week, on average), but where in reality contagion only occurs on particular 
days of the week, a phenomenon which would remain undetected when using (5.3) and (5.4).  
Hence, in the next section, contagion effect is tested for during the different days of the crisis.  
5.3.3. Spillover effect across days of the week 
 
In this section, both the day-of-the-week effect and spillover effects are combined in order to 
determine whether there are significant changes in spillovers across the days of the week. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 +  𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡+  𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡             (5.5)            
Equation 5.5 is used to test for changes in spillover effects across the days of the week during 
two distinct periods of time, i.e. pre-crisis period (29th July 2004 until 5th August 2007) and 
crisis period (6th August 2007 until 27th March 2009). 𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 𝛼𝑖,𝑀 , 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 and  𝐷𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊  are as 
defined previously.  
𝛽𝑖 captures the spillover from U.S. stock market to country i on Mondays, as 𝐷𝑖,𝐷𝑂𝑊 = 0 for 
Mondays. And as far as non-Mondays (i.e. Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays) are 
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concerned, the spillovers are captured by 𝛽𝑖,𝑀 +  𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊, as 𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 = 1 for non-Mondays (For 
example, on Tuesdays, the average spillovers can be denoted by 𝛽𝑖,𝑀 +   𝛽𝑖,𝑇𝑢. Hence, it can be 
said that 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 measures by how much non-Monday spillovers are different from Monday 
spillovers. Therefore, if 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊  for any non-Monday is significant (i.e. 
𝛽𝑖,𝑇𝑢 , 𝛽𝑖,𝑊𝑒 , 𝛽𝑖,𝑇ℎ 𝑜𝑟 𝛽𝑖,𝐹𝑟 ≠ 0), there is a day-of-week effect in spillovers.  
Eq. 5.6 below nests Eq. 5.5. 𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 𝛼𝑖,𝑚,  𝐷𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊, 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊, 𝛽𝑖,𝑀,  are defined as above. However, 
Eq. 5.6 differs from Eq. 5.5 in the sense that we are testing for spillover effects during the 
different days of the week across the whole sample period i.e. 29th July 2004 until 27th March 
2009 in order to determine whether there are any changes in the spillover effects pattern across 
the days of the week during the crisis period, as compared to the non-crisis period, whereby 
𝐷𝑐 = 1 during the crisis period and 0 otherwise. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 +  𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡+  𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 
+𝛼𝑖,𝑀
∗ 𝐷𝑐 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ 𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷𝑐+𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ 𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡𝐷𝑐+  𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ 𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                       (5.6) 
𝛼𝑖,𝑚
∗  and 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗  are the changes in parameters for Mondays and non-Mondays, respectively 
due to the crisis period. By employing Eq. 5.6, I estimate whether the pattern of spillovers 
effects on Mondays and the other days of the week are different between the pre-crisis and crisis 
period. Additionally, the pattern across the other days of the week (i.e. from Tuesdays to 
Fridays) during the two distinct periods are also examined.  
And to demonstrate this, we separate Eq. 5.6 into 5 parts: 
(a) Spillover on Mondays during pre-crisis (𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 = 0 and  𝐷𝑐 = 0)    
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑅𝑈𝑆+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                      (5.6a)            
From Eq. 5.6(a), it can be observed that during the pre-crisis period, spillover from U.S. market 
to country i on Mondays are denoted by 𝛽𝑖,𝑀, as 𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 = 0 and  𝐷𝑐 = 0. 
(b) Spillover on Monday vs non-Mondays during pre-crisis (𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 = 0 vs 𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 = 1 and  
𝐷𝑐 = 0)   
The equation below shows spillovers from U.S. to country i before the crisis period: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 +  𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑅𝑈𝑆+  𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝑅𝑈𝑆𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡          (5.6b) 
On non-Mondays, as 𝐷𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 = 1, the spillover is represented by 𝛽𝑖,𝑀 +   𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊. Hence it can 
be said that (𝛽𝑖,𝑀 +   𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊) − 𝛽𝑖,𝑀 = 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 measures by how much non-Monday 
spillovers are different from Monday spillovers before the crisis period. Therefore, if 𝛽𝑖.𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 ≠
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0 (i.e. 𝛽𝑖,𝑇𝑢 , 𝛽𝑖,𝑊𝑒 , 𝛽𝑖,𝑇ℎ 𝑜𝑟 𝛽𝑖,𝐹𝑟 is significant), there is evidence of a day-of-the-week effect in 
spillovers, as this indicates Monday (𝛽𝑖,𝑀)  and non-Monday (𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊) spillovers are different. 
(c) Excess spillover (contagion) on Mondays during crisis (𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 = 0 and  𝐷𝑐 = 1)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑀 +   𝛼𝑖,𝑀
∗ 𝐷𝑐 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡+𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ 𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                   (5.6c)           
From the above equation, it is assumed that 𝐷𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 = 0 and 𝐷𝑐 = 1 and it can be observed 
that spillover effects on Monday during the crisis is given by (𝛽𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ ). Therefore, the 
difference between the spillovers on Mondays pre-crisis compared with spillovers during the 
crisis on Mondays is given by (𝛽𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ )−𝛽𝑖,𝑀 = 𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ . 𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ shows how spillovers from the 
U.S. market on Mondays is different during the crisis period as compared with the pre-crisis. It 
can therefore be said that if 𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗  is significant, it means that following the outbreak of the crisis, 
the spillovers on Mondays were affected, and hence showing evidence of contagion on 
Mondays. 
(d) Spillover on Mondays versus non-Mondays during crisis (𝐷𝑐 = 1)  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊  + 𝛼𝑖,𝑀
∗ + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ 𝐷𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 +
𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡+  𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡𝐷𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊+𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ 𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡+  𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ 𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡𝐷𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                          (5.6d)            
From the equation above, it can be deduced that spillovers on non-Mondays during the crisis 
period are denoted by (𝛽𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ + 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ ). And Monday effect in spillovers 
during the crisis period are then captured by (𝛽𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ + 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ ) – (𝛽𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ ) 
= (𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ ). Thus, the impact of the crisis on the day-of-the-week effect in spillovers 
can be expressed as (𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ ) − 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 =  𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ .  
(e) Spillovers across non-Mondays before the crisis vs non-Mondays during the crisis 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊  + 𝛼𝑖,𝑀
∗ 𝐷𝑐 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ 𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷𝑐 +
𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡+  𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊+𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ 𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡+  𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ 𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                          (5.6e)            
Spillovers on non-Mondays during the pre-crisis period are denoted by 𝛽𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 and 
during the crisis, it is represented by (𝛽𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ + 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ ). The excess spillover 
(i.e. contagion) during the crisis period for non-Mondays hence given by 𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ + 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ . 
Contagion effects on Mondays relative to other days of the week during the crisis period is 
different if,  𝛽𝑖,𝑇𝑢
∗ , 𝛽𝑖,𝑊𝑒
∗ , 𝛽𝑖,𝑇ℎ
∗ , or 𝛽𝑖,𝐹𝑟
∗  ≠ 0 (i.e. 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ ≠ 0). And contagion on non-Mondays 
is determined if  𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ + 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ < 0. 
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5.4. Data and Methodology 
 
For the purpose of this chapter, stock market indices from 13 countries17 are used namely from 
Austria, Denmark, France, Euro Index, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, U.K. and U.S.  The daily prices denoted in local currency are obtained 
from DataStream for the period from 29th July 2004 until 27th March 2009. The sample consists 
of 1217 observations for each equity markets and begins on 29th July 2004, consistent with the 
previous tightening cycle in the monetary policy cycle in the US, and ends in March 2009 
(Dungey and Yalama, 2010). To examine Monday effects and how it affects spillover effects 
from the U.S. market to other markets in our sample, a synchronized dataset of 16:00 GMT 
market prices is used, as the timing of collected data is an important determinant of contagion 
results.   
Moreover, the period is also divided into non-crisis and crisis samples, delineated by the start 
of the crisis period, in 6th August 2007. The start of the crisis period is determined by 
considering major financial and economic events from the timeline provided by the Bank for 
International Settlements (Filardo et al., 2009). 
 
In view of the effect of heteroscedasticity for the stock return rate, it is not enough to employ 
the least square regression method when fitting the conditional residuals. The conditional 
residuals should be fitted via generalized error distribution as well in order to draw a 
comparatively consistent conclusion. Hence similar to Chapter 3 and 4, Eq. (5.1) to (5.6e) are 
estimated within a GJR-GARCH framework, as the OLS estimation technique may provide not 
only inefficient but also biased parameter estimates. 
     
 
  
                                                             
17 A synchronised dataset (16.00 GMT, in this case) is employed in Chapter 5 to test for days of the week effect 
on contagion, as it is more suitable to capture shocks that are transmitted due to the crisis. Time-aligned dataset 
(i.e. 16.00 GMT) of the indices used in Chapter 3 and 4 are not available on DataStream. Hence, I employ a 
synchronised dataset that was readily available on DataStream for Chapter 5, consisting of the main European 
equity market indices and U.S market indices from 24th July 2004 until 27th March 2009, which I believe was 
substantial enough to test for day of the week effect in contagion 
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5.5. Empirical Results 
5.5.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 5.2 below reports the descriptive statistics for returns of each market, in terms of means 
and standard deviations across the whole period. An examination of the characteristics 
displayed shows that overall, average daily returns on Mondays are not lower relative to other 
days of the week.  And the lowest average daily returns occur on Thursdays. Moreover, the 
descriptive statistics table shows that the presence of the day of the week effect on stock market 
return can be shown in terms of standard deviation, as the volatility is higher on Mondays, 
followed by Fridays as compared to other days of the week.  
 Mondays Tuesdays Wednesdays Thursdays Fridays 
 Mean Std 
Dev. 
Mean Std 
Dev. 
Mean Std 
Dev. 
Mean Std 
Dev. 
Mean Std 
Dev. 
Austria .00028 .01855 -
.00033 
.01669 .00008 .01666 -.00067 .01622 -
.00009 
.01694 
Denmark .00047 .01593 .00049 .01280 -
.00026 
.01439 -.00102 .01237 -
.00016 
.01279 
Eurostoxx .00010 .01597 .00028 .01268 .00005 .01383 -.00085 .01178 -
.00060 
.01478 
France .00008 .01618 -
.00018 
.01280 .00029 .01432 -.00103 .01233 -
.00009 
.01497 
Germany .00064 .01656 .00060 .01329 -
.00046 
.01416 -.00008 .01261 -
.00029 
.01434 
Ireland -
.00076 
.01667 -
.00010 
.01433 .00005 .01497 -.00078 .01184 .00034 .01551 
Italy -
.00014 
.01526 -
.00068 
.01265 .00054 .01308 -.00068 .01096 -
.00089 
.01375 
Netherlands .00041 .01711 -
.00015 
.01244 -
.00031 
.01439 -.00114 .01221 -
.00035 
.01414 
Portugal .00008 .01293 -
.00037 
.01086 .00047 .01013 -.00111 .00977 .00024 .01106 
Spain -
.00036 
.01489 .00017 .01306 .00051 .01394 -.00038 .01202 .00013 .01450 
Switzerland .00015 01466 .00030 .01177 -
.00026 
.01176 -.00048 .01121 -
.00019 
.01319 
U.K. -
.00034 
.01283 -
.00051 
.01296 .00034 .01262 .000103 .01191 .00066 .01243 
US.. 00061 .01553 -
.00043 
.01077 .00044 .01375 -.00082 .01172 -
.00093 
.01533 
 Descriptive statistics of the stock returns for 13 equity markets across the different days of the week 
Before estimating the different models in the previous section to investigate for Monday effect, 
spillover and contagion effect across the days of the week, the data pertaining to our sample is 
subject to a battery of tests to ensure that Eq. 5.1 to 5.6 are correctly specified. The results from 
the ADF test, tabulated in Appendix C.1 suggest that the log indices of the 13 stocks are non-
stationary and the returns on the other hand are stationary. Further, the Johansen test is used to 
identify co-integrating vectors for all pairs of stock prices (i.e. U.S. with other countries in our 
sample). From Appendix C.2 in the appendix it can be observed that the Schwaz Bayesian 
Information Criterion (SBIC) indicates that there are no co-integrating vectors for all pairs of 
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stock prices. In addition to this, Eq. 5.6 is estimated using an OLS method and tested for 
homoscedasticity of residuals by using the White General Heteroscedasticity of residuals. It can 
be seen from Appendix C.3 in the appendix that the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity is 
rejected for all at 1% indicating that there is significant amount of heteroscedastic while 
estimating Eq. 5.6 through an OLS model. In addition to this, the non-normality, all the 
equations in the previous section is re-estimated assuming a student-t distribution or a GED 
distribution. Appendix C.4 displays the findings from Shapiro Wilk test from Eq. 5.6. And, 
after having re-estimated the model with the correct error term follows a t-distribution or the 
residuals are tested for autocorrelation, and in cases where it is found, the errors are modelled 
as an ARMA process of an appropriate order. Finally, the Engle’s LM ARCH test shows that 
there is no ARCH effects in residuals after estimating all the models within a GJR GARCH 
framework. Appendix C.5 shows that the p-value observed are greater than the chosen alpha 
(at 5% significance level, in this case) for Eq. 5.6, indicating no remaining ARCH effects in 
residuals. 
 
5.5.2. Monday effect 
 
In this section, evidence of Monday effect is investigated across 13 stock markets. Table 5.3(a) 
and 5.3(b) below shows the estimated results from Eq. 5.1 and reports the findings pertaining 
to Monday effect during the pre-crisis and crisis period respectively. As established in the 
Methodology Framework section, Monday effect is observed if any of the non-Monday 
coefficients is positive and significant (i.e. 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 > 0). It can be seen from Table 4.2(a) that 
there are some significant non-Monday coefficients  (𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 ≠ 0) for Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Spain and U.K. The non-Monday coefficients are negative in all cases, except for 
Fridays in U.K.  For instance,  𝛼𝑖,𝑇𝑢 < 0 for Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and U.K.  This 
indicates wandering Monday effect. And as far as other countries (7 out of 13) in our sample 
are concerned, there is no Monday effects, as 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 = 0, showing a disappearing Monday 
effect in these markets.
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Table 5.3: Estimating days of week effects in stock returns (Based on Eq. 5.1) 
a. 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (Pre-crisis period, i.e. from 29
th July 2004 until 5th August 2007) 
 Austria Denmark Eurozone France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Switzerland U.K. U.S. 
𝜶𝒊,𝑴 .00178*** 
(2.57) 
.00009 
(0.16) 
.00099* 
(1.79) 
.00073 
(1.15) 
.00151** 
(2.26) 
.00102 
(1.65) 
 
.00105** 
(2.21) 
.00137** 
(2.37) 
.00075** 
(2.13) 
.00115** 
(2.23) 
.00093* 
(1.76) 
.00107** 
(2.31) 
.00024 
(0.67) 
𝜶𝒊,𝑻𝒖 -.00097 
(-1.03) 
.00012 
(0.21) 
-.00101 
(-1.22) 
-.00115 
(-1.36) 
-.00153* 
(-1.70) 
-.00033 
(-0.41) 
-
.00146** 
(-2.16) 
-.00145* 
(-1.88) 
-.00023 
(-0.49) 
-.00119* 
(-1.67) 
-.00110 
(-1.53)  
-.00104* 
(-1.73) 
-.00061 
(-1.01) 
𝜶𝒊,𝑾𝒆  .00019 
(0.21) 
-.00002 
(-0.03) 
-.00020 
(-0.25) 
-.00019 
(-0.23) 
-.00046 
(-0.52) 
1.40e-
06 
(0.00)   
 .00023 
(0.34) 
-.00115 
(-1.49) 
.000569 
(1.22) 
.00030 
(0.44) 
-.00012 
(-0.18) 
.00010 
(0.16) 
.00029 
(0.54) 
𝜶𝒊,𝑻𝒉 .00032 
(0.35) 
-.00009 
(-0.10) 
-.00017 
(-0.20)   
-
.0000528 
(0.950) 
-.00020 
(-0.23) 
.00050 
(0.61) 
-.00014 
(-0.20) 
-.00065 
(-0.87)   
-.00054 
(-1.06) 
.00005 
(0.07) 
-.00047 
(-0.65) 
.00082 
(1.33) 
.00080 
 (1.42) 
𝜶𝒊,𝑭𝒓 .00005   
(0.06) 
-.00006 
(-0.07) 
-.00006 
(-0.07) 
.0003913 
(0.252) 
-.00020 
(-0.22) 
.00057 
(0.71) 
-.00008 
(-0.12)  
-.00064 
(-0.85) 
.0006 
(1.26) 
.00009 
(0.13) 
.00014  
(0.20) 
.00110* 
(1.79) 
-.00003 
(-0.06) 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (for a two-tailed test) 
𝛼𝑖,𝑀 represent the mean return on Mondays, and 𝛼𝑖,𝑇𝑢, 𝛼𝑖,𝑊𝑒 , 𝛼𝑖,𝑇ℎ, and 𝛼𝑖,𝐹𝑟  captures the excess mean return on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays respectively, as 
compared to Mondays during the pre-crisis period 
b. 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (crisis period, i.e. from 6
th August 2007 until 27th March 2009) 
 Austria Denmark Eurozone France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Switzerland U.K. U.S. 
𝜶𝒊,𝑴 -.00197 
(-1.07) 
-.00181 
(-0.95)   
-.00144 
(-1.06) 
-.00136 
(-0.86) 
-.00088 
(-0.67) 
-.00232 
(-1.25) 
-.00270* 
(-1.81) 
-.00189 
(-1.30) 
-.00222* 
(-1.82) 
-.00190 
(-1.23) 
 -.00144 
(-0.91) 
-.00150 
(-0.83) 
-.00038 
(-0.28) 
𝜶𝒊,𝑻𝒖 .00047 
(0.18)   
.00115 
(0.45)   
.00078 
(0.38) 
-.00046 
(-0.20) 
.00086 
(0.44) 
.00007 
(0.03) 
.000430 
(0.21) 
.00055 
(-0.27) 
.00050 
(0.30) 
.00209 
(0.93) 
.00031 
(0.14) 
  .00066 
(0.26) 
-.00166 
(-0.84) 
𝜶𝒊,𝑾𝒆 .00363 
(1.47) 
.00177 
(0.65) 
.00332* 
(1.75) 
.00399 
(1.88) 
.00214 
(1.16) 
.00289 
(1.16) 
.00368* 
(1.88) 
.00466 
(2.40)   
.00156 
(0.91) 
.00236 
(1.13) 
.0017 
(0.76) 
.00204  
(0.80) 
.00199 
(1.06) 
𝜶𝒊,𝑻𝒉 -.00004 
(-0.02) 
-.000486 
(-0.18) 
-.00116 
(-0.58) 
-.00273 
(-1.19) 
-.00102 
(-0.53) 
-.00229 
(-0.78) 
-.00023 
(-0.12) 
-.00136 
(0.56) 
-.00019 
(-0.12) 
-.00039 
(-0.17)   
.00174 
(-0.56) 
-.00001 
(-0.01) 
-.00296 
(-0.44) 
𝜶𝒊,𝑭𝒓 .00069 
(0.28) 
 .00051  
(0.20) 
.00011 
(0.06) 
-.00010 
(-0.05) 
 .00058 
(0.31) 
.00130 
(0.52) 
.001947 
(0.96) 
.00189 
(-1.30) 
.00209 
(1.28) 
.00146 
(0.66) 
-.00104 
(-0.48) 
-.00097 
(-0.37) 
-.00082 
(-0.28) 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (for a two tailed test). 𝛼𝑖,𝑀 represent the mean return on Mondays, and 𝛼𝑖,𝑇𝑢, 𝛼𝑖,𝑊𝑒 , 𝛼𝑖,𝑇ℎ, and 𝛼𝑖,𝐹𝑟  captures the excess mean return on Tuesdays, 
Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays respectively, as compared to Mondays during the crisis period
197 
 
Table 5.3(b), on the other hand, shows the estimated results from Eq. 5.1 during the crisis period 
(i.e. from 6th August 2007 until 27th March 2009). Monday effect (𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 > 0) is present 
only for Euro Index and Italy during that period. And as far as the remaining countries (11 out 
of 13) in our sample are concerned, they showed no evidence of Monday effect during the 
recent financial crisis, as 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 = 0. 
Despite the fact that there was a short sale activity ban imposed by the government in Italy and 
several other European countries during the recent financial crisis, the findings indicate the 
presence of Monday effect in Euro Index and Italy. The result of the ban was that speculative 
short sellers would not take the risks of holding their positions during the weekend, which 
would otherwise mean that they will close out their position on Friday and reopen their position 
on the following Monday, hence contributing to the Monday effect. And as hypothesized by 
Chen and Singal (2003) “the behaviour of short sellers contributes to the occurrence of Monday 
effect due to the increasing selling pressure on Monday, and that the closing of short positions 
on Friday and the opening of these positions on the following Monday”. 
Potential reasons for the above two markets experiencing Monday effect might be due to the 
exuberance of the blue Monday hypothesis. The basic premise of this hypothesis asserts that 
investors are affected by systematic mood changes that cause negative pressures on Mondays 
(Rystrom and Benson, 1989). And since during a financial crisis, fear and emotions have a more 
widespread impact across investors, this might lead to high uncertainty avoidance, which would 
have a more prominent effect on Monday effect. 
However, unlike French (1980) and Kamara (1997), the findings from Eq. 5.1 show evidence 
of a disappearing and wandering Monday effect for most cases. According the authors, the 
wandering Monday effect refers to “a situation whereby the pattern of the day seasonality within 
a market may shift overtime, in a manner that is distinguishable from a random process.” 
According to Doyle and Chen (2009), seasonal effects continually evolve, especially since the 
way investment was conducted the 1970s is different from now, and hence the conditions that 
promoted Monday effects may no longer be present. For instance, the days on which key 
economic indicators were announced have changed and there is now the availability of 
electronic trading. Moreover, the overreaction of markets might be another reason of the change 
in seasonality pattern, according to De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Lehman (1990). This might 
happen if enough people act upon “buy on Monday and sell on Friday”, and consequently, 
overreaction to calendar effects might potentially push Monday returns up beyond equilibrium, 
hence leading to a new pattern of seasonality, which will eventually be reacted upon.  
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The results from Eq. 5.2 is not reported as it is simply the estimation of Eq.5.1 for whole period 
in our sample (i.e. Aug.t 2007 until March 2009), by adding coefficients (i.e. 𝛼𝑖,𝑀
∗ 𝐷𝑐 +
𝛼𝒊,𝑫.𝑶.𝑾
∗ 𝐷𝑫.𝑶.𝑾𝐷𝑐  ) and a dummy variable (i.e. 𝐷𝑐 = 1) representing the financial crisis.  
5.5.3. Spillover effect 
The findings pertaining to Table 5.4 below on the other hand is estimated from Eq. 5.4 is based 
upon the whole period in this study (i.e. July 2004 until March 2009). The results from Eq. 5.3 
are not reported since we wish to investigate for contagion effects (i.e. the excess spillover 
during the crisis period, relative to the pre-crisis period) instead of just comparing the spillovers 
across two distinct periods. 
The estimated results show how the spillover from the U.S. market is different in the crisis 
period relative to the pre-crisis period, as there is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 during 
the crisis period, and 0 otherwise. In other words, Eq. 5.418 is used to estimate contagion effect, 
that is, the excess co-movement during the crisis period, relative to the pre-crisis period.  
It can be observed from Table 5.4 that there is positive and significant spillover from the U.S. 
during the pre-crisis period, i.e. 𝛽𝑖 > 0 for all the markets in our sample (except for Denmark). 
Following the outbreak of the 2007 Financial crisis, there seem to be contagion effects from the 
U.S. market to Austria, Denmark, Portugal and U.K., as 𝛽𝑖
∗ > 0. However, there is a lower 
spillover effect during the crisis period, relative to the pre-crisis one for Euro Index, France and 
Germany, given that 𝛽𝑖
∗ < 0.  And as far as other markets (i.e. Ireland, Netherlands, Spain and 
Switzerland) in our sample are concerned, there has not been an impact on the spillover effect 
caused by the crisis, i.e. 𝛽𝑖
∗ = 0. 
                                                             
18 Note that Eq. 5.4 is a basic contagion model unlike the ‘Globalisation model’ in Chapter 3 and 4. 
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Table 5.4: Estimating spillover and contagion effect during the pre-crisis and crisis 
respectively (Based on Eq. 5.4) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛼𝑖
∗𝐷𝑐 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡 +𝛽𝑖
∗𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡𝐷𝑐+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    
 𝜶𝒊 𝜷𝒊 𝜶𝒊
∗ 𝜷𝒊
∗ 
Austria .00113** 
(4.13) 
 
 
 
.75046*** 
(16.35) 
-.00105** 
(-1.96) 
.16416*** 
(2.94) 
Denmark .000089 
(0.43) 
.02034 
(0.90) 
-.000170   
(-0.35)   
 .77030*** 
(21.48) 
Eurozone .000198 
(1.46) 
.98168*** 
(37.54) 
-.0002718 
 (-1.03) 
 
-.12121 
(-3.82) 
France .000238* 
(1.74) 
.97535*** 
(33.74) 
 
-.00023 
(-0.83) 
-.06632 
(-1.94) 
Germany  .00041** 
(2.37) 
1.0651*** 
(35.92) 
-.00019 
(-0.56) 
-.29573 
(-8.03) 
Ireland  .00059*** 
(2.70) 
.66186*** 
18.37) 
-.00086* 
(-1.69) 
.011255 
(0.25) 
Italy .00033** 
(2.08) 
.77138*** 
(27.14) 
-.00074** 
(-2.13) 
.02375 
(0.71) 
Netherlands .00024 
(1.49) 
.88473*** 
(34.20) 
-.00038 
(-1.13) 
-.02007 
(-0.58) 
Portugal  .00058*** 
(3.32) 
.32647*** 
(12.17) 
-.00128*** 
(-3.09) 
.18166*** 
(5.61) 
Spain .00057*** 
(3.38) 
.8029*** 
(29.38) 
-.0007** 
(-2.03) 
.00499 
(0.15) 
Switzerland .00037*** 
(2.66) 
.74924*** 
(25.83) 
 -.00053* 
(-1.74) 
.02834 
(0.80) 
U.K. -.00086** 
 (5.31) 
.62688*** 
(22.30) 
-.00102**             
(-2.56) 
 
.1782*** 
(4.82) 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
𝛽𝑖  represent the spillover from U.S. to a European Country i on during the pre-crisis period. 𝛽𝐢
∗ represents the 
excess spillover (i.e. contagion) during the crisis period over the crisis period. Evidence of contagion is 
observed if 𝛽𝑖
∗ > 0 (one-sided test). 
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5.5.4. Spillover effect across days of the week 
From the previous section, spillovers during the pre-crisis period, crisis period, and excess 
spillovers (i.e. contagion) during the crisis as compared to the pre-crisis period could be 
observed. One of the drawbacks of Eq. 5.4, is that it looks only at the excess average co-
movement during the crisis as compared to the pre-crisis period. However, spillovers might 
differ across the days of the week and contagion might not occur during all days of the week, 
but only on certain days of the week. As a result, Eq. 5.4 might not detect contagion effect, if a 
positive spillovers during a particular day of the week is met by a negative spillover on another 
day during that same week, hence eliminating the effect. Another instance might be whereby 
Eq. 5.4 shows evidence of contagion during the crisis period (i.e. existence of contagion 
overall), but actually this contagion is occurring on a particular day during the crisis period, 
which can be shown by using Eq. 5.6. Henceforth, Eq. 5.6 is employed to capture spillovers 
across the different days of the week and investigate how the crisis changes the spillover 
patterns. Moreover, there might be occasion whereby Eq. 5.4 shows no contagion, but Eq. 5.6 
shows evidence of contagion.  
Table 5.5 below is based on Eq. 5.6 and the results shows the spillovers for Mondays until 
Fridays from the U.S. market for the whole sample period (i.e. July 2004 until March 2009). 
Most importantly, the findings illustrate how the spillovers across the different days of the week 
during the crisis period differ from the pre-crisis period, and whether a day-of-the-week effect 
can be reflected while estimating spillovers.  
As established previously in this chapter, I define the day-of-the-week effect in spillovers as a 
significant difference between Monday and non-Monday spillovers, i.e., 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ ≠ 0. In 
addition, the day-of-the-week effect in contagion (i.e., contagion differs significantly across 
weekdays) can be observed if 1) either there was contagion on Mondays (𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ > 0) and 
spillovers change significantly on any remaining weekday (𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ ≠ 0), or 2) there was no 
contagion on Mondays but spillovers changed significantly on any remaining weekday such 
that the resulting non-Monday effect (𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ + 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ ) is significantly positive  (positivity 
assures existence of contagion). 
Firstly, day-of-the-week effects in spillovers before the crisis first is examined. Most of the 
markets (except for Denmark) in our sample experienced a positive and significant spillover 
from the U.S. market on Mondays during the crisis period, i.e. 𝛽𝑖,𝑀 > 0. Further, Monday 
spillovers tend to remain at a constant level across the week, as 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 parameters are mostly 
insignificant, except for a few exceptions affecting only three countries (Austria, Portugal, and 
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the U.K.). Hence, the overall evidence is not supportive of the hypothesis that pre-crisis 
spillovers from the U.S. varied in intensity across days of the week. 
Following the crisis outbreak, there is some evidence of financial contagion from the U.S. The 
baseline model (5.4) detected contagion for Austria, Denmark, Portugal, and the U.K. Model 
5.6 gives a deeper insight into the nature of this phenomenon. Firstly, it confirms that U.S. 
spillovers have had a stronger effect on each of these countries, on some days of the week. 
The coefficients 𝛽(𝑢𝑠)𝑚
∗  and  𝛽(𝑢𝑠)𝑚
∗ +  𝛽(𝑢𝑠)𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗  represent excess spillover (i.e. contagion) on 
Monday and other days of the week respectively during the crisis period, relative to the pre-
crisis period. It can be observed that there has been contagion effect only on Mondays (as 
𝛽(𝑢𝑠)𝑚
∗ > 0) for U.K. and Austria during the crisis period. On the other hand, for Denmark and 
Portugal contagion occurred for more than one day during the week. It can be observed from 
Table 5.4 that Denmark is experiencing contagion from U.S. on Mondays and Tuesdays, as 
𝛽(𝑢𝑠)𝑚
∗ > 0 and 𝛽(𝑢𝑠)𝑡𝑢
∗ > 0 whereas Portugal shows evidence of contagion on Tuesdays until 
Fridays, i.e. 𝛽(𝑢𝑠)𝑡𝑢
∗ > 0, 𝛽(𝑢𝑠)𝑤
∗ > 0, 𝛽(𝑢𝑠)𝑡ℎ
∗ > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽(𝑢𝑠)𝑓
∗ > 0  This is one advantage of this 
model, as it enables us to determine contagion effects across different days of the week effect, 
instead of just having an overall overview of whether a market has experienced contagion 
during the crisis period.  
Moreover, from Table 5.4, it can be seen how Eq. 5.6 outperforms Eq. 5.5 in terms of examining 
contagion. Eq. 5.6 allows one to detect contagion daily, whereas Eq. 5.4 investigates for 
contagion across the whole crisis period and assumes that all days of the week are identical, 
which is a general viewpoint that has been adopted by most financial contagion literatures (e.g. 
Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Baele et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2013). 
For remaining countries, the result of no contagion, on average, from model (5.4) is not rejected 
for any weekday by model (5.6), i.e., although theoretically possible, I did not observe any case 
where contagion would prevail only on some weekdays but would be undetected when 
estimated for all weekdays treated as identical.  
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Table 5.5: Estimating days of the week effect and spillovers across the days of the week (Based on Eq. 5.6) 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑀 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 +  𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡+  𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊 + 𝛼𝑖,𝑀
∗ 𝐷𝑐 + 𝛼𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ 𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷𝑐+𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ 𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡𝐷𝑐+  𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗ 𝑅𝑈𝑆,𝑡𝐷𝐷.𝑂.𝑊𝐷𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
 Austria Denmark Eurozone France Germany Ireland Italy Netherland
s 
Portugal Spain Switzerlan
d 
U.K. 
𝛼𝑖,𝑀 .00158** 
(2.59) 
-.0000209 
(-0.05) 
.000141 
(0.39) 
.000039 
(-0.10) 
  .0007141* 
(1.72) 
  .0006027 
(1.13) 
.000611 
(1.62) 
.0006986* 
(1.76) 
.0004498 
(1.29) 
.000599 
(1.62) 
.0003697 
(0.91) 
 
.000809** 
(2.24) 
𝛼𝑖,𝑇𝑢 -.0011682 
(-1.41) 
.0002441 
(0.48) 
-.0002734 
(-0.53) 
-.0004929 
(-0.90) 
-.001028* 
(-1.78) 
-.0003357 
(-0.49) 
-
.0012177** 
(-2.34) 
-.0008409 
(-1.51) 
.0000193 
(0.04) 
-.000577 
(-1.10) 
-.0004937 
(-0.87) 
-
.000941** 
(-2.01) 
𝛼𝑖,𝑊𝑒  -.0007327 
(-0.86) 
.0002768 
(0.55) 
.0000458 
(0.09) 
-.0000308 
(-0.05) 
-.0005283   
(-0.95) 
-.0000293 
(-0.04) 
.0001973 
(0.38) 
-.0008385 
(-1.55)   
.0004343 
(0.95) 
.000286 
(0.56) 
.0000352 
(0.06) 
-.000544 
(-1.11) 
𝛼𝑖,𝑇ℎ -.0003464 
(-0.41) 
-8.63e-06 
(-0.01) 
-.0003612 
(-0.72) 
-.0002615 
(-0.48) 
-.000622 
(-1.09) 
-.0000465 
(-0.06) 
-.000651 
(-1.26) 
-.0007802 
(-1.49) 
-.0005976 
(-1.25) 
-
.0003503 
(-0.65) 
-.0003234 
(-0.57) 
.000264 
(0.53) 
𝛼𝑖,𝐹𝑟  -.0000371 
(-0.04) 
.0000546 
(0.08) 
.0008405 
(1.58) 
.0011901*
* 
(2.10) 
.0005037   
(0.84) 
.0004275 
(0.59) 
.0002238 
(0.43) 
.0000651 
(0.11) 
.0007705* 
(1.67) 
.0004913 
(0.93) 
.0007817 
(1.34) 
.001169** 
(2.32) 
𝛽𝑖,𝑀  .43848*** 
(4.06) 
.025794 
(0.40) 
.966516**
* 
(13.99) 
.980926**
* 
(12.35) 
1.076843**
* 
(13.32) 
.547689**
* 
(5.42) 
.7649304**
* 
(9.58) 
.909981**
* 
(12.53) 
.459642**
* 
(6.70) 
.82934**
* 
(11.76) 
.761135**
* 
(10.34) 
.577952**
* 
(8.19) 
𝛽𝑖,𝑇𝑢 .407851**
* 
(2.65) 
.0116108 
(0.16)   
.1751853* 
(1.84) 
.1535927 
(1.45) 
.1017662 
(0.94) 
.0687791 
(0.52) 
.1028064 
(0.94) 
.1090963 
(1.08) 
-
.233798** 
(-2.43) 
.0744446 
(0.74) 
.1326065 
(1.20) 
.0483277 
(0.50) 
𝛽𝑖,𝑊𝑒  .3203197*
* 
(2.33) 
.0389958 
(0.58) 
-.0564873 
(-0.68) 
-.1245274 
(-1.30) 
-.0778679 
(-0.83) 
.0586138 
(0.48) 
-.0227893 
(-0.24) 
-.1256546 
(-1.45) 
-.1230269 
(-1.48) 
-
.0767313 
(-0.91) 
-.051137 
(-0.56) 
.0416042 
(0.48) 
𝛽𝑖,𝑇ℎ .398464**
* 
(2.59) 
-.0156605 
(-0.17)   
.059528 
(0.67) 
.0320496 
(0.32) 
.0522866 
(0.50) 
.2004877 
(1.48) 
.0586207 
(0.56) 
  -
.0021539 
(-0.02) 
-.1166037 
(-1.30) 
-
.0271348 
(-0.29) 
-.0266279 
(-0.28) 
.182259* 
(1.93) 
𝛽𝑖,𝐹𝑟 .37438*** 
(2.74) 
-.0156447 
(-0.17) 
-.0235095 
(-0.27)   
-.009837 
(-0.10) 
-.0585002 
(-0.58) 
.1963585 
(1.58) 
-.0552561 
(-0.58) 
-.0298806 
(-0.33) 
-.17438** 
(-1.98) 
-
.0420241 
(-0.46) 
-.0227793 
(-0.24) 
-.0647647 
(-0.72) 
𝛼𝑖,𝑀
∗  -.00232* 
(-1.83) 
-.0010248 
(-0.83) 
-.0011529 
(-1.49) 
-.0004181 
(-0.47) 
-.0009759 
(-1.09) 
-.0006245 
(-0.52) 
-
.0016115** 
(-1.96) 
-.0012738 
(-1.54) 
-
.002031** 
(-2.55) 
-
.0015339
* 
(-1.68) 
-.0006805 
(-0.81) 
-
.00249*** 
(-2.91) 
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𝛼𝑖,𝑇𝑢
∗  .001889 
(1.09) 
.0029854**
* 
(2.05) 
.0022102*
* 
(1.97) 
.0015318 
(1.27) 
.0027904** 
(2.25) 
-.0010603 
(-0.64) 
.0020325* 
(1.73) 
.0014476 
(1.24) 
.0014567 
(1.38) 
.002708*
* 
(2.18) 
.0017663 
(1.37) 
.003066** 
(2.54) 
𝛼𝑖,𝑊𝑒
∗  .0018304 
(1.10) 
.0001868 
(0.12) 
.000751 
(0.71) 
.0006616 
(0.57) 
.0004049 
(0.34) 
.0009067 
(0.56) 
.0008663 
(0.77) 
.0019554* 
(1.71) 
-.000524 
(-0.50) 
-
.0002317 
(-0.19) 
.0000867 
(0.07) 
.003544** 
(2.92) 
𝛼𝑖,𝑇ℎ
∗  .0013279 
(0.76) 
-.0004568 
(-0.27) 
.0013847 
(1.28) 
.0001382 
(0.12) 
.0012293   
(0.99) 
-.0020814 
(-1.24) 
.0010209 
(0.82) 
.0003537 
(0.30) 
.001281 
(1.16) 
.0007449 
(0.58) 
.0004988 
(0.41) 
.0013103 
(1.07) 
𝛼𝑖,𝐹𝑟
∗  .0013787 
(0.77) 
.0009888 
(0.55) 
.0000447 
(0.04) 
-.0005917 
(-0.49)  
-.0001011 
(-0.08) 
.000978 
(0.59) 
.0002142 
(0.19) 
.0009933 
(0.78) 
.0013834 
(1.23) 
.0006467 
(0.52) 
.0004988 
(-1.28) 
.0004284 
(0.34) 
𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗  .4199*** 
(3.34) 
.7842973**
* 
(8.88) 
-.1282976 
(-1.52) 
-.104829 
(-1.09) 
-.253793       
(-2.68) 
.0628367 
(0.54) 
.045004 
(0.52) 
-.0338083 
(-0.40) 
-.0802557 
(-1.06) 
-
.0738379 
(-0.89) 
.0243865  
(0.30) 
.1433326* 
(1.74) 
𝛽𝑖,𝑇𝑢
∗  -.222362 
(-1.19) 
.2198267** 
(1.96) 
-.051747 
(-0.45) 
-.0160836 
(-0.13) 
-.0679983 
(-0.52) 
-.0066469 
(-0.04) 
-.0264572 
(-0.21) 
-.011675 
(-0.10) 
.444667**
* 
(3.97) 
.0550478 
(0.46) 
-.0569092 
(-0.42) 
.1773258 
(1.47) 
𝛽𝑖,𝑊𝑒
∗  -.2473809 
(-1.49) 
-.0530849 
(-0.45) 
.0840004 
(0.81) 
.1260893 
(1.08) 
-.0679983 
(-0.41) 
.1645257 
(1.13) 
.0252833 
(0.23)   
.0948455 
(0.89) 
.2287566*
* 
(2.36) 
.1519217 
(1.42) 
.0024633 
(0.02) 
.0322887 
(0.30) 
𝛽𝑖,𝑇ℎ
∗  -.289782 
(-1.54) 
-.0019902 
(-0.01) 
-.0784631 
(-0.69) 
-.0320409 
(-0.25)   
-.1157546 
(-0.89) 
-.1773466 
(-1.07) 
-.1259895 
(-1.01) 
-.0377242 
(-0.30) 
.294565**
* 
(2.64) 
.0317307 
(0.27) 
-.0124764 
(-0.11) 
-.0628615 
(-0.51) 
𝛽𝑖,𝐹𝑟
∗  -.38843** 
(2.35) 
-.1199377 
(-0.94) 
.0492604 
(0.47) 
.0266069 
(0.23) 
-.0006821 
(-0.01) 
-.1756042 
(-1.21) 
-.0030027 
(-0.03)   
-.0221981 
(-0.20) 
.355591**
* 
(3.46) 
.1073624 
(0.99) 
.0000613 
(0.00) 
.0833874 
(0.79) 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
𝛼𝑖,𝑀 represent the intercepts of Eq. 6 on Mondays, and 𝛼𝑖,𝑇𝑢, 𝛼𝑖,𝑊𝑒 , 𝛼𝑖,𝑇ℎ, and 𝛼𝑖,𝐹𝑟  captures change in intercepts on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays respectively, 
as compared to Mondays during the pre-crisis period. 
α𝑖,𝑀
∗  represent the intercepts during the crisis period over the pre-crisis period on Mondays.  αi,Tu
∗ , αi,We
∗ , αi,Th
∗  and  αi,Fr
∗  captures change in intercepts on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, 
Thursdays, and Fridays respectively, as compared to Mondays during the crisis period over the pre-crisis crisis period. 
𝛽𝑖,𝑀 represent the spillovers from U.S. to Country i on Mondays, and 𝛽𝑖,𝑇𝑢 , 𝛽𝑖,𝑊𝑒 , 𝛽𝑖,𝑇ℎ, and 𝛽𝑖,𝐹  captures the excess spillovers on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays, and 
Fridays respectively, as compared to Mondays during the pre-crisis period. 𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗  represent the contagion during the crisis period over the pre-crisis period on Mondays. Day of 
the week effect on contagion on non-Mondays can be identified by 𝛽𝑖,𝑀
∗ + 𝛽𝑖,𝐷.𝑂.𝑊
∗  .
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When the results from Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 are compared, it can be observed from the former 
that there is evidence of contagion for Austria, Denmark, Portugal and U.K. However, Table 
5.4 illustrates that this contagion effect might occur only during certain days of the week, and 
not necessarily across all days of the week. As discussed in the previous chapters, the fact there 
is an uneven occurrence of contagion across the week might be due factors leading to the 
Monday effect anomaly and the release of macro-economic data on particular days of the week. 
For instance, the ban of short sales activities in certain economies (leading to international 
investors might have shift their short selling in countries where it was not banned), an 
accentuating blue Monday hypothesis, and the surge in the number of investors taking a short 
view due to liquidity needs during the recent financial crisis might lead to a Monday effect and 
this effect might be transferred to other markets during a turmoil period.   Moreover, the 
announcement of macro-economic data such as the release of nonfarm payrolls on Fridays, FED 
Decision on Wednesdays, ECB rate decision of Thursdays, Employment figures on 
Wednesdays might lead to contagion effect being different across the days of the week.  
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5.6. Conclusion 
This paper explores the possible existence of Monday effects and contagion effects during 
different days of the week across 13 countries before and during the financial crisis, using time-
aligned data (i.e. 4 p.m. GMT). Following the fact that there were continuous changes in 
economic policies and conditions (e.g. ban on short selling activities, changes in institutional 
investors’ trading pattern, and changes in investors’ behaviour pertaining to uncertainty in the 
market) during the recent global financial crisis, this might have had an impact on Monday 
effect, and contagion effect.   
The results of this chapter support the literature on weakening Monday effect (for e.g. Kohers 
et al., 2004; Gu, 2004; Marquering et al., 2006). Before the outbreak of the crisis all countries 
in our sample are either experiencing a reversal or disappearing Monday effect. And during the 
crisis period, there are only two markets (i.e. Euro Stocks and Italy) that showed evidence of 
contagion effect. One reason attributed to the effect of this anomaly in the two above mentioned 
stocks might due to the growing uncertainty and more pronounced blue Monday hypothesis 
during the crisis period, leading to investors liquidating their positions on Monday or delay their 
trades. The findings pertaining to this chapter show very little evidence of Monday effects, but 
there is still significant general weekday effect, which provides evidence for market 
inefficiency. This “twist” in Monday effect is expected as the way business and investment 
strategies were conducted forty years ago is different from how it is done today, for instance 
settlement procedure and the days key economic indicators are publicly released has changed 
(Steeley, 2001). Moreover, the availability of electronic trading has the potential to alter the 
significance of each of the day of the week. Therefore, many forces may drive this wandering 
seasonality effect. Hence it can be said that the findings pertaining to this chapter is in line with 
the adaptive market hypothesis, a state whereby anomalies can still exist, but underlie cyclical 
variations which can be due to changes in investment styles, trends and investor behaviour (Lo, 
2004).  
Having looked at Monday effect across 13 equity markets, a novel contribution of this paper is 
that, spillover and contagion effect across the different days of the week is also examined from 
U.S. market to other economies during the pre-crisis and crisis period. Most contagion research 
studies look at the average spillover over a certain period of time, and this might not be an 
effective way of detecting contagion effect as it can be observed from the estimations that 
spillovers differ across the days of the week. From the preliminary model of contagion, it can 
be observed that there is contagion effects in four countries, namely, Austria, Denmark, 
Portugal and U.K. However, while using the robust model to test for spillover and contagion 
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across the different days of the week, it can be noticed that the countries mentioned above did 
not experience contagion consistently during every day of the week, but instead the excess co-
movement was happening only during certain days of the week.  
There are various reasons why exploring Monday effect is important, despite the fact that it is 
indeed a well-researched topic. First, model specifications may have been inadequate for the 
detection of Monday effect. For the purpose of this chapter, a robust model (more precisely, a 
GJR GARCH model) is used and non-normality of residuals, autocorrelation, ARCH effects 
and heteroscedasticity is accounted for. Moreover, this study covers many countries, and since 
the period of our study covers the recent financial crisis, I believe that it is important to see 
whether there has been any change about how markets are affected by such anomaly during 
such a turmoil period.  Furthermore, it is also interesting to examine whether spillovers differ 
across the days of the week, which is an important contribution towards the literature pertaining 
to contagion effect.  
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APPENDIX C 
C.1: Augmented Dicker Fuller test  
ADF Test  Stock Prices Stock Returns 
T Stats 1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% 
C.V 
 T Stats 1% 
C.V 
5% 
C.V 
10% 
C.V 
 
-3.430 -2.860 -2.570 -3.430 -2.860 -2.570 
Austria -0.487  -32.451  
Denmark -0.695  -32.649  
Euro Index -0.118  -36.725  
France -0.182  -36.801  
Germany -1.382  -36.656  
Ireland -0.179  -33.172  
Italy 0.819  -34.368  
Netherlands 0.387  -35.153  
Portugal -0.316  -32.989  
Spain -1.154  -35.679  
Switzerland -0.554  -35.283  
U.K. -1.273  -32.449  
U.S. -0.163  -37.487  
ADF test is conducted for the daily log and aggregate stock market returns for each of the 13 countries for the 
full sample (July 2004-March 2009). The lag length is selected using SIC, and the t-statistics and critical values 
are compared in order to test the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. 
C.2: Johansen Test using Schwaz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC)  
 SBIC HQIC AIC Number of lags 
Austria    2 
Max Rank:   0 -11.73233* -11.74802* -11.7575*  
                      1 -11.72341 -11.74695 -11.76116  
                      2   -11.71762 -11.74377   -11.75956  
Denmark    2 
Max Rank:   0 -12.29094* -12.30663 -12.3161*  
                      1 -12.28638 -12.30991* -12.32412  
                      2 -12.28109 -12.30724 -12.32303  
Eurostoxx    2 
Max Rank:   0 -12.86862* -12.88433* -12.89381*  
                      1 -12.8579 -12.88146 -12.89569  
                      2 -12.85207 -12.87826 -12.89407  
France    2 
Max Rank:   0 -12.81544* -12.83113* -12.84061*  
                      1 -12.80237 -12.82591 -12.84011  
                      2 -12.79657 -12.82272 -12.83851  
Germany    2 
Max Rank:   0 -12.54066* -12.55635* -12.56582*  
                      1 -12.52901 -12.55255   -12.56676  
                      2 -12.5236 -12.54976 -12.56554  
Ireland    1 
Max Rank:   0 -11.77849* -11.78372 -11.78687*  
                      1 -11.772 -11.78508* -11.79298  
                      2 -11.76641 -11.7821 -11.79157  
Italy    3 
Max Rank:   0 -12.75233* -12.77848* -12.79427*  
                      1 -12.73984 -12.77384 -12.79436  
                      2 -12.73447 -12.77108 -12.79318  
Netherlands    2 
Max Rank:   0 -12.64711* -12.6628 -12.67228*  
                      1 -12.64068 -12.66422* -12.67843  
                      2 -12.63493 -12.66108 -12.67687  
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Portugal    1 
Max Rank:   0   -12.61005* -12.61528* -12.61844*  
                      1 -12.59901 -12.61208 -12.61998  
                      2 -12.59319 -12.60888 -12.61835  
Spain    2 
Max Rank:   0 -12.56123* -12.57693* -12.5864*  
                      1 -12.55121 -12.57475 -12.58896  
                      2 -12.54568 -12.57184 -12.58762  
Switzerland    2 
Max Rank:   0 -12.74758* 12.76327* - 12.77274*  
                      1 -12.73315 -12.75669  -12.7709  
                      2 -12.72741 -12.75356 -12.76935  
U.K.    3 
Max Rank:   0 -12.47053* -12.49668* -12.51247*  
                      1 -12.45714 -12.49114 -12.51167  
                      2 -12.45131 -12.48792 -12.51003  
Johansen test is conducted for the for all pairs of each 12 countries’ weekly log indices with the World stock 
market portfolio log indices for the period from (July 2004-March 2009). The test uses SBIC to indicate whether 
the pairs are co-integrated or not. 
C.3 Heteroscedasticity from an OLS model (based on Eq. 5.6) 
 Chi(2) P Value 
Austria 352.13 0.0000 
Denmark 252.56 0.0000 
Euro Index 80.01 0.0000 
France 89.69 0.0000 
Germany 67.29 0.0000 
Ireland 49.29 0.0000 
Italy 161.98 0.0000 
Netherlands 148.79 0.0000 
Portugal 269.59 0.0000 
Spain 91.43 0.0000 
Switzerland 115.35 0.0000 
U.K. 252.53 0.0000 
The White’s (1980) test is used to test the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity against heteroscedasticity. The 
null hypothesis is rejected all countries at 1% level which means that there is a substantial amount of 
heteroscedasticity from an OLS model. 
 
C.4: Normality Test 
 W V Z Prob>z 
Austria 0.93496 123.576 12.478 0.000 
Denmark 0.96119 73.716 11.140 0.000 
Eurostoxx 0.95706 74.662 11.136 0.000 
France 0.96376 127.370 12.831 0.000 
Germany 0.95481 114.669 12.414 0.000 
Ireland 0.93504 168.670 13.435 0.000 
Italy 0.95079 93.679 11.762 0.000 
Netherlands 0.94989 95.385 11.808 0.000 
Portugal 0.94989 95.385 11.808 0.000 
Spain 0.02014 3153.494 21.264 0.000 
Switzerland 0.94479 194.059   13.946   0.000 
U.K. 0.95289 141.153 13.033 0.000 
Shapiro Wilk test is conducted after modelling equation (5.6) to test for the normality of the error terms. Given the 
p-values are compared to the 5% significance level in order to determine whether the hypothesis of normality 
should be rejected or not. 
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C.5: ARCH LM effects tests after GJR GARCH estimation 
 Lags Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Austria 1 0.097 1 0.7553 
Denmark 1   0.002    1 0.9675 
Eurostoxx 1   0.005   1 0.9459 
France 1   0.024   1 0.8773 
Germany 1 0.003   1 0.9556 
Ireland 1 0.001   1 0.9794 
Italy 1 0.032 1   0.8583 
Netherlands 1 0.151 1 0.6979 
Portugal 1 0.008 1 0.9269 
Spain 1   0.000 1 0.9897 
Switzerland 1 0.000 1 0.9951 
U.K. 1 0.034 1 0.8545 
Engle’s ARCH LM test is conducted after modelling equation (5.6) for ARCH effects. Given the p-values are 
compared to the alphas (5% significance level) in order to determine whether there are any remaining ARCH 
effects in the residuals after estimating Model 5.6 with a GJR GARCH framework.
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Chapter 6. Summary and Conclusions 
6.1. Conclusion 
This thesis explores financial contagion across developed and emerging equity markets, financial 
and non-financial sectors across the globe. Given the controversies on the different definitions and 
methods used to test for contagion, this thesis develops and employs a more robust method and 
realistic definition in order to detect financial contagion during the recent financial crisis. 
Moreover, since contagion is not a phenomenon that occurs consistently over a turmoil period, this 
thesis investigates the occurrence of contagion from U.S. to 12 European equity markets on a daily 
basis, in order to determine whether contagion manifests itself more on a particular day relative to 
others. 
Apart from the Introduction and Conclusion chapter, this thesis consists of four other chapters, with 
chapter 2 being a literature review on financial contagion whereas the other three chapters are based 
on the empirical analysis of contagion. Chapter 2 describes the literature of contagion in details. 
Firstly, the different definitions and disagreements upon how to detect contagion throughout. As 
established in chapter 2, the most commonly used meaning of contagion is the one proposed by 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) who describe it as a significant increase in cross-market linkages after 
a shock is transmitted from one country to another. Moreover, the different channels through which 
a crisis can be propagated is discussed in detail and can be categorised into fundamental and 
behavioural causes. The former consists of factors such as trade and financial linkages, global 
nature of businesses and common shocks (e.g. increase in world interest rates), whereas 
behavioural causes is made up of liquidity problem, investors behaviour, information asymmetries 
and wake-up calls. Further, the factors that contribute towards an intensification of a crisis, such as 
financial innovations and liberalization of financial services are also discussed. In the last part of 
this chapter the empirical methods used in previous literature to investigate financial contagion, 
together with their advantages and limitations are discussed. The methods include probability 
models, correlation analysis, VAR models and ARCH/GARCH frameworks. 
The third chapter is based on developing a new model to distinguish between genuine 
contagion and growing interdependence between both developed and developing equity markets 
with the world stock market portfolio. This method accounts the pre-existing time-varying 
integration process between markets, which consequently leads to a novel definition of contagion, 
whereby it refers to an increase in co-movement in asset prices following the outbreak of a crisis 
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relative to what the co-movement would have been if the crisis did not occur and the same 
integration process as the pre-crisis period was being followed. This model also enables us to 
identify how the recent financial crisis has unfolded in 25 equities market, i.e. whether the crisis 
has hit a particular country at the first stage of the crisis period (a situation which I describe as 
‘shock’ contagion) or at a later phase (whereby the term ‘recoupling’ or ‘kink’ contagion can be 
used to describe such instances). The findings of contagion being confined into specific phases of 
the crisis period correspond well with, for example, Dungey and Gajurel (2014), Kenourgios and 
Dimitriou (2015) and Dungey et al. (2015), but in our approach these phases emerge endogenously 
from model estimation. The most common contagion type identified here is shock contagion. This 
type of market reaction at crisis’ onset corresponds to the “wake up call” hypothesis of contagion 
by Goldstein (1998) but could also be generated by irrational changes in investors’ sentiment, 
especially when combined with their herding behaviour. A GJR GARCH model is used and the 
empirical findings show the 18 instances of contagion from the world stock market portfolio, with 
some market showing contagion effects temporarily or across the whole crisis period. In addition 
to this, the results also show that during a crisis, economies tend of dis-integrate but, once 
economies around the world show signs of recovery, the integration process goes back to what is 
was before the outbreak of the crisis period.   
 
The fourth chapter focuses on contagion across the financial sector and real economies across 25 
countries. The literature on financial contagion has been mostly focused on equity markets and 
little attention has been paid to contagion at a sectoral level. The fact that the return dynamics of 
sectors are not identical and some real economy sectors (e.g. those that involve tradable goods) are 
more susceptible to shocks, it is interesting to test for genuine contagion. The same definition and 
empirical method as the last chapter is employed to examine financial contagion across different 
sectors. This chapter also sheds light on the potential causes that lead to contagion at a sectoral 
level and it includes dependency on external financing, industries’ valuation and investment, trade 
channel, information asymmetry and risk aversion amongst others. The results show that the real 
economy was mostly affected by the global financial sector relative to domestic financial sectors. 
This demonstrate that the recent financial crisis had a direct impact on the real economies, 
especially if the later were borrowing and lending globally, or the sectors involve tradable products. 
Moreover, sectors across developed countries were more vulnerable towards the crisis as compared 
to emerging markets. In addition to this, similar to Baur (2012), Kenourgios and Dimitriou, (2015) 
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and Bekaert et al., (2014), it is observed from our findings that basic materials and the financial 
sector are the one depicting highest occurrences of contagion across the 25 countries, and 
technology and healthcare showing less vulnerability towards the recent crisis. This chapter 
contributes to the literature of real economy contagion in terms of way it is modelled, i.e. using a 
time-varying method hence allowing one to know at what point during the crisis were the sectors 
affected. For instance, the basic material sector was affected at the beginning of the crisis period 
and experienced contagion throughout the whole crisis period for almost all countries examined, 
whereas the utilities sector in Germany experienced contagion at a much later stage of the crisis. 
Overall, this study shows that sectors were affected mostly at the start of the financial crisis. This 
sectoral level analysis is important for investors and portfolio managers as it suggests that 
diversification benefits may exist in certain markets even in periods of severe global turmoil.  
Chapter 5 combines calendar anomalies together with the examination of financial contagion. More 
specifically, this chapter looks at the Monday effect puzzle for a period of approximately 5 years 
(July 2004 until March 2009) and investigates whether there is indeed a lower return on Mondays 
relative to other days of the week in 13 developed equity markets or whether there has been a 
disappearance or reversal of this effect. In addition to this, the impact of the recent financial crisis 
on this puzzle is also explored. By employing a GJR GARCH model, it is shown that most markets 
in this sample show a reversal or a wandering Monday effect. And, the most important and novel 
part of this chapter is the examination of contagion effects across the different days of the week. 
The main motivation of this chapter is in conjuncture with the previous two chapters, i.e. contagion 
does not occur consistently. Some markets are affected immediately after the outbreak of a crisis, 
given the vulnerability of the economy (in terms of trade and financial linkages or current account 
deficit amongst others), investors’ risk perception, and the actions taken by the country in order to 
deal or lessen the effect of the crisis. However, there are some equity markets or sectors experiences 
a shock at much later phase of the crisis. Hence, it can be postulated that contagion (i.e. a significant 
increase in co-movement during the crisis period, relative to the pre-crisis period) might been 
different across the days of the week due to short selling activities, investors’ risk perception, or 
major macro-economic news announcement on a particular day of the week. The empirical findings 
show that contagion from U.S. to 12 European equity markets might occur only during certain days 
of the week, and not necessarily across all days of the week. More specifically, the results show 
that during the pre-crisis period, the majority of economies experience a positive spillover from the 
U.S. on Mondays relative to other days of the week. However, as the crisis struck, most of the 
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countries examined were not showing any signs of contagion, except for four of them. U.K. and 
Austria were experiencing contagion effects only on Mondays whereas other two economies were 
showing evidence of contagion effects only during a few days of the week. The findings contribute 
to the literature in the sense that it provides a more detailed picture of financial contagion as 
compared to a more traditional approach. It reveals that in countries for which contagion was found, 
it was not a persistent phenomenon but rather concentrated on specific days of the week and show 
how the weekly pattern differ and are universal across countries. 
A deepening international integration around the world has led to greater risk sharing, which as a 
result promoted economic development. However, growing interdependence has also led to 
heightening risk of contagion. The findings of the Chapter 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis contribute to 
academic literature and suggest implication for both investors and financial regulators, especially 
during times of uncertainties and while restructuring their portfolio. Chapter 3 and 4 show the time-
varying integration process and it is essential for portfolio investors to have information about time-
varying linkages between asset markets and how the impact of these unpredictable and fast 
changing linkages can be minimized, in order to devise safer investment strategies for their client. 
For example, in presence of kink contagion the change in comovements between markets is 
minimal initially and gives investors the time to rebalance their portfolios, whereas shock contagion 
changes these comovements abruptly and investors should rather try to predict/hedge against it ex 
ante. Chapter 5 is also of crucial importance for investors as it shows whether there is any pattern 
in contagion, i.e. whether day-of-the-week effect has an impact on contagion results. For instance, 
the release of macro-economic data (e.g. Non-Farm payroll) on a specific date of the week may 
have an impact on U.S equity markets, and spillover to the other equity markets.  
Moreover, the results of thesis can have a significant impact on international portfolio 
diversification, as it is shown in the thesis which country or sector has been least affected 
by the crisis and the time-varying co-movements depicts at which stage of the crisis was 
the country or sector was affected. For instance, in the presence of recoupling contagion, a 
country or sector does not show signs of contagion only at the beginning of the crisis but 
instead shows a disintegration with the world economy followed by showing evidence of 
contagion at a later stage of the crisis. . This information might also help regulators in the 
sense that they might not implement measures such as capital controls if contagion is only 
temporary in certain sectors. 
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6.2. Limitations 
Like any other research studies, this thesis has some limitations, which are as follows: 
 In chapter 3 and 4, prices for the equity markets, financial and non-financial sectors are 
collected from DataStream from 27th October 1979 until 27th March 2012, resulting in 1693 
weeks of observation. However, due to data unavailability for certain equity markets or 
sectors, there are less weeks being observed, which makes the pre-crisis period shorter, but 
the crisis and post crisis period is consistent across the whole sample.  
 Moreover, Chapter 3 and 4 assumes that there is a linear time-varying integration process 
amongst markets. However, despite the fact that, in reality the linkages are non-linear, the 
model still captures positive and negative interdependence trends, enabling us to identify 
genuine contagion. 
 While using GARCH framework to examine contagion at a sector level, there were some 
issues encountered in terms of non-convergence for a few sectors, as the prices available 
from DataStream were not available across the complete pre-crisis and crisis period. 
Moreover, there are some sectors which are non-existent in certain countries.  
 In chapter 3 and 4, a novel approach was used to contagion in terms of definition and 
method to detect this phenomenon. However, in chapter 5, the definition proposed by 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) is used as the aim of this chapter is only to show that contagion 
does not occur consistently across all days of the week, and not to detect genuine contagion 
as the previous empirical chapters of this thesis. 
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